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ADVANCEDRISKASSESSMENTOF THE EFFECTSOF GRAPHITE
FIBERSON ELECTRONICAND ELECTRICALEQUIPMENT
EXECUTIVESUMMARY
ORI, Inc.,in PhaseI of its NASAContractNo.NAS1-15379,developed
a modelto generatequantitativestimatesof the riskassociatedwith the
releaseof graphitefibersduringfiresinvolvingcommercialaircraftcon-
structedwithgraphitefibercompositematerials.The modelwas usedto
estimatethe riskassociatedwith accidentsat severalU.S.airports.These
•resultswere thencombinedto providean estimateof the totalriskto the
nation.
Compositematerialformedof graphitefibersencasedin epoxyresin
providesa materialstrongand lightenoughto replacealuminum,steel,or
titaniumin many applications.Evidenceexiststhatthesefiberscan cause
failuresof exposedelectrical,electronic,and powerequipment.Further,
burningof the compositematerialcan resultin the releaseof fibersinto
the environment.Thus,firesinvolvingthe compositematerialcan resultin
accidentalreleaseof graphite(carbon)fibersin amountssufficient o
damageelectricalor electronicequipment,and posea hazardto the popula-
" tion nearthe accidentsite. The probabilityof suchaccidentalreleaseand
subsequentdisseminationof criticalamountsof carbonfiberis not known,
" and thereforethe associatedrisk cannotbe accuratelyquantified.However,
the useof graphitefibercompositematerialis expectedtoincreaserapidly,
andthe riskwill.undergoa correspondingincrease.,
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The FederalGovernmenthas implementeda planassigningspecific
aspectsof thisproblemto particularagencies,in orderto dealwith the
potentialproblemassociatedwithuse of the graphitefibermaterial. One
of the responsibilitiesa signedto NASA is the investigationof the vulner-
abilityof commercialaircraftequipment.The NASA LangleyResearchCenter
is undertakingthis investigationas partof a majorprogramthatexamines
accidentalcarbonfiberrelease,disseminationand redisseminationf the
fibers,transferof the fibersintobuildingsand otherenclosures,and
vulnerabilityof household,industrial,and aircraftequipment.The ultimate
goalof the NASALangleyResearchCenterprogramis an assessmentof the
magnitudeof the risk.
AIRPORT- URBANAREARISKASSESSMENT
In orderto estimatethe riskassociatedwithaccidentalreleaseof
carbonfibersfollowinga commercialaircraftaccidentwith fire,ORI devel-
opeda MonteCarlosimulationmodelthatreplicatesmanypossibleaircraft
accidentswith firesand estimatesthe costsassociatedwith the subsequent
releaseof the fibers,theirdownwindtransportunderdifferentmeteorological
conditions,theirtransferintooffices,factories,and homes,and subsequent
failuresof vulnerablequipment.
The Method
Themethodemployedby ORI involvesthe repeatedcalculationof
possibleaccidenteffects,usinga modelto representtheprincipalevents
associatedwitheachaccident,and calculatingstatisticsafterthereplica-
tionof many accidents.Thesimulationmodelelementsand theirinterrelation-
shipsare illustratedin Figure1. The eventsbeingsimulatedare identified
by the shadedboxes. Randomaccidentsare generatedfor eachsimulatedsample
year,with repeatedsamplingto obtainthe finalstatisticaldistributions.
The principalstepsfollowedforone sampleyear'seventsat one airportare;
• GenerateAccident_We firstcomputethenumberof accidents
thatwill be simulated uringthesample'yearat theairport
foreach aircraftcategory.Thisnumberis obtainedby making
a randomdrawfroma Poissondistribution.The meanof the
distributionis estimatedby calculatingthe ratioof the number
ii
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Shadedblocksrepresenteventsbeingsimulated.
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of operationsin the particularaircraftcategoryto the projec_
ted totalnumberof air carrieroperationsin the UnitedStates,
and thenmultiplyingby the projectednationalannualrateof
aircraftaccidentswith fires. The mean is furtheradjustedto
accountfor the expectedfractionof aircraftin each category
thatwill.containgraphitefibercompositematerial. Eachof
the accidentswill be simulatedfor eachaircraftcategorypro-
cessedin sequence.The modelrandomlyassignsthe operational
phaseand locationof the accident,usingprobabilitydistribu-
tionsbasedon statisticalanalysisof accidentdatain the
NationalTransportationSafetyBoardfiles. At the end of the
generate-accidentphaseof the calculation,we havethe aircraft
category,operationalphase,and locationof the accident.
The techniquesappliedhereare consideredentirelyappro-
priate. The extrapolationof accidentratesintothe future
introducesome uncertainty,however,as doesthe assumption
thatthe locationand operationalphasestatisticsgenerated
frommany accidentsat differentairportscan be appliedto one
airport. Thereis essentiallyno alternativeavailable.
• ComputeWeatherDetails. Theweatherconditionswhichare re-
quiredforsubsequentcalculationsare the surfacewind speed
and direction,and the associatedatmosphericstabilitycon-
_ dition. The jointdistributionof thesevariablesis available
"forall airportsconsideredin a databasemaintainedat ORI
undera jointEPA-FAAcontract,One combinationof windspeed
anddirection,and stabilitycategoryis randomlyselectedfrom
thishistoricalfrequencydistribution.The methodused here,
with themeteorologicaldatabaseavailable,introducesno
approximation At thisstagein the computationwe are ready
to do the two calculationsdescribednext.
I ComputePlumeHeight. In thisstepthe modelcomputesthe height
to whichthe plumewillgrowwhenit is stabilized.Thisheight
is basedon the aircraftclass,the operationalphaseduring
iv
which the accidenttookplace, and theweather conditions. The
aircraft size determinesthe size of the fire, or rate of energy
release, which,with the meteorologicalstabilityconditions,
determinesthe behaviorof the fire plume. Classicalmethods
• are used to computethe plume height,but the behavior of the
fire plume at the inversionlevel is subjectto some uncertainty.
" One inversionheight is assignedto each stabilitycategory for
each airport, and it isassumed that the plume never penetrates
the inversion. This assumptionis consideredconservative,i.e.,
it overstatesthe risk.
• ComputeDownwindExposure. The weather detailsand the fire
plume height are used in the downwindexposure calculation,
based on a standardGaussianplume model, modifiedto include
falloutof the graphitefibersand partial reflectionat the
earth'ssurface. The use of a more sophisticateddiffusion
model did not appearwarrantedbecauseof uncertaintiesin other
phases of the computation. The amount of graphite fiber involved
in the fire is also determined. The fractionof composite
material in the aircraft structurethat is involvedin the fire
is assumed to be equal to the fraction•of the aircraftthat is
involvedin the fire, which is fixed for each operationalphase-
aircraft type combination. This assumptionwas introduced
becauseof the unavailabilityof detailedaccidentanalyses,and
tends to reduce the likelihoodof extremevalues occurringin
the results.
Exteriorexposurevalues are computedat pointswithin a set
of representativecirclescoveringthe region around the airportQ
out to a range of at least fifty miles. The impact calculations
describedbelow are also done for each of thesepoints. The
use of the representativecirclesconstitutesa satisfactory
approximation,since the simulationis repeatedfor many
accidentlocationsand wind directions,and the resultsare
• expressedprobabilistically.
• ComputeInteriorExposure.It was assumedthateachtypeof
residentialunit,business,or industryat eachof the key points
forwhichthe exposureis computedcan be characterizedby a
typicalbuildingor typeof enclosure.Thesecharacteristics
determinehow the exposureinsidethe buildingis relatedto
the exposureoutside;the exposureinsideis calculatedfor each
classof businessand industrypresent. The definitionof typi-
cal buildingtypesleadsto resultsthat are satisfactoryin the
expected-values nse,but limitsthe spreadof the results.
Increasedvariancein the inputcharacteristicswould,however,
requireadditionalsimulationrunsin orderto yieldstableresults.
• ComputeFailures.Eachindividualvulnerablepieceof equipment
obeysan exponentialfailurelaw,whichis in reasonableagreement
withavailableexperimentalresults. Foreachbusiness-industry
category,as definedby the StandardIndustrialClassification
(SIC)two-digitcode,a standardequipmentconfigurationis defined.
The modelcomputesthe overallprobabilityof failureforeach
typicalplantor facilityfrom the interiorexposurevaluesand
the equipmentfailureparameters.Similarly,householdequipment
failuresare computedforeachhouseholdclassat eachof the
characteristicpointsin the geographicalarea. Thisis essentially
an expectedvaluecalculation.
• ComputeCosts. Foreach residentialunitthe impactis estimated
on thebasisof the fractionof the equipmentsexpectedto be
damaged,and a standardrepaircost. The business-industryimpact
is estimatedby allocatingto eachlocalbusinesscategoryitsshare
of the GrossDomesticProduct,basedon the ratioof its localpay-
rollto thenational_payrollfor the sameSIC two-digitcode. The
impactis thenobtainedby multiplyingeachbusinesscategory's
overallfailureprobabilityby itsallocatedlocaldailyshareof
the GrossDomesticProduct. The calculationthusassumesthata
completeclosingof a businesswill resultin a financialimpact
equalto the business'shareof the GrossDomesticProduct;this
neglectsthe costsof effectsotherthana completeshutdown,but
vi
doesincludesomesecondaryeffectsassociatedwith one indus-
trialsector'seffecton others.
e ComputeStatistics.The computationof the interiorexposure,
resultingfailures,and theirimpactis doneforall industries
" and residentialunitsat all of the pointsrepresentinga county
or a portionof a county. Afterthe computationis donefor one
Q
county,themodelmoveson to the nextone; all industriesand
residentialunitsthereare processed.Damagecostsfor all
•affectedgeographicareasare thentotalledtoyieldthe estimate
of the totalimpactof one accident.Any additionalaccidents
for thesame aircraftcategoryare thentreatedin the sameway,
afterwhichaccidentsin the nextaircraftcategoryare simulated.
Thisprocessis repeatedfor all aircraftcategories--all acci-
dents--forthe sampleyear to obtainthe totalimpactof graphite
fiberaccidentsduringthatyear. Anothersampleis then drawn
generatingthe accidentsto be simulatedduringthe nextrepli-
cation.
The sequenceof stepsdescribedaboveis repeatedformany sampleyearspro-
vidingthe annualdollarvalueof the impactforeach sample,afterwhichthe
frequencydistributionof annualcostsis generated.In addition,themodel
preparesa riskprofile,showingthe probabilitythata givenannualcostis
exceeded,and detailsdescribingtheten mostcostlyaccidents.
Results
Resultswere obtainedusinginputvaluesthatwere thebestestimates
availableto the NASA-ORIteamfor the 1985and 1993timeperiodsof interest.
The modelcomputes,aftermany replications,a riskprofilewhichgivesthe
. probabilitythat theannualcostassociatedwithequipmentfailuresfollowing
an accidentexceedsa statedamount.
• The 1985and 1993riskprofilesforWashingtonNationalAirportare
• shownin Figure2. Resultsindicatean expected(average)annualimpactof
$110for 1985and $1,200for 1993. For 1993,theprobabilitythatthe damage
in any one yearwouldexceed$I00,000is .0025_(25in ten thousand),whilefor
$I,000,000it is .O001(l inten thousand).
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FIGURE2. WASHINGTONNATIONALAIRPORT RISK PROFILESfor 1985 AND 1993
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Thereis some uncertaintywith regardto many of the requiredinput
parameters.If it is assumedthattheseuncertaintiescorrespondto a factor :
of ten in the productof the amountof fiberreleasedin the aircraftfire,
theeffectof downwindtransportand diffusion,and_thetransferintobuild-
. ings,we can estimatethatthe riskcouldbe as highas .Of (l in a hundred)
thatthe annualimpactwouldexceed$I00,000,and .002(2 in a thousand)that
it wouldexceed$I,000,000.
The examinationof individualaccidents howsthatthe effectsof the
accidentalreleaseof graphitefiberscan be feltat considerabledistances
downwind. Forexample,more thanhalfof the greater-than-$4,000,O00impact
of one simulated1993accidentat WashingtonNationalAirportwas due to the
calculatedeffecton businessand industryin downtownBaltimore.
The individualairportriskis in parta functionof thenumberof
aircraftoperationsat an airportand the amountof businessand industryat
risk in the areasurroundingthe airport. ForO'HareAirportat Chicago,the
nation'sbusiest,forexample,the expected(average)annualriskis $300for
1985and $2,700for 1993. For1993,theprobabilityis estimatedto be .0004
(4 in ten thousand)thatthe annualimpactwill exceed$I,000,000and .O0001
(l in a hundredthousand)thatit will exceed$I0,000,000.Several1993air-
portriskprofilesare comparedin Figure3.
NATIONALRISKPROFILE
The totalnationalriskcan be estimatedin severalways. A national
modelcan be exercisedin the samewayas the singleairportmodel. The num-
ber of accidentsin the countrywouldbe generatedand accidentsassignedto
individualairports.Anothermethodis to developthe riskprofilesfor a
numberof airportsand thencombinethemtoyielda nationalriskprofile.
In orderto developindividualairportresultswhichare of considerable
interestin theirown right,as well as the nationalriskestimate,the latter
methodwas used.
The nationalresults,illustratedby the 1985and 1993riskprofiles
in Figure4, indicatethattheexpectedannualnationalimpactis approximately
$3,000for 1985and $35,000for 1993. For 1993,it is estimated.thatthe
probabilityof exceedingan annualnationalimpactof $I,000,000{in 1976dollars)
is approximately.005(5 in one thousand)and decreasesto .O001(l in ten
thousand)for $I0,000,000.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This is the finalreportof theworkperformedby ORI, Inc.,in
PhaseI of the GraphiteFiberRiskAssessmentProgramsponsoredby NASA,
underContractNumberNASI-15379.The ORIeffortswere concentratedon the
developmentof a computerizedmodelto be usedin preparingquantitativesti-
matesof the riskassociatedwith the releaseof graphitefibersduringfires
involvingportionsof commercialaircraftconstructedof graphitefiber
composite materials.
Compositematerialformedof a graphitefibermesh encasedin epoxy
resinprovidesa materialstrongand lightenoughto replacealuminum,steel,
or titaniumin manyapplications.Graphitecompositestructuresare under
developmentfor use in commercialtransportaircraft.Thesedevelopments
include:
• Ruddercontroltab for the McDonnellDouglasDC-9Super80
configuration.
• • Inboardaileronsforpossibleapplicationon the Lockheed
L-lOll.
•e Secondarystructureson the Boeing767.
NASA'saircraftenergyefficiency(ACEE)programis supportingadvancedcom-
mercialtransportcompositestructuresdevelopment.Union:Carbidehas
announcedplansto builda carbonfiberplantto beginoperatingin 1981
I-I
with an initialproductioncapacityof 800,000poundsof carbonfibera
year. Theyestimatethe totalmarketin 1979to be one millionpoundsof
carbonfiber.
In viewof evidencefroma varietyof sourcesthatthe fibercan
damageelectricalequipment,and thatpiecesin the criticalsize rangecan
be releasedby firesinvolvingthe compositematerial,NASA, as partof
a nationalprogram,is investigatingthe potentialriskthatthesecontem-
platedusesof graphite/epoxymaterialconstitute.The probabilityof
accidentalreleaseand the disseminationof carbonfibersat criticaldamage
levelsis not knownand the riskcannotbe accuratelyquantified.However,
the useof compositematerialis expectedto increaseat a rapidrate,and
the riskwhichis relatedto the amountof CF in usewill increaseaccord-
ingly.
The FederalGovernmenthasproduceda plan involvingmany agencies
to dealwithall aspectsof thepotentialproblemassociatedwith CF. One
of the responsibilitiesa signedto NASA is the investigationof the vulner-
abilityof commercialaircraftequipment.NASALangleyis undertakingthis
investigationas partof a largerprogramthatinvolvesaccidentalfiber
release,fiberdisseminationand redissemination,transferof fibersto
enclosures,and equipment(household,industrial,aircraft,etc.)vulner-
ability. The ultimategoalof the NASALangleyprogramis an assessmentof
the magnitudeof the risk.
In orderto estimatethe risk,ORI has developeda stochasticmodel
thatreplicatesmanypossibleaircraftaccidentswith fire,and estimates
the dollarcostsassociatedwith the subsequentreleaseof the fibers,their
downwindtransportunderdifferentmeterologicalconditions,theirtransfer
intooffices,factories,and homes,and subsequentfailuresof vulnerable
equipment.The modelwas usedto estimatethe riskassociatedwith acci-
dentsat severalmajorU.S.airports.Theseresultswere latercombinedto
providean initialestimateof the totalriskto thenation.
I-2
The resultswere obtained using a varietyof input parametersthat
were, in all cases,•the best estimatesavailabletothe NASA-ORIteam for
the time periodsof most interestto NASA:1985 and 1993. The results
indicatethat the risk, expressedas the probabilitythat the annual cost
. associatedwith equipmentfailuresfollowingan accidentexceedssome stated
amount,appears relativelysmall. However, the results indicatethat, in
view of the uncertaintywith regard to many of the input parameters,further
investigationappearswarranted. In additionwe have shown that the model
resultsstill exhibitsome uncertaintyin the high cost-lowprobabilityrange
where there is, of course•, considerableinterest.
The model developedand reportedon in this documentprovides an
economicalmeans of developingthese additionalrequiredestimatesfor a
varietyof differentsets of input specifications.
Detailedanalysisof the possibleimpactof accidentsat Washington
NationalAirportindicatesan expected(average)annual impact of $110 for
1985 and $1,200 for 1993. The i993 results indicatethe probability
that the damage in any one year will exceed $I00,000is .0024,while for
$I,000,000it is .O001. There is some uncertaintywith regard to many of
the inputs that are necessaryin treatingthis problem. If we assumethat
these uncertaintiescorrespondto a factorof ten in the productof the amount
of fiber releasedin the aircraftfire, the effectof downwinddiffusion,
and the intake into buildings,we estimatethat the risk would then be
approximately.Ol,that the annual impactwould exceed $I00,000and .002for
exceeding$I,000,000. This amount of uncertaintyin the factorsassociated
with the problem is by no means unreasonable.
The examinationof worst-caseaccidentsgeneratedby the random
selectionof specificparametersclearlyshows that effects of the accident
leading to releaseof graphitefibers can be feltat considerabledistances
downwindfrom the accident•site. For example,a simulated1993 accidentat
WashingtonNationalAirport resultedin an impactgreaterthan $4,000,000;
more tha_ half of this was due to the•calculatedeffect on businessand in-
dustry in Baltimore. _ - .
The individualairportrisk is a functionof the levelof aircraft
operationsat the airportand the amountof businessand industryat risk,
that is, in the geographicalareasurroundingthe airport. ForO'HareAir-
portat Chicago,the nation'sbusiest,forexample,the expected(average)
annualriskis $300for the 1985scenarioand $2,700for the 1993scenario.
The probabilitythatthe totalimpactwillexceed$500,000is .0002for1985
and .0015for1993. Forthe 1993case the probabilityis .0004thatthe an-
nual impactwillexceed$I,000,000and estimatedas .O0001thatis will
exceed$I0,000,000.
Theseresultsmay alsobe presentedin termsof individualacci-
dents;the averageimpactassociatedwith aircraftaccidentsat O'HareAir-
port is estimatedto be $18,200for 1993,while0.2 percentof the accidents
had an estimatedimpactgreaterthan$I,000,000.
The resultsfor the nationalriskprofileindicatethattheex-
pectedannualnationalimpactis approximately$2,800for 1985and $29,000
for 1993. Forthe 1993scenariowe estimatethatthe probabilityof exceed-
ingan annualnationalimpactof $I,000,000(in1976 dollars)is approxi-
mately.005and decreasesto .O001for $I0,000,000.
This reportdescribesthe ORI work in somedetail. The following
chapterdescribesthemodelin broadoutlineform. ChapterIlldescribesthe
resultsobtainedfromthe analysisof historicalaccidentdata,used to de-
velopseveralof themodelinputs. ChapterIV describesthe sub-modelde-
velopedto predictthe behaviorof the plumeresultingfroma fireassociated
withan aircraftaccident. Followingthis,we describethe methodsused to
modelthe downwindtransportanddiffusionof the fibersreleasedat the
" accidentscene,(ChapterV). ChapterVI discussesthe transferof fibers
fromthe exteriorto the interiorof structures.In ChapterVIIwe present
equipmentfailuremodelsto treatparticularsegmentsof businessand in-
dustry. Next,in ChapterVIII,themethodsfor costingout the equipment
failuresare derived.
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Resultsof the studyare presentedin some detailin the remaining
sectionsof the report. ChapterIX describesthe resultsfor theWashington
NationalAirport- WashingtonDC metropolitanarea at severallevelsof
detail,froman individualsimulatedaccidentto thestatisticsdeveloped
over manyreplications,includinga descriptionof the tenmost costly
accidents.Sensitivityof the resultsto majorchangesin the amountof
compositematerialon boardthe aircraftis investigated.ChapterX presents
additionalresultsfor the individualairportinvestigations;theseinclude
the comparisonof severalairports,and the discussionof statisticalerror
boundsfor the simulationresults. ChapterXl describesthemethodsused
togeneratethe nationalriskprofile,presentsthe resultsand developsthe
associatedstatisticalconfidencelimits.
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II. OVERVIEWOFTECHNICALAPPROACH
BASIC APPROACH
Method
The basic approach embodied in the ORI risk assessment technique
is that of the Monte Carlo simulation. This method was essentially dic-
tated by the following factors:
• The problem is affected by many variables
• It was difficult to identify in advance the values of these
variables associated with the "worst cases."
e It was important to obtain information about the statistical
distribution of the results, and this is difficult to do
analytically.
The complete model, which is exercised in each simulation, comprises several
individual modules. These form the backbone of the complete model as well
as the structure for this report.
The major problem elements are illustrated in Figure 2.1. Each is
" discussed briefly in this section of the report and then described in more
detail in subsequent sections. Overlaying each accident-outcome calculation
are several operations required to establish the conditions associated with
the accident and to compute the desired statistics. These are illustrated
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in theaggregatein Figure2.2. For eachsample,or replicatedyear,any
fireaccidentsthatoccurwithattendantreleaseof graphitefibersare,
simulatedand theirimpactassessed.Theyear is replicatedmanytimesin
orderto developprobablisticestimatesof the annualimpact.
UnderlyingAssumptions
The ORI strategydescribedin thissectionmakesuse of several
assumptionsthatare requiredfor the implementationof themodel. All
aircraftin the timeperiodscoveredby the analysisare consideredto be
membersof a limitednumberof categories,definedprimarilyby aircraft
size. Nationalhistoricalaccidentdatadescribingthe relativefrequency
of an accidentduringparticularoperationalphasesare assumedto be appli-
cableto all airportsbeinganalyzedin the future;the expectednumberof
accidentsat an airportis proportionalto thenumberof operations.The
geographicalareasurroundingthe airportis definedin termsof a data
base,primarilythe CountyBusinessPatterns,whichpresentseconomicin-
formationon a county-by-countybasis. Eachcountyis describedfor the
modelas a set of points,eachof whichis surroundedby a circle,suchthat
the circlescoverthecounty. The industryand householdswithinthe circle
are assumedto be uniformlydistributedoverthe areaenclosedby the circle.
Eachtypeof businessis defined,for purposesof calculatingdamageand its
costimpact,by itstwo-digitStandardIndustrialClassificationcodenumber,
by whichinformationis categorizedin the CountyBusinessPatterns.
AIRPORT-URBANAREA RISKASSESSMENTMODEL
In thissectioneach of the majormodelelementsis described.
Thesemodelelementsand theirinterrelationshipsare illustratedin
Figure2.3. Eachmodelelementis describedin order. The modelcan treat
. severalairportsin sequence,butthe descriptionhereis limitedto the
processingof one airport. At the startof the calculation,themodelis
set up to run a givennumberof replications(samples);it takesthe neces-
saryactionsto initializefor the firstreplication.Afterthat,random
samplesare drawnand accidentsoccur,_as describedbelow.
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GenerateAccident
The computermodelcomputesthe numberof accidentsthatwill take
placeduringthe simulatedyear at thisairportfor eachaircraftcategory.
Thiscalculationis a randomprocessbasedon the assumptionthatthe actual
numberof accidentsis describedby a Poissondistribution.The mean is
estimatedby takingthe ratioof the numberof operationsof one typeof air-
craftat this airportto the totalnumberof operationsin the United
States,andmultiplyingthisratioby the expectednationalannualaccident
rate. For generality,however,the completemodelcan considerall acci-
.dents,laterdecidingon the basisof referenceto inputdatawhetherthe
accidentled to a fireand possiblereleaseof graphitefibers. In the
calculationsreportedhere,we restrictedour attentionto accidentswith
fire. Further,we dealonlywith aircraftthathavegraphitecomposite
materialin theirstructures;therefore,the nationalaccidentrateused in.
calculatingthe expectednumberof accidentsis the ratefor graphite-fiber
aircraftaccidentswith fires. Samplecalculationsof this rate,and com-
parisonsof randomdrawsfromthe Poissondistributionwithexpectations,
are presentedlaterin the report.
Once themodelcomputesthe numberof accidentsfor the aircraft
typebeingconsidered,we determinethe operationalphaseduringwhichthe
accidenttookplace;thisis a randomassignmentbasedon experientialdata
drawnfromaccidentfilesat the NationalTransportationSafety Board. For
eachoperationalphaseand aircrafttypethe modelassignsan accidentloca-
tion,whichis alsoa randomdrawfromaccidentlocationdistributions
developedby analysisof the NTSBdata. At theend of the accidentgenera-
tion routinewe thenhavethe aircrafttype,theoperationalphaseduring
whichtheaccidenttook place,and the associatedaccidentlocation.The
modelis now readyto computethe subsequentmovementof graphitefibers
releasedin the firethatfollowedthe accident,but firstmustdetermine
certainassociatedvariables,as describedbelow.
ComputeWeatherDetails
The actualweatherconditionswhichare requiredas inputto the
modelare the surfacewind speedanddirection,and the associated
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atmosphericstabilityconditions. Fortunately,the joint distributionof
these variablesis availablein a data base maintainedat ORI under a joint
EPA-FAAcontract. This distributionis read into the computerfor each
airportbeing investigated. The probabilitydistributiongives the frequency
with which each combinationof wind direction,wind speed range, and
stabilityclass occurred in the past. Some considerationwas given to bias-
ing this distributiontowardspoor weather conditions,since accidentsare
more likelyto occur in bad weather than in good. After some discussion,
the decisionmade was to considerall weather conditions,without bias in
favor of poor weather conditions;it was estimatedthat the differencein
final resultswould be less than a factorof two. With theseweather data
at hand, the model is ready to do the two calculationsdescribednext.
ComputePlume Heiqht
At this step in the program, the model computes the height to which
the fire plume will grow before stabilizing. This height is based on the
aircraftclass, the operationalphase duringwhich the accident took place,
and the weather conditionsselectedearlier. It was recognizedthat many
differentrandom elementsare present in this stage of the process,but,
becauseof the uncertaintyregardingthem, we limitedourselvesto using one
set of stabilizedplume heights for each combinationof aircraftclass and
weather stabilityconditionat the time of the accident. This methodwill
tend to reduce the final variance,when comparedto a wider range of plume
height values. The aircraftsize determinesthe size of the subsequentpool
fire, or rate of energy release,which, with the meteorologicalstability
condition,determinesthe behaviorof the fire plume.
Compute DownwindExposure
The model uses the weather detailsobtainedearlierand the fire
plume height generatedin the last routineas inputs to the downwindex-
posure calculation. The other major input,which is the amount of graphite
fiber releaseddue to the fire is also determinedhere. Although the actual
value is a random variablewe have assumed thatthe fractionof the air-
craft actuallyinvolvedin the fire is fixed for_eachoperationalphase; the
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fractionof fiberin the aircraftstructurethatis involvedin the fireis
assumedto be equalto the fractionof the aircraftthatis involvedin the
fire. Further,we usedthe generally-acceptedvalueof 20 percentof this
fiberas theamountsubsequentlyreleasedas singlefibers. Thesemethods
wereadopteddue to the unavailabilityof morepreciseaircraft-firedata;
the useof probabilitydistributionswhileintroducingmorevariancewould
alsohaveintroducedmoreuncertaintyand requiredmore replications.The
actualexteriorexposurevaluesare computedat pointswithina setof
representativecirclescoveringtheregionaroundthe airportout to a range
of at leastfiftymiles. This set-upis illustratedschematicallyin
Figure2.4 fora case in whichone circleis usedfor an entirecounty;in
many casesmore thanone circlewas required.For eachrepresentativecircle
themodelcalculatestheexteriorexposureat the centralpointand at points
two-thirdsof the radiusto the east,west,north,and southof the central
point,in orderto establishvaluesrepresentativeof thearea. Theequip-
mentfailureand resultingcostimpactcalculationsdescribedbeloware
alsodoneforeachof thesepoints. The basictransportand diffusionmodel
is characterizedas a Gaussianplumemodelwith somemodifications.The
principalmodificationsmadewere to includetheeffectsof thefalloutof
the graphitefibersandpartialreflectionat theearth'ssurface.
ComputeInteriorExposure
The modelassumesthateachresidentialunitand eachtypeof busi-
nessor industryat each of the key pointsforwhichtheexposureis corn,
putedcan be characterizedby a typicalbuildingor typeof enclosure.Each
typeof business-industryandeach residentialunithas associatedwith
it a setof inputparametersthatdeterminehow the exposureinsidethe
buildingis relatedto the exposureoutsidethe building.Thesevalues
are developedfromstandardair conditioningand heatingmanuals. By refer-
ringto theseparametricvaluesthemodeldeterminestheexposureinterior
to typicalbuildingsforeach classof businessor industry(orparticular
partsof thesebuildingsif this is pertinent).Thisset of assumptions
alsotendsto reducevariance,but is reasonable_intermsof the introduction
of uncertaintyand associatedcomputational,requirements.
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ComputeFailures
The modelassumesthateach individualvulnerablequipmentobeys
an exponentialfailurelaw. The inputstructurefor eachbusiness-in.
dustrytypedescribestheset of equipmentswithinthe typicalbuilding
and theway theyare relatedto eachother. Fromthe interiorexposure
valuesand the inputfailureparametersfor eachof theseindividualequip-
mentsthemodelcomputesthe probabilitythatan individualfactoryor
businessestablishmentin eachcategorywouldhave failed. Similarly,
the probabilitythathouseholdequipmentwouldhavefailedis computed
for each typicalhouseholdclassat eachof the characteristicpointsin
the geographicarea. This is donefor all business-industrycategories
and typesof residenceat eachcharacteristiclocation.
ComputeCost
For eachresidentialunitthe impactis estimatedon the basis
of the fractionof the equipmentsexpectedto be damagedand a standard
repaircost. In the caseof businessand industrythe impactis based
on the assumptionthatall impactcan be proxiedby the likelihoodthat
a completefailurewouldresultin one day'slostbusinessor production.
Theprobabilityof failureof one typeof businessor industryis used as
an estimateof the fractionof all businessesof thattypenear (within
a distanceof theorderof R/3as shownin Figure2.4)thatlocationthat
wouldhavebeen affected.The modelthenallocatesto eachtypeof busi-
ness its share,basedon its fractionof the nationalpayroll,of theGross
DomesticProductfor thattypeof business.The estimatedimpactin
dollars,at one point,is the sum overallbusinessesof the productof
the GrossDomesticProductallocatedto eachbusinessand the failure
probabilityfor thattypeof businessat thatlocation.The calculation
is carriedout for all pointsin the geographicalareasurroundingthe
airport. This is essentiallyan expectedvaluecalculation;for the
airportsof mostinterest,wherebusinessand industryare relatively
densethismethodis not expectedto yieldresultsthatare significantly
differentfroma completelyrandomizedcalculation,whilesavingcon-
siderablecomputationaleffort.
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The computationof the interiorexposure,resultingfailures,and
theircostimpact-- is donefor allindustries,and residentialunittypes
at all of the pre-definedpointswithinthe circlerepresentinga countyor
a portionof a county. Once the computationsare made for one of the clus-
tersrepresentinga countyor portionof a county,themodelmoveson to
the next geographicalareaand its componentcircles.The computations
are repeatedtherefor thatlocation'sindustriesand residentialunits,
usingthe valueof exposurefor thatlocation.Whenall geographicalareas
havebeen completed,we havethe estimateof the totalcostimpactof one
accident.The modelthendetermineswhetherit has finishedprocessingall
accidentsthatoccurredin the simulatedyear (sample)for thataircraft
type. If not,the nextaccidentis processedexactlyas describedabove
untilthe totalcostimpactis generated.Thisis donefor all the air-
crafttypesconsideredfor theyear beingsimulatedto obtainthe total
estimatedimpactof graphitefiberincidentsduringtheyear. The model
° thendrawsanothersampleby generatingthe numberof accidentsduring
anotherreplicationof the yearunderinvestigation.Whenthe pre-set
numberof replicationshavebeenmade themodelhas the informationit
needsto computeselectedstatisticsoverall samples.Theseincludethe
frequencydistributionof annualcostsand the riskprofile, Detailedre-
sultsdescribingthe tenmost costlyaccidentsare alsoavailable.
NATIONALRISKPROFILE
The totalnationalriskcan be estimatedin severalways. One
methodis to modelthe entirenation,at leastas representedby someset
of airports.The nationalmodelcan be exercisedin exactlythe sameway as
the singleairportmodel. The numberof accidentsin the countryis gen-
eratedand accidentsassignedto individualairports.A replicationwould
consistof simulatingthe totalnationalimpactby addingthe costsincurred
at eachof the representativeairports.This methodis considered
relativelycostlyin termsof computationaleffort. Othermethodswould
developthe individualriskprofilesfora numberof airportsand then
combinethe riskprofilesto preparea nationalriskprofile. One such
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approachis a variantof the nationalmodelin whichindividualoutputre- :
sultsare randomlydrawnfromdistributionspreviously,computedin single
airportanalyses.Anothermethodis the straightforwardcombiningof risk
profilespreviouslyobtainedfromindividualairportanalyses.Thisprocess,
by whichseveralprobabilitydistributionsare combinedto yieldtheprob-
abilitydistributionof a new variablewhichis the sum of the individual
variables,is a convolution.In orderto developindividualairportresults
whichare of considerablesignificanceintheirown right,en routeto the
nationalriskestimate,thisis the,methodwe adopted.
A computationalalgorithmwas preparedto performthe convolution,
usingas inputthe frequencydistributionsof the accidentimpactcostfor
severalairports.Thismodelcan treatany numberof airportsto generate
theprobabilitydistributionof totalnationalcostimpact: the national
riskprofile. If necessary,one airportcan be convolutedwith itselfto
estimatethe impactof severalsimilarairports.
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III. AIRCRAFTACCIDENTDATA
Severalfactorsassociatedwith aircraftaccidentsare requiredas
inputto the riskassessmentcalculation.We needto determinethe probability
thatan aircraftwill catchfireduringan accidentneareachairportof
interest,sincegraphitefibersare onlyreleasedas the resultof a firein-
volvingcompositematerial.We needsomedescriptionof the locationsof
theseaccidents,and the resultingfires,relativeto the airport.We need
someestimateof the fractionof graphitecompositein the aircraftstructure
thatwill be involvedin the fire,and the resultingamountof fiberthatwill
be releasedin the sizerangethatwe expectto constitutea risk. Eachof
theseaspectsof theaircraftaccidentproblemis discussedin thissection
of thereport.
AIRCRAFTACCIDENTSINVOLVINGFIRE
Aviationaccidentsthathavebeen•reportedby the NationalTransporta-
tion.SafetyBoard(NTSB)for theeleven-yearperiod1966to 1976werereviewed.
The basic.datasourcewas the NTSB'sAnnualReviewof AircraftAccidentData,
one volumeforeachof the elevenyears. The AnnualReviewis publishedeach
year for commercialcivilaviation(thecertificatedair carriers)as well as
for generalaviation.The scopeof our investigationcausedus to restrict
attentionto the commercialaviationstat!sticsonly. Althoughthe dataare
summarizedin the annualreports,and although,thedataare alsoavailableon.........
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magnetictape,it is stillnecessaryto turnto morefundamentalsourcesof
information.
Table3.1 sunTnarizesthegrossstatisticsfrom the accidentbriefs
as reportedin the NTSB'sAnnualReviewseries. A totalof 594 accidentswas
reportedin the courseof the elevenyears,and of these,136 involvedfires.
That is,23 percentof the reportedaccidentsinvolvedfires.
TABLE3.1
SUMMARYOF U.S.AIR CARRIERACCIDENTSI
No. of Accidents No. of Accidents
Year Reported with Fire
1966 75 13
1967 70 21
1968 71 17
1969 63 6
1970 55 16
1971 48 II
1972 50 14
1973 42 9
1974 47 12
1975 45 9
1976 28 8
TOTALS 594 136
It is possibleto drawa trendlinethroughthesedata,as someinves-
tigatorshave,and showthatthe numberof accidentsperyearwill approachzero
withina fewyears. We havetakena morerealisticapproachand assumedthat
therewillalwaysbe someaccidents.The actualnumberwouldrealisticallybe
a functionof many variables,for example,theexperienceassociatedwith the
introductionof new aircraft.In viewof theseconsiderations,we haveassumed
thatthe totalnumberof accidentsinvolvingfiresin theUnitedStateswill
"leveloff"at six peryear. Thiscombinesthewell-documenteddownwardtrend
with thenotionthat thenumberis not likelyto reachzero. We haveretained
INTSB,AnnualReviewof AircraftAccidentData,1966-1976.
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this estimate throughoutthe calculations,using it both for the 1985 and
1993 scenarios. With expectedincreasesin air trafficduring the inter-
vening years, this impliesa continueddecreasein the nationalaircraft
accident rate, but avoids the introductionof one more variableparameter
into the comparisonof our resultsfor 1985 and 1993.
In the simulationmodel describedlater in the report it was neces-
sary to allocatean appropriatefractionof the six fire accidentsestimated
• to occur nationallyto each airportbeing processed. For this allocationwe
assumedthat the expectednumber of accidentsat an airportin one year is
given by the expression:
Number of operationsat this airport x 6
Total number of operationsin the U.S.
•Further,rather than estimatethe number of accidentsnationallyfor
each aircraft type we are concernedwith, we chose to apply essentiallythe
same relationshipfor each aircrafttype. That is, the expected numberof
accidentsinvolvingfires for a specifictype of aircraftis obtainedby multi-
plying the expectednumber of accidentsat the airportby the ratio of opera-
tions at the airportby the aircrafttype of interestto all operationsat the
same airport. This is equivalentto replacingthe numeratorabove by the number
of operationsof the specificaircraft type at the specificairport.
To summarize,then, the •expectednumber of accidentsat the airport
is•assumedto be proportionalto the number of operationsat that airport. In
a separateanalysiswe demonstratedthat more than 70 percentof the variance
in the accidentdistributionwas accountedfor by the number of operations. For
the purposesof this study, in view of the questionableaccuracyof many of the
other inputs,we consideredthis resultsufficientconfirmationof the proposed
method•
In the ORI Risk Assessment Model the number of accidents in any sample
is obtained by making a random draw from a Poisson distribution. The probability
of exactly k accidents with fire in a year atone airport involving a particular
class of aircraft with carbon fiber is given by:
p(k;_) : e-xk (3.1)
• k'
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where _ is the mean annual fire-fiber accident rate at the airport. That is,
given by:
No. of operations at airport, aircraft category of interest x 6 x (3.2)
Total U.S. operations, all commercial aircraft
Fraction of aircraft in category with fiber
The Poisson distribution is often used for estimating accident incidence and
other related random events. The distribution, because of its special utility
in this regard, was once known as the "law of small numbers or rare events. ''2
FRACTIONOF AIRGRAFTCONSUMEDBY FIRE
In examining the data describing accidents accompanied by fire in the
NTSBAnnual Reviews, as well as tabular summaries generated by the accident
abstracts included in the NTSB-prepared computer tape, we determined that
many of the details necessary at this stage of the analysis were not avail-
able in these two media, it was necessary to review more basic accident data,
much of which was available at the NTSBHeadquarters. In particuiar, it was
necessary to develo_ estimates, for future input to the computer, of the
fraction of an aircraft that might be consumed by fire following an accident.
It was particularly desirable to relate these estimates to aircraft type, if
feasible,and operationalmode duringwhich the accidenttook place. It was
e _
clear from a preliminaryrevlewof the summarydata that many of the accidents
accompaniedby fire might be such that liberationof graphitefibers could not
reasonablybe expected.
The NTSB maintainstwo data sourcesthat are "more basic" than the
publishedannual summariesor the tabulatedsummarydata: the AircraftAccident
Reports (knownas the "Blue Books")and the actual file of raw accident data
containingon-the-spotreportsfrom many sources. It was possibleto review
severalyears' worth of accidentsinvolvingfires with the aid of the informa-
tion in these two sources. Unfortunately,some earlieraccidentswith little
damage did not rate the preparationof a "Blue Book,"while severalthat had
been prepared were no longeravailable. Our concernfor problemsof inhomoge-
2W. Feller,1950. An Introductionto ProbabilityTheoryand ItsApplication,
JohnWiley,New York,P 158 et seq.
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neity of the data associatedwith going too far back in time led us to forego
the hunt for accidentfiles earlierthan those maintainedat the NTSB Head-
quarters. Accordingly,our review of raw accidentdata spannedthe years 1972
through1976. We coveredthose accidentsthat had previouslybeen identified
as accompaniedby fire or explosion. This compriseda total of 52 accidents
that had been identifiedin the Annual Reviewsfor these years. In the "Blue
Books" and the basic accidentfiles we were able to find 34 of these. A sum-
mary of our findingswith regard to the possibilityof graphitefiber release
as a result of the accidentappearsbelow. Here we have indicatedthe number
of "possibles"out of the total number of fire accidentsreviewed. The scoring
of "possible"means that, in the judgmentof our accidentreview team, graphite
fibersmight have been releasedin the accident,given that there were fibers
in the structureof the aircraft. Of course,no fiberswere releasedin any
of these accidentssince there were nonepresent. The preliminaryresultswere:
• 1972 -- Six accidentsreviewed;six possibles
e 1973 -- Seven accidentsreviewed;six possibles
e 1974 -- Seven accidentsreviewed;five possibles
• 1975 -- Six accidentsreviewed;two possibles
• 1976 -- Eight accidentsreviewed;six possibles.
In summary,25 out of the 34 accidentsinvolvingfire for which detaileddata
were available,were judged to be potentialgraphitefiber releaseaccidents.
Some of the detailsunderlyingthe exclusionof specificaccidents
from the "possible"category are worth noting. Brief accountsof these ex-
cluded fire accidents,focusingon the reasonsfor deciding that they would
not lead to graphitefiber release,follow:
e 1973 -- Aircraftran off the runway after landing. A small
fire in the right enginewas extinguishedby the aircraft's
own fire-extinguishingequipment.
• 7974 -- An in-flightfire in the nu_er two enginewas extinguishedby
the engine'sown fire bottles.
-- An accidentwas found to be caused by an explosiondue to
sabotage. There was no fire.
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• 1975 -- Prior to take-off there was a fire due to overheated
wires; extinguishedand aircraftresumedoperation.
-- Prior to take-offthe number-3engine caught fire. The
fire was put out "immediately"by ground mechanics.
-- A flash fire in the area of the tail pipe of the num-
ber-1 enginewas under controlin seconds. The fire
effectswere limitedto the landinggear tires and wheels.
-- Fire prior to take-offwas limitedto the APU and lasted
only 5 to lO seconds
• 1976 -- In-flightfire in number°2enginewas self-extinguished.
-- The use of a power carbidesaw by rescue personnelcaused
a fire. The fire was extinguishedin seconds.
AMOUNT OF GRAPHITEFIBER RELEASED
The number of graphite fibers that might be releasedas a result of an
aircraftaccident involvingfire dependson severalfactors. Among the more
obviousfactorsare how much graphite fiber material (more precisely,perhaps:
how much compositematerial,and what fractionof the compositeis graphite
fiber) is used in the aircraft structure,and how much of the compositematerial
is actually involvedin the fire. If the compositematerial is used in identifi-
able parts of the aircraft,the factorsof particularinterestto us are whether
that portionof the aircraftwould be involvedin a fire resultingfrom an acci-
dent, and, if involved,what fractionof the fiber thereinwould be liberated.
As part of NASA's Aircraft Energy Efficiency(ACEE)program,the avia-
tion industryis currentlydevelopinga number of aircraftstructurecomponents
using graphite fiber composites. Componentsincludingrudder,ailerons,and
elevatorscould be used in 1980-1983productionaircraft. Structuressuch as
the verticalfin and the horizontaltail will probablynot be in productionbe-
fore 1983. There is apparentlyno'currentdevelopmentprogram to apply carbon
compositematerialsto the wing structuresof productioncommercialaircraft.
Such compositestructuresare not expected to be availablebefore 1985, at the
earliest. Compositewing structuresfor aircraft about the size of the DC-9
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or the Boeing727mightcontainabout1,800kilogramsof carbonepoxycomposite
material.We havenoted,for example,thatin severalaccidentsthe tail
sectionwas separatedfromthe restof the aircraftduringthe early•stageof
the accident. If all of the compositematerialin suchan aircraftwerein the
tailstructure,and the firewere confinedcompletelyto the mainfuselage,then
no graphitefiberwouldhavebeenreleasedin thoseaccidents.A parallel
studyby the air framemanufacturersis underwayto providemoredetailsof the
typeoutlinedabovefor pastaccidents.
Atpresent,with futureapplicationsof compositematerialnot completely
firm, and the detaileddatadescribinginvolvementof specificaircraftstructural
elementsin firesresultingfromaccidentsunavailable,we havemadean assump-
tionequivalent o: the compositematerialis useduniformlythroughout heair-
craftstructure.The actualamountof graphitecontainedin compositematerial
projectedfor aircraftby aircraftsize (type)is shownin Table3,2. Thesevalues
weredevelopedcollectivelyby NASA,Boeing,McDonnell-Douglas,and Lockheed,
and were essentiallyadoptedby ORI and otherinvestigatorsas standardvalues
for the PhaseI riskassessmentcalculations.Our basicassumptionis that if
one-halfof the aircraftis involvedin a fire,one-halfof the composite
materialon boardis involvedin the fire. Table3.2 alsoshowsthe fractionof
commercialaircraftin each sizecategorythatis expectedto havegraphite
compositematerialin theirstructure.Further,the availabledatareportedby
otherNASA/Langley-sponsoredinvestigatorssuggestthatabout20 percentof the
carbonin thatcompositematerialwillactuallybe releasedas singleshort
fibersin the size rangethatposesa threatto electricand electronicequip-
mentdownwind.Again,this 20-percentfactorwas adoptedas standardfor all
calculations.
FRACTIONOF AIRCRAFTCONSUMEDBY FIRE
Table3.3summarizestheavailableinformationfor eachof the aircraft
• fireaccidentsreviewedby the ORI team. For eachaccidentthe tableshowsthe
operationalphaseduringwhichthe accidenttookplace,theweatherat the
accidentsite,theamountof fuelon board,thedurationof the fire,the
extentof damageas estimatedby theNTSB investigators,and the fractionof
• aircraftstructureconsumedin the fire,as estimatedbytheORI accidentreview
team. In each casewe havereportedthe originalNTSBfilenumberwhichenables
any investigatorto retrievethe completedocketfor thataccident.•
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TABLE 3.2
PROJECTEDFUTUREUSEOF CARBONFIBER IN
• COMMERCIALAIRCRAFT '
1985 1993
AircraftCategory
Fraction Fiber Fraction Fiber
Carrying Per Aircraft Carrying Per Aircraft
Size CurrentExamples Fiber (Kilograms) Fiber (Kilograms)
-Large DC-IO,L-lOll,747 .33 454 .50 2041
727, 757, 767, 707
Medium DC-8 .20 136 .60 680
Small 737, DC-9 .33 91 .50 454
L
The ORI estimates of fraction of structure consumed by the fire were
based on the narrative reports prepared by NTSBinvestigators, and the ex-
amination of all relevant data in the complete accident file, which Occasion-
ally included photographs. One finding is that, in all cases examined, some
portion of the aircraft escaped complete destruction by fire. As an example
of how the fraction of aircraft consumed was estimated, consider the 1976
accident with file number 1-0020 (cf_ Table 3.3).
The following is an excerpt from a 1976 accident "Blue Book. ''3
"Fire erupted in the left side of the aircraft after the left
main landing gear traversed the ditch and severed the left
main landing gear's attaching structure on the left main fuel
tank's rear bulkhead. Fuel escaped from this tank, burned and
caused massive damage to the left side of the fuselage and in-
board section of the left wing, The cabin interior wasdamaged
heavily throughout by smoke and soot."
-_ NationalTransportationSafety Board, AircraftAccidentReport,Texas Inter-
national Airlines, Inc., DouglasDC-9'I4,N9104, StapletonInternationalAir-
port, Denver,Colorado,November16,.1976,.ReportNumber NTSB-AAR-77-10._
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TABLE 3.3
SUMMARYOF AIRCRAFTFIRE-ACCIDENTDATA
YEAR FILE NO. AJC TYPE OPE_IIOIV_. WEATIIIRAT FUEL ON BOARD FIREtXJRATION AIRERArTSIRUCTURE DAMAGE
PHASE ACCIU|NTSITE (POUNDS) CONSt_IZU(I'LRCENI)* EXTENTf
1-0002 Dc-g Lending rain NR 3 mln. 50 Destroyed
1-0003 D¢-9-14 Landing hone 22,000 (Jet A) NR 80 Destroyed
Go-around
CV-580 "in-flight, NR XR 30 Destroyed1972 1-0005 OttO-6 cruise none 30 Destroyed
1-001G L-I011 In-flight none 43,000 f|ash fire 10 Destroyed
1-0017 0C-9 Take-off,
Inltlalclimb fog 22,000(JetA) 19 mln. 60 Destroyed
1-0048 8-737 Final Approach fog 20-30 mtn. SO Destroyed
1-0011 0C-9 Final Approach fog 13,000 20 mtn. 80 Destroyed
I-OOlS DC-8 Take-off NR** NR NR 10 Minor
1-0017 ¢¥-600 In-flight rain NR NR 20 Destroyed.
1973
i-0018 0C-8 Landing drizzle 70,000 70 Destroyed
1-0019 B-737 Landing rain NR • 0 _ 0 Substantial
1-0026 0C-10-30 ? rain 182,000 • 3 mln. 40 Substantial
1-0041 FllZ27B Landing rain 4,030 (Jet A) NR 20 Destroyed
1-0001 g-707 Landing rain 69,000 • 14 mtn. 90 Destroyed
I-O00B Lockheed In-fllght rain 40,500at NR 60 Destroyed
382 take-off
1-0012 B-707 Landing fog hydraulicfluid 25 min. 60 ) Destroyed
1974 burned
1-0013 DC-IO Climb to cruise NR 0 0 Substantial
1-0020 0C-9-31 Landing fog 10 mln. 80 "" Destroyed
1-0024 B-707 In-fllght clear No fire - explo- 80 Destroyed
stve device
1-0029 B-727 Lending ratn 80 Destroyed
1-000Z B-727 Parked NR WiringOverheated Subst_ntlal
1-0006 B-727 Landing rain II,300 8 min. SO Destroyed
1-0019 L-lOll StartingEngine! NR NR NR 0 None1975
1-00Z9 B-727 Taxi fog NR 12 mln. 20 Substantial
1-0032 D¢-lO Take-off haze 155,000 _ sec. 0 Substantial
1-0037 D¢-10 Taxi rain NR NR 0 None
1-0003 B-727 Landing fog/snow 35,000 4 hrs. SO (classtc Destroyed
bent-over plume)
l-O00g B-727 Landing clear 14,100 40 mln. 80 (plu_ sev- Destroyed
eral lO0 ft high)
1-0009 L-IOll Descending . NR NR l NR 0 Substantlal
197G (electrical fire)
1-0012 8-727 Take-off clear NR NR 10 Substantial
1-001S DC-6 Take-off rain 9,600 _ sac. 0 Destroyed
(av.gasoline)
l-OOZO DC-9 Take-off clear 18,300 7 min. 15 Substantial
1-0024 • 0¢-10 Landing NR NR 20 Substantial
I-OOZS L-188 Landing NR (S,OOOgallons I day 50 Destroyed
transported)
• £stimted by ORI accidentreview team
+ Estimated by NTSBaccident team
NR Mot reported
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In addition,otherreportsin the investigativefileshowedthatthe fuselage
was burnedthroughon the leftsidein the areaof the leftwing roots.The
leftwing rootand fairingwere burned. The leftoverwingexistwas almost
completelyconsumedby fire. In thisinstance,the investigativefilecon-
Jtainedthe statementthatabout25 percent(suchpercentagesare rarelygiven)
of thefuselageon the leftsidewas consumedin the fire,whichwas extin-
guishedin 7 minutes.This led to the ORI team'sestimateof 15 percentover-
all firedamageto the aircraft.The NTSBreportcharacterizedthe damage
to theaircraftas"substantial."
We were clearlyinterestedin the relationshipof the fractionof
aircraftdestroyedby fire and the operationalphase. Due to the limiteddata,
someaggregationwas donein seekingto establishthisrelationship.In the
"take-off"categorywe includedtaxipriorto take-offas well as ascentto
cruiselevel. In "landing"we includeddescentfromcruiseleveland taxi
afterlanding.The intentwasto separatetheoperationof the aircraftinto
timecategoriesthatwouldsegregateperiodswhentherewere largeamounts
of fuelon board(take-off)from thosewith relativelylittlefuel (landing).
Of the 34 accidentswith firethatwere reviewedin detail,we were ableto
classify17 as "landing"accidentsand 7 as "take-off"accidents.The re-
mainderwere eitherunassignabledue to datagaps,or clearlynot in these
operationalphases.
Basedon our analysisof the datasummarizedin Table3.3 and these
definitions,we estimatedthe distributionby operationalphaseof accidents
involvingfiresthatcouldpotentiallyresultin the releaseof graphite
fibersto be:
• Static -- 0
• Taxi -- 0
• Take-off -- 20%
• In-Flight-- 20%
• Landing -- 60%
Theseresultsare discussedfurtherbelow.
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The data indicatethatthe fractionof aircraftconsumedby fires
duringlandingaccidentsis significantlygreaterthanfor take-offacci-
dents. The estimatedmedianfractionof aircraftconsumedis 50 percentfor
landingand 20 percentfor take-off.This suggeststhatthe amountof fuel
on board,typicallyfar lesson landingsthanon take-offs,is not critical
to the determinationof consumptionby fire. Moreimportant,perhaps,is
the impactassociatedwith an emergencylandingand the higherprobability
of the crashbeingoff the airportresultingin decreasingaccessibilityfor
fireand rescueequipment.The fraction-of-aircraft-consumeddata for in-
flightaccidentswere evenmoresparsethan indicatedearlier. As a rea-
sonablevaluebasedon the few documentedcases,we selectedthe valueof
30 percentof the aircraftinvolvedin firefor accidentsoccurringduring
the in-flightphase.
FIREDURATION
Anotherquestionof interestis the durationof any fireresulting
froman aircraftaccident,and its relationshipto phaseof operation.The
frequencydata for firedurationfollowinglandingand take,offaccidents
fromthe NTSB reportsindicatethatthe medianfiredurationis 20 minutes
for landingaccidentsand 2.5 minutesfor take-offaccidents.The dataset
is extremelylimited,implyingthatrelativelylittleconfidencecanbe
placedin the numericalresults,but longerdurationsfor landingaccidents
are consistentwith the earlierfindingof greaterconsumptionby firein
landingaccidents.The frequencydistributionbasedon the casesavailable
is shownin Figure3.1.
The conclusionbasedon necessarilyrestrictedanalysesof limited
datais thatthe firehazard,and consequentreleaseof graphitefibers,
is greaterfor landingthantake-offaccidents.Thereare considerably
more landingaccidentswith firethantake-offaccidentswith fire;the
percentageconsumptionby fireisconsiderablygreaterfor landingaccidents
thantake-offaccidents;and,probablycorrelatedwith the previousfinding,
landing-accidentfireslastlongerthantake-offaccidentfires.
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StanfordResearchInstitute(SRI)haswrittena detailedreport
whichalsocharacterizesaircraftaccidentsinvolvingfires._ The period
forwhichtheystudiedthe accidentdatawas 1963-1974,whereaswe generally
revieweddatafor 1966to 1976,and concentratedour analysison 1972to
. 1976. Theirreporteddistributionof accidentsinvolvingfireoveropera-
tionalphaseis consistentwith ORI'sfindings.Landingaccidentspre-
dominate,and the staticand taxiphasesare relativelyinsignificantcon-
tributorsto the overallaccidentset.
The SRI study,likethebasic NTSBdatasource,givesdegreeof
destructionby fireonlyin the qualitativeterms: destroyed,substantial,
minor,and none. Thus,it is not possibleto use SRI findingsto supple-
mentORI'snumericalestimatesof percentof aircraftdestroyedby fire.
AIRCRAFTACCIDENTLOCATIONS
In developingthe distributionof aircraftaccidentlocationswe
separatedthe categoriesof in-flightand landingaccidentswhichwe had
tendedto lumpin the analysisdiscussedto thispoint. We recognized,as
will be shownlater,thattruelandingaccidentstendto be nearerthe
airportand in-flightaccidentstendto be distributedovergreaterdis-
tancesfromthe airport.
Table3.4 givesthe proximityto the "nearestrunwayof the air-
port"for 33 accidents•involvingfirethatoccurredin theyears1972to
1976.* One accidentthathad beenincludedin someof the earlieranalyses
was in factan explosiondue to sabotage(withoutfire)and itwas decided
to excludeit fromthisportionof the analysis.Onlytwo of the 33 acci-
dentsinvolvingfiretookplaceunder"static"Conditionsand two took
placeduringthe "taxi"phase. Thissupportsour decisionto simplifythe
. analysisby assigningzeroprobabilityto accidentsinvolvingfireduring
the staticor taxiphases. Further,it seemsveryunlikely•that"on-
. airport"firesduringtheseoperationalphaseswouldbe allowedto burnfor
• more thana few secondsbeforefire-fightingequipmentcameto extinguishthem.
_An Analysisof AircraftAccidentsInvolvingFires,"_G.V.Lucha,M.A.
Robertson,and F.A.Schooley,SRI,May_1975,NASACR 173690.
*Notethatmilesare usedas the unitsbecausethis is how originaldata
are reported.
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TABLE 3.4
AIRPORTPROXIMITYFOR AIRCRAFTACCIDENTSWITH FIRE*
DISTANCEFROM DISTANCEFROM
AIRPORT AIRPORT OPNL
YEAR FILE NO. (MILES) OPNLPHASE YEAR FILE NO,... (MILES) PHASE
1-0002 0 L 1-0002 0 S
1-0003 0 L 1-0006 <_ L
i 1-0005 >5 I/F l-OOl9 0 S
1972 1-0016 >5 I/F 1975 1-0029 0 T
1-0017 0 T/O 1-0032" 0 T/O
1-0048 <2 L 1-0037 0 T
l-OOll 0 L " 1-0003 0 L
I'0015 0 T/O 1-0005 0 L
l-OOl7 >5 I/F 1-0009 >5 I/F
I
1973 l-OOl8 >5 L 1976 l-OOl2 0 _ T/O
1-0019 0 L l-OOl5 <I T/O
1-0026 0 L 1-0020 0 T/O
l-O041 <3 L 1-0024 0 L
1-0025 0 L
l-O00l 0 L
1-0008 ? I/F Legend:
1974 l-OOl2 0 L L = Landing
1-0013 >5 I/F T/O = Takeoff
1-0020 <4 L I/F = In-flight
1-0029 >5 L T = Taxi
* 34 accidentsfrom1972 to 1976previouslyselectedfor damageanalysis,but one caseof sabotage
explosion dropped. Distances are to nearest runway of the airport.
• !
q, 6 T _'
Six of the reportedaccidentswith firetook placeduringthe
take-offphase. As Table3.4 shows,fiveout of six took placeon the run-
way (distanceto runwaywas zeromiles)and thesixthtookplacelessthan
a mile fromthe runway. It seemslogicalthat take-offaccidentswill either
• occuron the runwayor justbeyondtheend of the runway. Lackingspeci-
fic data,we haveassigneduniformprobabilityfor locationsof take-off
accidentswith firefrom thebeginningof the runwayto a distanceof one
mile beyondthe farend of the runway.
Seventeenof theaccidentswith firewere landingaccidents.Eleven
of thesetookplaceon the runway. The remainingsixwere distributedas
follows:
l withinI/4 milesof the runway
l within2 milesof the runway
l within3 milesof the runway
l within4 milesof the runway,
while2 were more than5 milesawayfromthe end of the runway.
Thus, combining the one landing accident that was within one-quarter
mile of the runway with the eleven that were on the runway, we conclude
that approximately two-thirds of all landing accidents with fire occur on
the runway. For computer modeling purposes, we assumethat these acci-
dents are distributed uniformly along the runway with a total probability
of two-thirds. Since we have no data to distinguish undershoots from over-
shoots, we arbitrarily assumelanding accidents are equally likely to be
undershoots or overshoots with probability equalto one-half for each type,
Based on the crude proximity data for the sample of six landing accidents
that occurred off the runway we assign the off-runway accidents uniformly
• withina six-mileband shortof the runwayand anothersix-milebandjust
beyond the runway.
Of the six in-flight accidents with fire reported in Table 3,4, the
site of oneis not given, and the other five all took place at distances
greaterthan fivemilesfromthe airportrunway. We haveassumedsymmetry
so thathalfthe in-flightaccidentsend up shortof the runwayand half
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beyondthe runway. We imposea fivemile zonejustshortand just longof
the runwaywhereno in-flightaccidentsoccur. And thenwe assumethere
is a 15-mileband beyondthe fivemile zonewherethe in-flightaccidents
do occurwith uniformprobability.
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IV. FIRE AND RELEASEOF GRAPHITEFIBERS
The graphite-fiberreleasestarts with an aircraftaccident leading
to a fire. The "typical"accidentenvisionedis fed by the aircraftfuel.
As a result of the fire some fractionof the aircraft is consumed. Chapter III
reviewedthe correlationbetweenaircraftoperationalphase (take-off,landing
etc.) and the amount of damage caused by fire. It was noted that official
sources,such as the NationalTransportationSafety Board, do not prepare
quantitativeestimatesof the amount of damage caused by fire and, of course,.
there is essentiallyno informationavailableon the amount of composite
materialthat would be involvedin the fire.
In the absenceof detailedestimatesof future use of carbon fiber
compositematerialin commercialaircraft components,we introducedthe assump-
tion that the fractionof compositematerialin the aircraftstructurethat
would be involvedin the fire is equal to the estimatedfractionof the
aircraft involvedin the fire. This isessentially equivalentto assuming
that the compositematerial is used uniformlythroughoutthe aircraft.
• Further,as describedin ChapterIll, it is expectedthat 20 percent,by
weight,of the carbon in the compositematerialwould be releasedas single
• fibersin the size range of interestduring the fire. These assumptions
reducethe varianceof the final results,but some insightinto their impact
can be obtained fromthe sensitivity•testsreported in ChapterIX.
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As a consequenceof the fuel-fedfirea hotbuoyantplumeis formed
thatrisesto a "stabilization"heightwhichis a functionof theenergyavail-
ableto feedthe fire,thewind speed,and the atmosphericstability.The
releasedgraphitefibersenterthe buoyantplumeandtravelto the stabili-
zationheight,whichis reachedat a particulardownwindstabilizationdistance.
The solutionto the physicalproblemof the riseof the buoyantplumewas
formulatedby GaryBriggs. The resultsappearin the nextsection.
PLUME HEIGHTCALCULATION
Calculationof the plumerise (orelevation),H, at stabilizationfrom
an open firefollowsthe workof Briggs._ The heightof the plume,in meters,
is givenby:
H = 2.9(F/us)1/3. (4.1a)
for stableconditions,where u is the mean wind speed in meters per second.
For neutralor unstableconditionswe have
H = 1.6F1/3u-1x2/3,when x <3.5x* {4.1b)
H = 1.6F1/3u-1{3.Sx*)2/3,when x >3.5x* (4.1cI
where:
x* = 14F5/8,When F < 55
x* = 34F2/5 whenF > 55
The buoyancyfluxparameterF, appearingin the aboveequation,is givenby
gQR
F - _CppT
I Some RecentAnalysesof Plume Rise Observations,Gary A. Briggs,paper presented
at the 1910 InternationalAir PollutionConferenceof the InternationalUnion
of Air PollutionPreventionAssociates.
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where:
g = accelerationof gravity,9.8m sec-2
QR = heatemissionrate,kcalsec-1
C = specificheatof air atconstantpressure,
P
0.2391kcalkg-l(°K)-1
p = atmosphericdensity,1.293kgm-3
T = ambienttemperature,(273.2+ temp°C)°K.
The atmosphericstabilityparameter,s, is definedby:
s :T_BOBz
where:
@0 = gradientof potentialtemperature,O.35°km-1Bz
for stableconditions(valueappearsin CRSTER
codeforsubroutineBEH072).2
In orderto use the Briggsformulas,we must specifyQR, the heat
emissionratefor a burningaircraft.For thisspecificationwe are indebted
to BartBartramof NUS Corporation.3 Bartramhas shownthatQR may be approxi-
matedby:
QR = RApE t4.2)
where:
R = fuelburningrate,0.047ft/min
A = fueldispersionarea,481.74ft2
p = fueldensity,48.7Ib/ft3
E = fuelheatcontent,18,400BTU/Ib
2 User'sManualfor Single-Source(CRSTER)Model,EPA July 1977 EPA,405/2-, . ' ..... " ....
77-013.
3 UnpublishedCommunication,1978.
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The fuelburningratewas determinedempiricallyby Los AlamosScientific
LaboratoriesforJP-4 jet fuel_;more recentexperimentsconductedby NASA,
reportedaftertheORI calculationswere complete,indicatethatthisvalue
may be toohigh,by as muchas a factorof two (cf.the followingsection,
"LayerPenetration.")The fueldispersionarea is an estimateof the area
belowthewing tankson a B-737aircraft. Usingthesedatawe findthat
QR = 3.3575x 105BTU sec-1 (or8.4614x 104 kcalsec-1) for a B-737type
aircraft.
Substitutingthe abovevalues,we findthatEquation(4.1a)becomes
HB.737= 400 u-1/3 forstableair at 700 F and HB_737= 380 u-1/3for stable
air at 200 F. Forunstableor neutralconditions,at either200 or 700 F,
equations(4.1b)and (4.1c)becomeHB_737= 4800 u"1.
Sincethe B-737is designatedas a smalltransporttype,we needa
meansto extendthe plume-risecalculationsto medium(707-type)and large
(747-type)transportaircraft.We note in Equation(4.1)thatH is proportional
to F1/3 forstableconditionsand F is directlyproportionalto QR" It follows
thatH is thereforeproportionaltoQR1/3.
Equation(4.2)showsthatQR is proportionalto theareaof the burning
pool,the fueldepositedon the groundfromtheairplane'sfueltanks. For the
B-737,a smalltransporttype,the fueldispersionareawas set equalto the
areabelowthewing tanks. Sincethewing tankscomprisemost of thewing
structure,excludingductsalongthe leadingedgeand controlsurfacesand
voidsin the trailingedge,thisareais proportionalto the areaof the wing.
Furthera wing chordis typicallyapproximatelyproportionalto thewing span,
so thatthe areasubtendedby the fueltanksmay be consideredproportionalto
thesquareof thewing span. We haveusedthisproportionalityrelationship
in extrapolatingEquation(4.2)to otheraircraft. It thenfollowsthatthe
maximumplumeheightobeysthe relationship:
H : K(wingspan)2/3.
Then the heightof the plumefor anyaircraftfire,HAC,can be obtainedfrom
the heightcalculatedfora B-737aircraft,givenby Equation(4.1)(defined
R. K. Clarke,et al.,1976. Severitiesof TransportationAccidents,Sandia
Laboratory,SLA-74-001.
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as H737). In stableatmosphericonditionsthe resultis:
F(WingSpan)Acl 2/3
HAC = H737 L(wingspan)737]
In unstableor neutralconditionsH is proportionalto:
F1/3F4/15= F3/5
ThenH may be estimatedfrom:
. 615
[(Wing Span)AclHAC: H737 (Wing 73_
These relationships thus enable us to determine plume rise for accidents
involving different aircraft for any combination of wind speed and stability
conditions. Typical values of the calculated plume heights under different
conditions are given in Table 4.1.
LAYERPENETRATION
It is pointed out in Chapter V that there are occasions when the
calculatedplume rise is greater than the mixing layer height. Whenthese
cases occurred in the simulated accidents the plume height was set equal to
the layer height. That is, "punching through" was forbidden. In the "real
world," whether punching through occurs is problematic. For instance,
L. Lavdas, of the Forest Service, has suggested that it is unlikely, s On
the other hand, Table 4.2 from Pasquill 6 shows, for a limited set of data,
instances of both penetration and nonpenetration of inversions. The values
of QRare of the sameorder of magnitude as those that concern us here. The
bottom of the inversion as shownin Table 4.2 is the mixing layer height, as
the term is used in this report.
It would be important to evaluate the !'punch through" or penetration
problem with greater care if the graphite-fiber problem turned out to be
• s Letter from Lavdas, USDA,Forest Service, Macon, Ga., to R. Greenstone, ORI,
Inc., 26 October 1978.
GF. Pasquill, Atmospheric Diffusion (2d edition), John Wiley.& Sons, New
York,1974. •
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TABLE4.1
TYPICALPLUMEHEIGHTS(METERS)
(MODERATEWINDSPEED= 10 m/sec)
Aircraft WingSpan StabilityCondition
Category (meters) Stable Neutral/
Unstable
Large 59 257 685
Medium 44 180 480
Small 29 108 289
4-6
TABLE4.2 ...........
DATAONPENETRATIONOF INVERSIONSBY HOTPLUMES
After Briggs (1969)
i , J,Q,
, m,
Plume Inversion.height(m)
Date Time QR u Height ...... Penetration ?
(I0 _ cal/sec) (m/sec) (m) Bottom. Top
May 25 1825 1.97 _9.0 295 145 180 Yes
325 475 No
July 20 0552-0559 0.98 10.5 350 °255 275 Yes
365 395 No
0617-0820 1.11 7.3 360 540 580 No
July 21 0600-0724 1.13 4.3 360 410 450 No
0828 1.64 2.7 510 240 280 Yes
•= 360 410 Yes
' September8 0648-0930 1.66 7.5 410 360 400
1000-1020 1.77 5.4 560 620 650 No
0640-0705 1.20 9.6 350 360 400 No
0747-0850 1.54 9.1 370 260 300 Yes
370 410 No
September9 0930-1000 2,13 9.6 390 420 530 No
Source: F. Pasquill,Op.Cit.
severe. Our modelof the physicalprocessesinvolvedin fibertransport{see
ChapterV) indicatesthat therewill be no graphitefiberat the groundas
longas the plumeis abovethe layer. The plumestaysabovethe layeruntil
its centerof gravitydropsthroughas a resultof gravitationalsettlingof
the fibers. Thisphenomenonis representedby thetilted-plumemodelwe have
adopted,as describedin ChapterV.
/
/
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V. DOWNWINDTRANSPORTAND DIFFUSIONOF FIBERS
MODELSELECTION
Background
For this risk assessment study we wished to use a downwind trans-
port and diffusion model that captured all of the significant physical elements
of the problem. At the same time we wanted a model that could be easily
adapted to our use. We hoped to use one that required a relatively small amount of
input meteorological data and was relatively modest in its requirements for
computer time. In examining relatively sophisticated models we recognized
the associated liabilities in terms of cost associated with data prepa-
ration and computing time_ Wealso concluded that this model need not provide
results that were significantly more accurate than those that could
realistically be expecte d from other parts of the complete risk assessment
modeling chain.
A review of existing models with the above considerations in mind
led us to a choice between the widely used EPATurner Model!. and the H.E.
2
Cramer model . We selected the Turner Workbook approach. The basic Cramer model
i D. Bruce Turner, Workbook of Atmospheric Dispersion Estimates, EPA, 1970.
2 R.K..Dumbould and J.R. Bjorklund, NASA/MSFCMultilayer Diffusion Models
and Computer Programs -- Version 5, H,E. Cramer Co., Inc., Salt Lake City,.
Utah, NASA CR-2631, December,1975.
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is not significantlydifferentfromtheTurnermodelin the sensethatthey
are bothGaussianplumemodels. The multilayerversionof Cramer'smodel
referencedhereoffersa degreeof refinementhatappearsto go beyondthe
requirementsof, and thedata availabilityfor,the presentstudy. To use
themultilayermodel,onemust have theappropriatemeteorologicalcharacteris-
ticsfor the variousatmosphericlayersbeingmodeled. Sincewe are postula-
tingaccidentswe wouldrequiredata for typicalmultilayeratmospheric
structuresat variousairport-associatedaccidentsitesaroundthe country.
To determinetypicalmultilayeratmosphericstructuresfor eachof a
numberof potentialaccidentsiteswouldrequirea significantmeteorological
investigation.The resultswouldprobablyhaveto be givenin termsof stan-
dardsynopticsituationsor by seasonof theyear. In viewof theirdetailed
inputdatarequirements,and associatedcosts,it"appearedwisestto reject
relativelysophisticatedapproaches,as exemplifiedby the Cramermodel;the
sameargumentappliesto primitive quationmodelswhichdependon the numeri-
cal integrationof the hydrodynamicequationsof motion. Instead,a more
readilyappliedmodelas exemplifiedby theTurnerWorkbookwas selected.
Thismodelis alsogenerallyacceptedby professionalsin the pollutioncontrol
field.
EPA Standard(Turner)Model
Turner'smodel(thepresent"standard"EPAmodel)providesfor net
downwindtransportof materialin theformof a plumethatdiffusessimultane-
ouslyinthe crosswindand verticaldirections.The initialsourcecan be
elevatedat a specifiedheight.
The atmosphereis characterizedas beingin one of severalstability
classes,with themost stableconditionhavingthe lowestmixingheight
(inversionlevel),and the leaststablehavingthegreatestmixingheight.
Dispersionparametersthatgovernthe rateof crosswindand downwinddiffusion
are associatedwith eachspecifiedstabilityclass. The dispersionparameter
is smallestfor themost stableatmosphericonditionsand greatestfor the
mostunstablecondition.The magnitudeof eachdispersionparameterincreases
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with downwinddistancefrom thesource;the functionalrelationshipfor
differentstabilitycategoriesis providedby thewell-knownPasquill-Gifford
dispersioncurves. They areused in thisORI reportin a formadaptedfrom
an EPA computerprogramcalledCRSTER3 Thesesubjectsare discussedin more
detailbelow.
The ORI Transportand DiffusionModel
The plumerise calculations,performedseparately,give the source
height,whichis then usedexplicitlyin the transportand diffusionmodel.
Plumerisecalculationswere discussedin ChapterIV. When the the inde-
pendentplumerisecalculationslead to plumeheightsgreaterthan the
heightof themixedlayer,theplumerise is arbitrarilyrestrictedto the
layerheight. In otherwords,heatedplumesdo not"punchthrough"the layer,
as discussedin SectionV.
As describedbelow,theORI modelhasfeaturesnot includedin the
standardTurnermodel. It providesfor finiteparticlesettlingthroughuse
of a "tiltedplume'!model. Also,themodelpermitsless-than-perfectreflec-
tionof the diffusingcloudfromthe groundthroughintroductionof a reflec-
tioncoefficient,as shownby Cramer.
3 User's Manual for Single-Source(CRSTER)Model, EPA, July 1977,
EPA-450/2-77-013.
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GENERALMATHEMATICALMODEL
The most general form of the ORI meteorological transport and
diffusion equation is:
D(x,y,z,H'): Z °yOzU L (5.1)
{exp [_ 12 _21+ r exp _ 12 (z+H'_2)2_.°z J z
where:
D(x,y,z,H') = dosage at x,y,z (receptor location) in particle-
sec m-3 for the particle size of interest
x = downwind distance from source to receptor, meters
y = crosswind distance from source to receptor, meters
z = elevation of receptor, meters
u = mean wind speed, m sec-1, from release altitude to
plume stabilization altitude, H.
Q = total number of particles in the size range of
interest released
Oy = standard deviation of the wind speed in the crosswind
direction, as a function of x and the stability class,
in meters
°z = standard deviationof the wind speed in the vertical,
as a functionof x and the stabilityclass, in meters
r = reflectioncoefficient,the fractionof particles
that are reflectedfrom the ground surface,dimension-
less parameter
Equation (5.1) makes use of the effectiveplume height,H'; this is the
elevationof the plume centralaxis at any downwinddistance,given by:
H' = H - ( vs / u ) x (5.2)
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where:
H = elevationof plumeat plumestabilization,meters
• -l
vs = particlesettlingspeed,msec , for the selected
particlesize
The ORI Equation(5.1)fordosageis essentiallythe sameform
as Turner'sEquation(3.1)for concentrationwhen the height,z, is set
equalto zero. To show thispreciselywe notethatthereis no settling
consideredby Turnerso thatH'=H. Totalreflectionis assumedso thatr
in Equation(5.1)may be setequalto one. The twoexponentialtermsin-
volving_z representdiffusionawayfromthe "true"sourceat H and an
"image"sourceat -H. Ifwe set
r=l
Vs =0
and
z=O
we havethe conditionsfor no gravitationalsettlingof the diffusingparti-
cles,perfectreflectionof theparticlesat the groundsurface,and haveset
the receptorforwhichthe dosageis beingestimatedat groundlevel;these
are the conditionsassumed_ Turner. Then,Equation(5.1)becomes:
yZl _ 2 •
whichis identicalto Equation(5.10)presentedin Turner'sWorkbook,
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MODELIMPLEMENTATION
In this section we describe the actual methods used to adapt and
modify Equations (5.1), (5.2), and (5.3) to capture the key elements of the
problem at hand, as well as to make them amenabl_ for computer application in
a Monte-Carlo simulation. The major model adaptations are discussed in turn
below, along with the development of the appropriate input data. It should
be noted that the model programmed and used is somewhat more general than
the one published by Turner.
Elevated Virtual Source
It is necessary to develop methods to provide a source of fibers
some distance from the scene of the aircraft accident and fire that is
liberating the fibers. Here "distance" is typically some vertical elevation
of the fire plume, and some downwind distance at which the plume is said to
be stabilized. At this point we may say that Equation (5.1) "takes over."
It is customary in many applications of these diffusion methods to compute
the plume size at stabilization, and then determine the location of an up-
wind virtual point source from which a diffusing plume could be expected to
grow, according to the diffusion model being used, to the actual size pre-
viously computed for plume stabilization. In this case the virtual point
source will certainly be upwind of the plume stabilization point, and either
upwind or downwind from the accident site. In view of the large uncertain-
ties present in many other phases of the complete risk calculation, and the
insight that leads us to be concerned with effects some miles downwind from
the accident site, we have chosen to arbitrarily set the virtual point source
directly over the accident - fire site. The calculation of the plume
height at stabilization has been discussed previously, and is,of course
modeled in the full calculation. In this application, then, we approximate
the actual elevated downwind finite source by a virtual point source directly
over the accident site.
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The TiltedPlumeModel
Ampleexperimentalevidenceexiststo showthatthe graphitefibers
we are interestedin fallout witha non-neglibleterminalvelocity,variously .-_
estimatedto be in the rangeof two to threecentimetersper second. The diffusion
• and transportliteratureclearlyindicatesthatfallratesof thismagnitude
havea significantimpacton thedownwindconcentrations.Theseeffects
• were alsodemonstratedin othercalculationsmadefor NASA Langley,princi-
pallythoseby Tretheweyand Cramer. In orderto incorporatetheseeffects
intoour calculationswe haveadoptedthemethodpresentedby Van der HovenN .
Van der Hovenproposedthattheeffectof gravitationalsettlingof diffusing
particlescouldbe modeledby treatingthe plumeas if it were tiltedatan
anglewhosetangentis givenby the ratioof thesettlingspeed,vs, to the
meanhorizontalwind speed,u. The decreasein heightof the plumecenter-
lineas the plumemovesdownwindis thengivenby (vs/U)X,wherex is the
downwinddistancefromthevirtualpointsource. The resultingcenterline
heightH' wouldeventuallyreacha valueof zeroand thenbecomenegativeas
x increases.Themodelguardsagainstthisresultby settingH' equalto
zero forall valuesof x at whichH' wouldotherwisehavea negativevalue;
thisin effectpreventsthe tiltedplumefrom"goingunderground."
DispersionParameters
Equation(5.1)requiresinputvaluesof the dispersionparameters,
Oy and oz, as functionsof the downwinddistance,x, and the prevailing
stabilityconditions.The standardin thiscaseis providedby thewell-
knownPasquill-Giffordcurves,presented,for example,in Turnerand shown
hereas Figures5.1 and 5.2. Severalinvestigatorshaverecentlyquestioned
theiruniversalapplicability;the readeris referredto Pasquill'srecent5
workon thissubject. In viewof thefactthatno generallyacceptedmodi-
• ficationof the Pasquill-Giffordcurvesyet exists,and thatCramerhas
indicated,in discussionsheldat NASALangley,thatsimplemodificationsof
Meteorology and Atomic Energy 1968, David H..Slade, Editor, AEC, July 1968.
(See section 5-3, "Deposition of Particles andGases,") " •
s Pasquill, F., Atmospheric Dispersion Parameters in Gaussian PlumeModeling_
Part II, "Possible Requirements for Changein the Turner WorkbookValues,"
EPA,Research Triangle Park,.June 1976, EPA,600/4-76-0306.
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these curves can handle most unusualmeteorological_-topographicalsituations,
we have essentiallyadopted'these curves for our calcuTations. The ORI risk
assessmentmodelluses a computationalsubroutine--.SUBROUTINE.SIGMA -- from
the Single Source (CRSTER)Model developecLby Turner and available,from the
EPA.6
MeanW;in'dSpeed_
The meanwind speed to be used in Equation (5.1) is most conveniently
related to the s:urface wind speed reported in standard meteorological data.
The wind speed at an% height, h, can be related to the surface wind speed,
us_ually measure4 at an elevation of seven meters, by a power law:
u: uo (hlT)p (5.4)
where uo is the surfacewind speed in meters per second.
The requiredmean wind speed must be representativeof the layer in
which the carbon fibers are dispersing. It is standardpracticeto use the
wind Speed at the plume height for this purpose,on the groundsthat the plume
will disperseabove and below that height. In this case Equation(5.4) may be
written:
u = uo (H/7)p (5.5)
If the actual plume height is lower than seven meters,it is set equalto
seven. (In other words, u = uo if H < 7.) For plume heightsgreaterthan seven
meters, the value of u used in Equation(5.1) is then dependenton uo, H, and p.
The exponent p depends,in turn, on the stabilityconditions. It is assigned
specific values,for the differentPasquill-Giffordstabilityclasses,as shown
in Table 5.1, adapted from EPA's CRSTERmodel. 6
6 EPA, July 1977,o_p_.cit.
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TABLE 5.1
VALUES OF WIND PROFILEEXPONENT
Pasquill-Gifford
StabilityClass Exponent,p
. . . . . .
A O.lO
• B 0.15
: C 0.20
" D 0.25
E 0.30
" F 0.30
Effectof Inversion
The effect of an inversionlid (mixingheight = Hm) above a neutral
or unstablelayer may be taken into account in two ways. First, at downwind•
distanceswhere H' is greaterthan Hm, itmay be assumed that no particles
will reach receptors(dosageequals zero) at the surface. Since the plume
is tilted,H' decreaseswith increasingdownwinddistance,and where H' < Hm
dosage calculationscan be made using Equation (5.1). In most cases, though,
rather stringentphysical conditionsmust be met for the plume to "punch
through"the inversion. Observationsindicatethat this typicallydoes not
occur. It is thereforeconsideredmost reasonableto assume that if the
computedplume height H is greaterthan the height of the inversionHm , it
can be setequal to the inversionheight. Indeedthe ORI risk assessment
model does this.
Further,when the vertical range over which the plume is mixed
becomesequal to the depth of the mixed layer (belowthe inversion),it can
be assumedthat this mixing resultsin a relativelyuniform distributionof
particlesin the vertical. The model therefore,followingTurner,makes the
distributionof graphite fibers uniformin the vertical,from the ground
• surfaceto the base of the inversion,when_Oz becomeslarger than 1.6 Hm.
-For relativelylow elevationsof receptorpoints,it is reasonableto set z = 0
t
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in Equation(5.1)to yieldthe followingsimplifiedequationfor the dosage:
Q(l+r) [_ (y)2] [ (H__)2]D(x.y,O,H'): ou exp ½ exp-½ • (5.5)°y
Then,followingTurnerv, if mixingresultsin an essentiallyuniform
distributionof the fibersin the verticalwe can replace
e (H'_'
2 _Oy_z
(l+r)
by 5.0133OyHm
(notethat2vr2_= 5.0133)and obtain:
q(l+r) exp -.D(x,y,O,H'): 5.0133o HmU Oy (5.6)Y
Equation(5.6)is usedin themodelwheneveroz >1.6Hm.'
Specificationof MixingHeightValues
The meteorologicaldatais providedin the formof a frequency
distributionof the combinationof stabilityclass,wind speedand
direction;thisdataset doesnot includevaluesof themixingheight. The
actualvalueto be usedin calculatingdownwindtransportand diffusionof
graphitefibersmust be specificto the airportandmeteorologicalconditions
usedin the particularMonte-Carlorun.
In our searchfor usefuldatawe wereled to a paperby Holzworth8
whichgivesmean (climatological)mixingheightsfor 62 NationalWeather
" Servicestationsin the contiguousUnitedStates. Forexample,Holzworth's
TableB-l givesthe meanannualmixing.heightfor afternoonsin Washington,
Turner,op. cit.
a Geor_eHolzworth,Mixin9Heights,Wind Speeds,and Potentialfor Urban
AirPollutionThroUghout he ContiguousUnitedStates,EPA,January19"72;
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D.C.,as 1570meters. (Thecorrespondingvaluefor Los Angeles-- SantaMonica
is actuallythe siteof theweatherobservations-- is 814 meters.} These
valuesare mean annualmixingheights,andwe were stillfacedwith the
problemof generatingvaluesthatwere specificallyassociatedwith appro-
priatewind direction,speedand stabilityclassvalues.
The problemof developingappropriatevaluesof themixingheight
_" for differentstabilityconditions,giventhemean annualmixingheight,is
addressedin a paperby K. L. Calder9. Calder,basedon theanalysisof
availabledataand theoreticalarguments,recommendsthat,for Pasquill-
GiffordstabilityclassA, themixingheightshouldbe set equalto 1.5 times
theHolzworthclimatologicalvalue, For stabilityclassesB, C, and D the
mixingheightis set equalto the Holzworthvalue. For stabilityclassesE
and F the mixing_heightis setequalto 100meters. Thismethodgivesthe
resultsforWashington,D.C.,and LosAngeles(SantaMonica),California,
shownin Table5.2 as examples.
TABLE5.2
SAMPLEMIXINGHEIGHTSFOR DIFFERENTSTABILITYCONDITIONS
(Meters)
Stability LosAngeles
Class Washington,D.C. (Santa Monica)
A 2355 1221
B 1570 814
C 1570 814
D 1570 814
E lO0 lO0
- F lO0 lO0
m m l u
ClimatologicalMean 1570 814
9K. L. Calder,"A ClimatologicalModelfor MultipleSourceUrbanAir
Pollution,AppendixD" to A, D.,Buseand:J.R. Zimmerman,User'sGuide
for the ClimatologicalDisperSlonMOdel,EPA-73-024,December1973.
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OtherInputSpecifications
In the descriptionprovidedhereof the ORI transportand diffusion
modelused in the overallriskassessmentcalculations,many of the necessary
inputparametershave been,perforce,defined. In thissectionwe briefly
notethoseinputdatasetsthathavenot beenexplicitlycoveredabove.
• Wind speedand direction,with stabilityclass,are available .
in a frequencydistributionforall of the airportsforwhich
riskassessmentcalculationsweremade. This database (the
fundamentalsourceis the STARdataprovidedby the National
ClimaticCenter)is maintainedby ORI as partof itswork under
a jointFAA-EPAaircraftengineemissionstudy. Foreachof the
fourseasons,and theentireyear,the dataprovide,for each
Pasquill-Giffordstabilityclass,for eachof the sixteenprinci-
palwind directions,the frequencywithwhichthe surfacewind
speedwas observedin any of fiveclassintervals In implementing
the modelwe assumedthewind directionto be uniformlydistributed
withineach of the 22.5-degreesectorscenteredabouteachof the
sixteenprincipalwind directions,to avoidany systematicerror
due to geographicalareacenterlocationsrelativeto the
airportlocation.
• Basedon availabledata reportedby severalinvestigators,
the valueof the settlingspeed,vs, has beenset equalto
0.02metersper second.
• On the basisof our discussionswithTretheweyand Cramerat
themeetingarrangedby the ProjectOfficeratNASA Langley,
we haveuseda reflectioncoefficient,r, equalto 0.7. This
impliessomereflection,but allowsfor someadherenceof the
fibersto surfaceroughnesselements,whichin the casesof
particularinterestare probablybuildingsides,etc.
The inputvalueof Q, themassof fiberreleasedin the simulatedaccidentis,
of course,the principalinputto the transportanddiffusioncalculation.
Itsdevelopmentwas discussedpreviouslyin SectionIV.
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Vl. TRANSFEROF FIBERSINTOINTERIOR
OF STRUCTURES
This sectionof the reportdocumentsthe developmentof themethods
and inputsusedtoestimatethe penetrationof carbonfibersintorepresentative
buildingsand structures.
BASICPROCESSES
Whena buildingor equipmentenclosureis impingedon by a plumeof
carbonfibers,someof the fibersmay enterthe buildingor enclosurethrough
air conditioningor otherventilationsystemsand by variousair leakagepaths.
Onceinsidethe buildingor enclosure,fiberswillbe removedby falloutand
throughleakagepathsbackto the outside. If insideair is recirculatedand
filtered,additionalfiberswill be removedby thismethod. The concentration
of activefibers(e.g.thoseactuallyproducingfailurestresseson equipments
in a buildingor enclosure)at any timemay be determinedfromequations
describingthe net flow. Thesehavebeendevelopedin a relativelysimple
formby Slade.I
The leakageand recirculationpathsmay be definedfor typicalbuild-
ingsand enclosures using standard design factors and ventilation rates
containedin handbooks.Examplesof theseare the Handbookof Air Conditionin9
I Slade,_eteoroloqy and Atomic Enerqy,Eq. (7.83),p. 365,.... 1968..
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SystemDesign2 and the StandardHandbookof MechanicalEngineers._ Falloutof
fibersmaybe estimatedsimplyon thebasis of knownfiberfallratesand the
areauponwhichfibersare beingdeposited.
ORIMODELINGAPPROACH
If a buildingor enclosureis impactedby a cloudof carbonfiberswith
an averageconcentrationX, the rateof changeof theamountof activefibers
insidethe buildingor enclosureis givenby:
dq : viX--dt- Vo(_)dt- Vsa(_)dt" Vr(_)dt (6.1)
where:
q : numberof active fibers in building or enclosure at time (t)
= average concentration of fibers outside building or enclosure
at time (t)
vi : rate at which fiber-borne air enters the building, or enclosure
through both the air conditioning system and through all sources
of leakage
v° : rate at which fiber-borne air leaves the building, including
that removed by recirculation
vs = fallrateof carbonfibers '
vr = rateat whichfibersare removedby recirculationfiltering
s = volumeof buildingor enclosure
a = areaof spacesubjectto fallout.
The abovetermsare definedin moredetailas requiredduringsubsequent
developmentin thissection.
Equation(6.1)may be rearrangedintothe followingform:
dt = dq (6.2)
v
_Carrier Air ConditioningCo.,Handbookof Air Conditionin9 SystemDesign,
McGraw-HillBookCo_,1965.
3StandardHandbookfor MechanicalEngineers,Baumeister& Marks,McGraw-Hill,
1967.
6-2
or: d__ d(s_) . (6.3)
S' vi__ Vo(s_)_ Vsa(s_), Vr(s_)
Now,for convenience,let
. A = vo + Vsa + vr
so thatEquation(6.3)can be moreeasilywrittenas:
dt _ d(s_) (6.4)
s v._- A(s_)1
Equation(6.4)is:mostconvenientlyintegratedfor two specialcasesas
shownin the next two subsectionsof thischapter.
InsideConcentrationDurin9 Build-upPhase
The firstspecialcaseto be consideredis the build-upof the
concentrationof graphitefibersinsidea buildingstartingat the timethe
leadingedgeof the graphitefiberplumefirsthitsthe exteriorof the
building. For conveniencelet the timewhen thisoccursbe definedas
t=O
at which time the interiorconcentrationof fibers is also zero:
In this case Equation (6.4) can be integratedto yield:
t_l [ vi_ ] (6.5)
_--_In
vi_-A(QIs)
In the moreconventionalexponentialformatthisequationmay be written:
q=vi_ [1_ e-(A/s)tI (6.6)s A
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InteriorConcentrationDuringDecax
The secondspecialcase to be consideredfor Equation(6.4)is that
describingthe behaviorof the concentrationof graphitefiberswithinan -,
enclosureafterthe exteriorplumehas passed. Ifwe definethe timeat which
the cloudjustpassesthe exteriorof the structureas
t- T
thenthe exteriorconcentrationat thistime (andlatertimes)is
X= O,
The differentialequation,Equation(6.4),takesthe specialform:
whichmay be integratedto yield:
t-T _ -(I/A)In . (6.7)
S
This may alsobe writtenin the exponentialformas:
q(t)_ q(T)e-(A/s)(t-T). (6.8)
S S
In thiscasewe havemadeexplicitthe dependenceof the fibercount,q, on
timein orderto differentiatebetweenits valuefor time_ fromits valueat
the specifictimeof cloudpassage,T.
Calculationof InteriorExposure
The exposureis definedmathematicallyas the integralof the
concentrationovertime. For conveniencewe introducea termE(O,T)for the
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interiorexposureat timeT, and assumethatthe concentrationwas zeroprior
to timezero. The exposureat timeT can thenbe written:
• 1E(O,T) : T
0
We losevery littlegeneralitywith regardto the completeriskassessment
calculationif we assumethattheexteriorconcentrationactuallyhas the
constantvalueX fromtime t = 0 untiltimet = T. This is particularlytrue
becausethe transportand diffusionmodel,describedin SectionV of this
report,actuallytreatsthe cloudof fibersin sucha way thatwe may think
of it as causinga sharprisein exteriorconcentrationto a constantlevel
untilthe cloudpasses,followedby a suddendropto zeroconcentration.
Withthisassumptionit is a relativelystraightforwardmatterto integrate
the expressionin Equation(6.9)to providethe followingresult:
IT (eA _]
vi_ s - T T (6.10)
E(O,T) - _ + _
In analogousfashionit is possibleto writean integralfor the
exposuredueto the fibersinteriorto the structureafterthe exteriorcloud
has passed. We considersometimelongafterthe exteriorplumehas passed,
and considerthisto be t = _ for our purposes.The exposureexperiencedafter
theexteriorplumehas passedis definedas E(T,_)and is givenby:
E(T,_):/e -(A/s)(T-T)dT (6.11)
T
whichmay be integratedto yield:
E(T,_) : (s/A) (q/s) T " (6.12)
" The totalinteriorexposuredue to the passageof the exteriorplume
can be writtenas:
i
E(O,_) = E(O,T) + E(T,_). (6.13)
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We evaluatethis expressionby using the resultsjust obtained,namely
Equations(6.10)and (6.12): ....
E(O'_; -T T + _ - s
Nowwe notethatEquation(6.6)can be written,for timeT, as:
q(T)= vi___X[1- e-(A/s)T]" (6.6a)s A
This can now be substitutedinto Equation (6.14),after which, if terms are
appropriatelycombined,we obtain:
vi_ (6.15)
:-- T •
A
The exteriorexposure,due to our assumptionthatthe concentration
is a constantvalue_over a timeperiodof lengthT, is simplygivenby:
E° =_T
so thatthe interiorand exteriorexposuresare relatedby:
Vo
E vi I (6.16)
E° A vo + avs+ vr
which may be termed the "penetrationfactor."
PenetrationFactors
Equation (6.16)forms the principalbasis for our calculationof
interior exposure values which are used, in turn, to compute the failure _
probabilities for specific equipments, as described! in Section VII, which
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follows.•Eachof the termsappearingin thatequationis discussedin
moredetailbelow:
• The rateat whichfiber-borneair,vi, entersthe buildingor
otherenclosureincludesthatwhichentersthroughthe air
conditioningsystemand thatwhichentersvia leakage.The
• "air,enteringthroughthe air conditioningsystemis obtained
fromthe air conditioningairflow,Vac,and thefilteref-
- ficiency,EFF,as follows:
Vacf = Vac (1 - EFF). (6.17)
• The rateat whichfiber-borneair entersthe buildingor other
enclosurevia leakage,v1, is obtainedfromstandardair con-
ditioningplanningfactorsfor variouscombinationsof types
of doorsandwindows,in different ypesof buildings,lo-
catedin differentclimaticzones,for differentwind con-
ditions. Then:
vi = Vacf + Vl • (6.18)
e The rateat whichfiber-borneair leavesthebuilding,vo, as-
sumingconservationof mass,is equalto the totalof the air
enteringthebuildingthroughthe air conditioningor ventilat-
ingsystemand the air enteringthe buildingvia leakage:
= + vI (6.19)V0 Vac
• For the fallrate,vs, we haveused thenominalvalueof 4
feetperminute,or 2 centimeterspersecondfor all calcula-
tions;thisappearsto be in accordwithcurrentobservational
data.
e The rateat whichfibersare removedby recirculation,vr, ac-
countsfor fibersremovedby recirculationfiltersplusthat
whichdepositsin the ductwork.The rateatwhich fibersare
removedin the recirculationsystemis obtainedfromthe pro-
ductof the recirculationrate,Vrr,andthe filtereffi-
ciency,whilethatwhichis depositedout is estimatedbythe k.
productof the fallrate,vs, and theeffectiveareaof the
recirculationsystem,ar:
Vr = Vrr (EFF)+ vs ar . (6.20)
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MultipleEnclosures
In some instancesthere can be severalenclosuresin series in the
penetrationpath, for examplean equipmenthousingmay be locatedinsideof
a building. In this case, the penetrationfactorsare multipliedtogether
to arrive at an effectiveoverall factor. This operationtacitlyassumesthat
the resultderivedin Equation (6.16)holds even if the exterior concentration
cannot be characterizedas a squarewave. Intuitively,this assumptionappears
reasonablein the presentcontext.
CHARACTERIZATIONOF TYPICALSTRUCTURES
The sizes, shapes,and types of buildingsand equipmentenclosures
of interest to this study are, of course,nearly infinitein variety. How-
ever, if it is assumedthat these buildingsand enclosureshave been designed
to generallyaccept heatingand ventilationstandards,they can be,defined
by a few ratherstandardcategories. It is assumedthat all buildingsand
equipmentenclosurescan be adequatelydefinedby one or more of the following
categories:
I. Small EquipmentBuildingor Van
2. Medium EquipmentBuilding
3. Large EquipmentBuildingor Factory
4. EquipmentRoom insidea building
5. UtiIity Room
a) filtered
b) unfiltered
6. HospitalOperatingRoom, IntensiveCare Area
7. SwitchgearCabinet
a) filtered
b) unfiltered
8, ElectronicEquipmentEnclosure- forcedair
a) filtered
b) unfiItered
9. ElectronicEquipmentEnclosurewith louvers
a) filtered
b) unfiltered
ID. Residence
a) air conditioned
b) not air conditioned
ll. Business/OfficeBuilding.
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DesignFactors
Table6.1 showsthe designfactorsassociatedwith each categoryof
buildingor enclosuredefinedabove. Thesedesignfactorsare usedto deter-
mine the air conditioningflowrates,filterefficiencies,and air leakage
ratesusedin Equation(6.16)et seq. The sizesof buildingsand enclosures
havebeen arbitrarilyselected. It shouldbe notedthatenclosuresize is
not criticalas longas theassociatedventilationrateis reasonablefor
thatsizeenclosure.
The typesand numbersof doorsandwindowswere selectedon thebasis
of buildingtypeand size. It is assumedthatthe additionof doorsand win-
dowsfor largerbuildingsof the sametypewouldresultin approximatelycon-
stantleakageper volume(i.e.,leakageeffectsare independentof building
size oncea basicdesignis selected).The sizeand typeof doorsandwindows
are selectedfromthoseshownin Table44, pp. 1-95of the Handbookof Air
Conditionin9 SystemDesign._ Industrialdoorsare well fittedmetaldoors
withweatherstripping.Hospitaldoorsand businessdoorsare selectedfrom
Table41E,pp. 1-91. The leakageratethroughbusinessdoorsis basedon
an averageoccupancyrateof 5 peopleper 2400squarefeetand 2.5 CFM
leakageper person.
The ventilationratesshownin Table6.1 are basedon standards
.containedin the Handbookof Air ConditioningSystemDesignsand in the
StandardHandbookforMechanicalEngineers.6 Ventilationratesfor electronic
equipment,in cubicfeetper minute,are approximatedby:
ventilationrate= powerconsumptioninwatts/required
temperaturereductionin degreesF.
Typicalelectricalandelectronicequipmentmust be keptwithinabout20
degreesFahrenheitof the ambienttemperatureso thata ventilationrateof
approximately1.5 cubicfeetperminute(CFM)perwatt consumedis a reasonable
valueto assume.
" Op. cit.
s Ibid.
Op.cit____.
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TABLE6.1
DESIGNFACTORSFORTYPICALENCLOSURES
Ventila-
Size • Doors FacingI.!ind Windows FacingWindEnclosure W x L x H . tion Filter'
Category (feet) No. Size l Type No. Size Type Rate(CFM) Eff.*
I. Small Equipment 15 x 30 x IS I 3' x 7' Industrial/ 0 300 85% AFI
Buildingor Van Weatherstrip 95% CF
Industrial
2. Medium Equipment 30 x 60 x I0 2 3' x 7' Industrial/ 2 3' x 5' Casement .lO00 85% AFI
Building Weatherstrip 1/64" Crack 95% CF
3. Large Equipment lO0 x 300 x I0' 3 3' x 7' Industrial/ 20 3' x 5' Industrial 3000 80% AFI
Buildingor Factory Weath{rstrip Casement 90% CF
Building (per floor) 1/64" Crack,
3'. x 7'
4. EquipmentRoom in 30 x 60 x I0 2 Interior/ FactoryType 5 3' x 5' Industrial 1000 85% AFI
Building (one exter- Exterior Interior"and CasemenZ 90% CF
ior we11) Vestibule Exterior 1/64" Crack:
Factory Type a - 85%AFI
5. Utility Room 30 x 60 x I0 1 3' x 7' Exterior/ 0 .... 500 95%CF
(_ I/5" Crack b - Nonel
0 6. HospitalOperating 20 x 25 x I0 2 3' x 7' Swinging 0 .... I000 Doubleat
Room, Intensive with Ves- Door 95% CF Each
Care Area tibule I
: a - 300 J_5% AFI 95%CF
7. Switchgear Cabinet 5 x 3x 7 0 .... 0 ....
(FromWestinghouse b - ! NoneAssumed
Catalog55-000) Leakage
a - _5% AF!
8. ElectronicEquipment 2 x 1 x I/2 .... . - - 0 .... 30 95% CF
Enclosure(with (20 b - None
forcedair) ) watts)
i I l a - ES,_y_FI
9. ElectronicEquipment 2 x I x 1 0 .... 0 - - ( - - J 3 | 9E_ CF _-_
Enclosure(with l J (2 w_tts)i b- _,one
louvers) J I
85% AFI 95%CFGlass - Avg. iResidential a - 30C
I0. Residences 40 x 30 x 8 1 3' x 7' Fit 3/16" 4 4' x 7' ICzse_ent b - None iCrack ( 1/32" Crack(
II. Business (small) 60 x 40 x I0 1 3 x 7' Swinging ) ;.II!dindcv;sSealed I cOO
I
I
' _ 33_ AFI
j 95% CF
• Two types considered: Dry Type Glass Wool: 85%AFI, 95%CF
Viscous Impingement: 80%AFI, 90%CF
The effectivenessof filterswith respectto carbon fibers of various
size is not accuratelyknown. Comparisonsof American Filter Institutevalues
forstandardfilter typeswith availablegraphitefiber tests on similarfilters
indicatethe approximaterelationsshown in Table 6.2.
TABLE6.2
COMPARISONOF REPORTEDFILTEREFFECTIVENESS
WITH EFFECTIVENESSIN FILTERINGRAPHITEFIBERS
(percent)
Effectiveness GraphiteFiber
Reportedby AFI Effectiveness
80 90
85 95
95 99
99 99.9
PenetrationParameterValues
Table6.3 summarizesthe dataobtainedfromtheseveralsources
•referencedabovefor the differentenclosuretypesdefinedhere. Theseare
shownfor buildingsin typicaltemperatezoneclimaticregimesfor different
valuesof thewind speed. In implementingthesevaluesfor the computermodel
it was determinedthatthe "falloutterm"tendedto dominatein computing
numericalvaluesof the ratioshownin Equation(6.16). The valueswere
thereforerelativelyindependentof wind speed. For this reasona standard
10mile-per-hourwind speedwas assumedto be blowingdirectlyat external
windwarddoorsand windows. In addition,the followingassumptionswere
introduced:
• The "airconditioning"forenclosuretypes7b, 9a, 9b is by
naturalconvectionthroughlouversat recommendedvalues.
• Leakageof air intoelectricaland electronicenclosures
(otherthanthatwhichis intendedthroughlouvers)is neglected.
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TABLE 6.3
VENTILATIONRATES(CFM) FORTYPICAL ENCLOSURES
AT VARIOUSWINDSPEEDS
0 mph* 5 mph I0 mph 15 mph 20 mph -
Enclosure
Category vi Vo vi Vo vi Vo vi Vo vi Vo
1 15 300 24 309 25 310 33 318 41 326
2 50 1000 69.6 1020 80 1030 95.6 !046 115.8 1066
3 300 3000 343 3043 390 3090 450 3150 516 3216
4 50 1000 61 1011 73 1023 88 1038 104 1054
5a 25 500 89 564 153 628 217 692 285 760
5b 500 500 564 564 628 628 692 692 760 760
6 2.50 1000 4.25 1002 6,00 1000 7.70 1005 9.43 1007
7a 15 300! Infiltrationthru cabinetneglected
7b 1 1 Switchgearassumed insidebuilding
8a 1.50 30 Leakageis assumedto be zero
8b 30 30 Leakageis assumedto be zero
9a 0.15 3 Leakageis assumed to be zero
9b 3 3 Leakage is assumed to be zero
10a 15 300 131 416 262 550 372 657 527 812
10b 0 0 416 416 550 550 657 657 812 812
11 25 500 30 505 37.5 512,5 45 520 55 530
*Thesevaluesalsoapplyto pressurizedenclosures.
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With theseadditionalminorassumptions,the inputparametersfor
calculatingthe transferfunction,or effectof ventilationon allowingex-
teriorfibersto enterbuildingsor otherstructures,are thoseshownin
Table6.4. The relationshipof thesebuildingand otherenclosuretypesto
differentfacilitiesmodeledin eachof the airport-urbancomplexes
treatedin the riskassessmentcalculationsis establishedin the next
sectionof thisreport. Thereit is shownthateachclassof business
or Industrymay be characterizedas beinglocatedin one or moreof the
typesof enclosuresdescribedin thissection.The use of theseone-to-one
relationshipsbetweenbusinesstypeand buildingtypereducesthe input
data variabilityand thustendsto reducethe varianceof thefinal re-
sults. On the basisof resourcesavailablefor thisanalysis,and the ex-
pecteddifficultyin improvingon thisassumption,it was consideredmost
appropriateto make thisassumptionand acceptthe consequences.The
calculationof the failureprobabilitiesfor specificequipmentin parti-
cularclassesof enclosuresis combinedwith the calculationof thetrans-
fer of fibersfromthe outsideto the insideof thoseenclosures.
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TABLE6.4
INPUTPENETRATIONPARAMETERVALUESFORSELECTEDBUILDINGANDENCLOSURETYPES*
Bullding PenetrationFactors
vi/
or vi Vo avs Vo,aVs(Vo+aVs).Enclosure Vac (I-EFF) Vacf Vl
Type
I 300 .05 15 I0 25 310 1800 2110 .01180
2 1000 .05 50 30 80 1030 6000 7020 .00989
3 300 .10 300 90 390 3090 lOOwO00 103090 .00378
4 I000 .05 50 23 73 1023 6000 7023 .01040
!
5a 500 .05 25 128 153 628 6000 6628 .023104_
5b 500 1.O0 500 128 628 628 6000 6692 .09380
6 1000 .0025 2.50 3.50 6.0 1000 6000 7000 .00086
7a 300 .05 15 0 15 300 60 360 .04170
7b I 1.00 I 0 I I 60 61 .01640
8a 30 .05 1.50 0 1.5D 30 4 34 .04410
8b 30 1.00 30 0 30 30 4 34 .88200
9a 3 .05 0.15 0 0.15 3 4 7 .02140
9b 3 I.O0 3 0 3 3" 4 7 .42800
lOa 300 ,05 15 247 262 550 4000 4550 .05800
lOb 0 1.O0 0 530 550 550 4000 4500 .11100
11 500 .05 25 12.5 37.5 512.5 9600 10112.5 .00370
*Allventilationratesare in cubicfeetperminute.
VII. FAILUREOF INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVEEQUIPMENTS
DESCRIPTIONOF FAILUREMODELS
Use of Exponential Model
The probability of failure of equipment which is exposed to carbon
fibers is obtained from the exponential expression:
PF : 1 -exp I-E/E] (7.1)
Where:
PF = probability of failure of equipment
E : exposure level in the immediate vicinity of the
vulnerable equipment, in fiber-seconds per cubic meter
E : average exposure level causing a failure
The U.S. Army Ballistics Research Laboratory (BRL) at Aberdeen, Maryland has
tested the exponential model against a large number of test results and has
shown that the experimental data show a close fit to the exponential
failure law. 1'2 ORI also completed a log-linear plot of e-ct as a function of
time-to-failure (t) for various concentrations (c). This analysis, performed
during ORl's previous Phase I work using data from the Ford Aeronautics
Have NameVulnerability of the Improved Hawk System, BRL Report No. 1964,
Shelton & Moore, Feb. 1977. .
ORI discussions with BRL, Aug. 15, 1978.
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generictargettestsshoweda linearrelationshipexceptfor largevaluesof
the time-to-failure,forwhichdatawere sparse. For our purposes,then,
Equation(7.1)is consideredto adequatelydescribethe probabilityof failure
for a singlepieceof equipmentas a functionofexposure.
Incorporationof Penetration
The valuesof exposureusedin Equation(7_1)are thosedirectly
impingingon the vulnerablequipment.Whenthisequipmentis locatedwithin
a buildingand/orenclosure,the valueof the internalexposuremay be obtained
fromthe outsideexposureby multiplyingtheexternalexposureby the appropri-
ate penetrationfactor(s)(asdescribedin SectionVI):
E = Eo KP (7.2)
where:
E = insideexposure
Eo = outsideexposure
vi
KP = = penetrationfactor(Sec.VI).
vo + avs + vr
Whenan equipmentis doublyenclosed,forexample,when equipmentis
in a cabinetthatis insidea building,an overallpenetrationvalueis
obtainedfrom:
Kpi = (KPb). (KPe) (7.3)
\
Where:
KPi = overallpenetrationfactorfor equipment(i)
KPb = penetrationfactorfor building
KPe = penetrationfactorfor enclosure
Developmentof FailureConstants
Sincethe penetrationfactorsand themean exposureto failure,E-,
are constantsfor any particularpieceof equipmentin a particularenclosure
(whereenclosuredescribesthe buildingtypeas wellas any box the equipment
is in)we can definea singlefailureparameter:
Kij = KPj/_ (7.4)
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Where:
: overall failure parameter for equipment of type iKij
in anenclosure of type j
KPj = penetration factor for an enclosure of type j
Ei : mean exposure to failure for equipment of type i
The parameter Kij may now be substituted into Equation (7.1) to yield a use-
ful relationship giving the probability of failure for equipment of type i
in an enclosure of type j for any value of the exposure recorded exterior
to the enclosure:
PF,ij : 1 - exp (-Kij Eo) (7.5)
Treatment of Equipment Confiqurations
The failure probabilities for individual equipments may now be
combined to cover various series, parallel, or series-parallel configurations
found in typical facilities. It is first convenient to define the reliability
of a particular piece of equipment in a particular class of enclosure as:
Rij : 1 - PF,ij (7.6)
Then we can write, for several pieces of equipment in series:
PFS,j : 1 - RIj R2j ....
: 1 -(e-Klj EO)(e'K2j Eo) ....
= 1 - e -(KIj + K2j + .... ) Eo
This is the probability that at least one of the equipments in series fails.
For situations in which several equipments are in parallel (redundant configu-
rations), the probability of failure for the aggregate is given by:
PFP,j : PF,Ij " PF,2j " ' • • (7.7)
Series-parallel equipment configurations are treated by first converting
parallel combinations into an aggregate equivalent and then computing
failures #or the resulting series configurations.
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A standardconfigurationfromwhichall facilitiesmay be synthesized
is shownim Figure7.1. "PRI"representsthe primarysourceof powerfromthe
publicutility. When thissourcefails,powerat the facilitymust be obtained
froma localauxiliarypowersupply,"AUX,"if sucha supplyis available.
Box "SW"refersto serviceswitchgearwhichhandlesincomingpowerat the facil-
ity. Commonequipmentincludescentralcomputers,centralcommunications,etc.
The failureof commonequipmentresultsin an overallfailureof the facility.
Distributedcomponentsaccountforparallelassemblylinesor otherparallel
productionelementsso thatthe failureof a distributedmodulewouldreduce
facilitycapacityor productionwithoutcausinga completefacilityoutage.
The probabilityof no inputpowerat the facility(PNP)is obtained
from:
PNP = PPRI+ (l - PPRI) • (Psw) (7.8)
where:
PPRI= probabilityof failureof primarypower
PSW = probabilityof failureof switchgear
The probabilityof no powerinsidethefacility(PNPI)is givenby:
PNPI= PNP " PAUX (7.9)
wherePAUXis the probabilitythatthe auxiliarypowersystemfails. The
probabilitythatthereis powerinsidethe facilityis equalto:
PPI = l - PNPI
The probabilitythatthereis powerinsidethe facilitybut thatthe facility
is downdue to a failureof the commonmoduleis equalto:
PPI ' PFC
wherePFC is the probabilityof failureof the commonmodule.
Similarly,the probabilitythatthereis powerinsidethefacility
and thatthe commonmodulehas not failed,but thatthe facilitylsproduction
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Lines
FIGURE7.1. STANDARDCONFIGURATION
FORMODELLINGFACILITY POWERFLOW
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or output is reduceddue to a_failureof one of the distributedmodules is
estimatedby:
PPI (l - PFc)PFD
where PFD is the probabilityof failureof one distributedmodule: for example,
one of severalproductionlines operatingin parallel.
By carefullysummingup the terms of the relationshipsdeveloped
above,we find that the probabilityof no output or productionfrom any single
distributedmodule is equal to:
F = PNPI+ PPIPFC+ PPI(l- PFc)PFD (7.10)
Now, the probabilitythat exactlyn out of a total of N distributed
modules remain in production--donot fail --is given by:
R(n,N)= (_) (I - PFD)n (PFD)N-R .
In this"case the fractionalcapacityassociatedwith the n distributedmodules _
that do not fail is n/N. We maytherefore write, for the expected capacity
or productionobtainablefrom the distributedmodules:
N
(_) (_) (I - PFD)n (PFD)N-R
n=O
The fractionof productionlost due to failuresof the distributedmodulesmay
thereforebe estimatedby PFD' the probabilityof failureof one distributed
module, and Equation (7.10)can be used to estimatethe fractionof production
or output lost due to failuresat the facility. If the equationwere applied
a
to many identicalfacilitieswe would expect the overall result to be essentially
the same as if each facility'sdegradationwere obtainedby a randomsampling
procedure. In actual analyses,however,the equationis appliedto a varietyof
facility-typesat one location,and this may result in some reductionof variance
in the final results.
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RELATIONSHIPOF INDUSTRIESANDPOPULATIONCENTERSTO EQUIPF_NTENSENBLES
Methodology
In any center of population, i.e., urban area, close to a major air-
port, there is a wide range of facilities measured by type and/or size. There
isalso great variability in types and configurations ofequipment across
facilities, or even within facilities of a particular type. The only approach
considered practical for this study was to define "typical" facilities which are
believed to best represent specific facilities in existence in the geographical
area being studied during the time frame of interest. Failure computations
were then addressed to these typical facilities. To provide the basis for
defining the typical facilities it was decided to make use of a classification
scheme already well established for other, quite different reasons: the U.S.
Census Bureau Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Codes. It is recog-
nized that in some cases there can be a bigger difference between two facilities
characterized by the same SIC Code than between facilities with different code
numbers. However, these code numbers do provide a standardized basis for
facility definition and have the advantage of being directly relatable to popu-
lation centers for which census data are readily available. Further, as shall
become evident below, in Section VIII of this Report, this decision makes a
great body of data developed for economic analysis available for use in
estimating the dollar impact of a graphite fiber incident. A partial list of
SIC numbers and Corresponding business types is shown in Table 7.1. The industry
categories shown are those that figured prominently in the study.
The types of individual equipments and their groupings into typical
facility configurations (of the type typified generally by Figure 7.1) were
preparedafter a broad literature review, supported by a number of site visits,
and further augmented by discussions with representatives of several major
industries and government agencies. These data and information-gathering
activities are summarized here. Documents covered in the literature review,
primarily periodicals in order to obtain up-to-date information, included:
• IEEE Spectrum 1970 to Present
• Instruments and Control Sxstems 1970 to Present
• Production Engineerin 9 (formerly Automation) 1970 to Present
m Computers and Automation 1975 to Present
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TABLE7.1
SELECTEDLIST OFSIC CODENUMBERS
SIC
Code Major IndustryGroup
Manufacturing
20 Foodand kindredproducts
22 TextileMillProducts
23 Appareland other textileproducts
- 24 Lumberandwood products
25 Furnitureand fixtures
27 Printingand publishing
28 Chemicalsand alliedproducts
29 Petrole:nand coalproducts
30 Rubberand misc.plasticsproducts
33 Primarymetalindustries
34 Fabrlcatedmetalproducts
35 Mach(ne_, exceptelectrlcal
36 Electricand electronicequlp_.ant
37 Transportationequipment
38 Instrumentsand relatedproducts
.... TransPortationand other'publicutilities ''
45 Transportationby air
48 Communication
49 Electric,gas,and sanitaryservices
'Wholesaietrade '"
50 Wholesaletrade-durablegoods
51 Wholesaletrade-nondurablegoods
Retailtrade
52 Buildingmaterialsand gardensupplies
53 Generalmerchandisestores
54 Foodstores
55 Automotivedealersand servicestations
56 Apparelan(laccesso_ stores
57 Furnitureand ho_,efurnishingstores
58 Eatingand drinkingplaces
59 MiscelIaneousretail
Finance,insurance,and realestate
60 Banking
61 Creditagenciesotherthanbanks
62 Security,con_noditybrokersand services
63 insurancecarriers
Services
73 Businessservices
80 Healthservices
99* Government
* Definedby ORI
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• DataProcessin9 _ 1975to Present
• ElectronicCommunication . 1975to Present
• MachineDesign 1975to Present
Visitswere made to the followingfacilitiesin theWashington,D.C.metro-
politanarea:
• WashingtonNationalAirport
• HolyCrossHospital,SilverSpring,Md.
• MontgomeryGeneralHospital,Olney,Md.
• RadioStationWTOP, Wheaton,Md.
Discussionswere heldwithrepresentativesof the followingspecificindustries
and governmentagencies:
e PotomacElectricPowerCompany
• EdisonElectricCompany
• IEEESubstationDesignGroup
.e Departmentof Energy/EnergyResearchand DevelopmentAgency
• FederalPowerCommission
e WestinghouseSubstationDesignGroup
• Departmentof Health,Education;andWelfare/
Bureauof MedicalDevices
e GeneralElectricMedicalDevicesDivision
In addition,severalvisitsweremade to the BallisticsResearchLaboratory
(BRL),Aberdeen,Maryland,for generaldiscussionson the subjectof equip-
ment vulnerability,the reviewof testproceduresused_atthatfacility,and
the reviewof specificexposure-to-failureresults,
The equipmenttypesfinallydefinedfor eachSIC code-typical
facilitywere thencomparedwith the typesof equipment hat.hadbeencovered
in the BRL testprogram.Meanexposure-to-failurevalueswereselectedfor.
thoseequipmentstestedthatmostcloselymatchedtheequipmentsdefinedfor
eachtypicalindustrial-commercialf cility,as well as residences Once the
taskof definingthe typicalfacilityforeach requiredSIC codenumberwas
' completed,the numbersof.eachfacility-.-businessor industrialunit --in -.
eachcountyor othergeographicalareaof interestwere obtaineddirectly
frompublishedBureauof Censusdata,primarilythe CountyBusinessPatterns.
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Thesedatawere necessarilysupplementedin somecasesby personalcontacts
with CensusBureaupersonnel.The methodsusedto assessthe consequencesof
industrial-commercialfailuresand theirassociatedcostsare describedin
SectionVIIIof thisreport.
Descriptionof TypicalFacilities
Specifictypesof industriesand relatedfacilitiesare described
in AppendixA. AppendixA servesas a baselinefromwhichconfigurationsand
vulnerabilityfactorsforeachrequiredSIC Codewere derived;theappendix
containsthe followinginformation:
• Descriptionsof specificconfigurations
• Descriptionof equipmentcomponents
• Rationalefor assigningenclosuretypes
• Rationalefor assigningmean exposure-to-failurevalues.
Standardizedconfigurationsfor the variousSIC Codes,basedon varia-
tionsof Figure7.1,are describedbelowand illustratedin Figure7.2:
e ElectricUtility;SIC 49; Figure7.2a. The stationconsists
of commoncommunicationsand controlstogetherwith a numberof
parallelbays,eachconsistingof a switchgearpaneland high
voltageequipment.
• SmallLightIndustry;SIC 20,23,24,27,38;Figure7.2b. These
industrialplantsare assumedto haveno auxiliarypower. The
followingspecificchangesweremade to the generalconfiguration
shownin Figure7.2bforeach of the SIC numbersshown:
- SIC 23,38: replaceserviceswitchwith powerdistribution
- SIC 20,38: servocircuitsas shown
- SIC 24 : replaceinterfaceunit+ servowith highvoltage
motorcontrolsand heavydutymotors
- SIC 23,27: powerdirectlyfromcontrollerto smallmotors
- SIC 24 : no controller
• LargeLightIndustry:SIC 22,25,34,35,36;Figure7.2c.
Largelightindustriesare similarto smalllightindustries
exceptthatauxiliarypoweris assumedto be available.The
followingvariationsof Figure7.2cwere introduced:
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_) El_-tricU'tility, SIC 49 J
InsideSubstation IiBuilding " _" Outside
(b) Small U_t {ndustriel, SIC 20, 23, 24, 27, 38. I
(Poweror Dist) -- or: SW + H. D. Motor
-- or: Small motors
(c) LargeLight Indusll_ries,SIC 22, 25, 34, 35, 36. I
.__ SERVO J[i o.
I _ H.V. SW. + Heavy DutyI Motor
/ _ (d) Heavily AutomatedIndustries,SIC 26, 28, 29, 30, 33, 37. I
KIDZ
.m
(e) Bu_mm Service. SIC 60,61,62,63,73. J
FIGURE7.2. CONFIGURATIONOF EQUIPMENTFORSPECIFIC INDUSTRYGROUPSIDENTIFIED
BY SIC NUMBER •
7111
(f) Health Ser_ - S$C80 I
(g) Air Transportation- SIC 45 (Air Traffic Control System) I
,__@'_ I DiStributed
(h) CommunicationServices(Telephone) SIC 48 J
{i) Small B_sineszEstablishments- S|C 50 thru 59.99. I
_ Power Distribution
FIGURE7.2. (CONCLUDED)CONFIGURATIONF EQUIPMENTFORSPECIFICINDUSTRY
GROUPSIDENTIFIEDBY SIC NUMBER
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-- SIC 22,36: interfaceunitsand servosas shown
-- SIC 25,34,35:replaceinterferenceunitsand servos
withhighvoltagecontrolsandmotors
-- SIC 34,35,36: linecontroller
-- SIC 25 no linecontroller
• Heavily AutomatedIndustry: SIC 26,28,29,30,33,37; Figure 7.2d.
• Heavily automated industries are similar to large light indus-
tries except that they have a commonmodule consisting of compu-
ters in parallel, together with keyboard/displays which are also
in parallel. SIC 28,29,30 and 37 are assumedto have production
lines dominated by servo systems while SIC 26 and 33 are assumed
to have production lines dominated by high voltage motor controls
(switchgear) and heavy duty motors.
• BusinessServices:SIC 60,61,62,63,73;Figure7.2e.
Businessservicefacilitiesare assumedto havea singlecentral
computerwith associatedpowerconverterand keyboard/display.
Distributedmodulesconsistof dataterminals(keyboard/display)
togetherwith localprocessorsand input-outputinterfaceunits.
• HealthServices:SIC 80; Figure7.2f.
Healthservicefacilitiesare assumedto be vulnerableonly to
poweroutages,and to possessauxiliarypower. It is assumed
thatmedicaldevicesand othervulnerable"production"unitsare
in highlyprotectedenvironments.
• Air Transportation:SIC 45; Figure7.2g.
Air trafficcontrolconsistsof powerunitstogetherwithcentral
computingfacilities.The distributedmodulesactuallyconsist
of RADARS,ILS,VORs,Communications,etc. Theseare highly
redundant,well filtered,and havelocal(site)auxiliarypower,
and on thisbasiswere not includedin the computerizedmodel.
Off-linecalculationshowedthatthe riskto such facilities
couldbe neglected.
• CommunicationServices(Tel_phone):SIC 48; Figure7.2h.
A verysimplifiedtelephonecentralofficeis assumedto consist
of one commonmarkerand registerequipmentservinga numberof
trunkframesand lineframesviarelayswitches.
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• Small Businesses;SIC 50-59,99;Figure7.2i.
Small businessestablishmentsare assumedto be vulnerableonly
from the standpointof power outage• The only vulnerableequip-
ment within the establishmentare power distributioncircuits.
• PrivateResidences
Residenceswith and without air conditioningare considered,
using a fractionof occurrencebased on type of county (urban,
rural). The only equipmentsconsideredto be vulnerablewere
televisionsets and high-fidelityequipment. Electrictoasters
are vulnerablebut, becauseof their relativelylow replacement
cost, they were not includedin the calculation. On the other
hand, toastersdo appear to constitutea potentialshock hazard;
this effect was not includedin the calculationsreportedhere.
The considerableuncertaintysurroundingthis problemmade it
virtuallyimpossibleto attemptto quantify the phenomenon• It
is a subjectthat clearlyrequiresmore attentionin further
analysisof the carbon fiber risk.
Implementationfor the SimulationModel
The computerprogram that determinesthe impactof each simulated
aircraftaccidentand associatedreleaseof graphite fibers uses Equation (7.10)
to estimate the probabilitythat each businessor industryin the geographical
area of interestis affected• One of the major effortsin this projecthas been
the characterizationof each business-industrysector,definedby an SIC number,
by a specificset of equipmentsinstalledin a specifictype of structure• The
resultsfor the physicalplant were describedearlier,and the equipmentproblem
has been covered in this section. Once these definitionshave been arrived at,
we have, in effect,defineda set of Kij (cf Equation(7•4)) for each class of
equipmentin each class of building•
FailureparametersWere prepared for each SIC number by using expressions
(7.3) and (7.4) for each equipment-enclosurecombinationdefinedfor each rele-
vant SIC number• In terms of the configurationsillustratedin Figure 7.2, the
.°
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following generalized equipmentcategories were defined:
• serviceswitch,or powerdistributionpanel
• auxiliarypowersystem
• commonequipmentmodule
• distributedequipmentmodule.
It was-foundthat,for computerinputspecification,itwas usefulto define
a set of inputparameterslessabstractthanthoserelyingon the "ij"notation.
Accordingly,the followingset of failureparameterswere defined;thesecor-
respondto the Kij definedby Equation(7.4),and are preparedfor eachSIC
numberneededfor eachairport-urbanareasimulated:
Inputfailureparameterforserviceswitch,inputpower
• KF'SW panel,or transformer
• KF,AUX Inputfailureparameterforauxiliarypowersystem
• KF,C Inputfailureparameterfor commonequipmentmodule
• KF,D Inputfailureparameterfor distributedequipmentmodule.
In orderto accommodatethewide varietyof actualconfigurations
shownin Figure7.2and describedabove withinthe generalstructureof power
flowingintoa generalizedinterface(transformerand/orswitchRanel),an
auxiliarypowersystemin parallel tolacommonmodule,and thento a parallel
set of distributedmodules,severalstrategieswere adopted,as listedbelow:
• If no auxiliarypowersystemis available,theauxiliarypower
systemis treatedas "alwaysfailed"by assigningan essentially
infinitefailureparameter
• If the facilitybeingmodelledhas no servicepowerinterface
KF,S is setequal to zero;i.e.,it can neverfail
• If the facilityhas no commonequipment,KF,C is set equalto
zero;it can neverfail
• If the facilityhas no distributedmodules,KF,D is setequal
to zero;theycan neverfail
• If the facilityhas severalequipmentsinparallel,to insure
a highdegreeof redundancy,collectivelytheseare assumednot
to fail;the failureparameterfor thisstageis set equalto
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zero. Whentestedwithmodel-generatedvaluesof the exterior
exposureand otherinputparameters,thisapproximationwas
of thesameorderas thosetoleratedelsewherein theanalysis.
SUMMARYOF FAILUREPARAMETERS
The tableswhichfollowsummarizetheequipmentand equipmentmodule
failureparameters,and enclosurecharacteristics.Theseare basedon the
facilityand equipmentdesignationscontainedin AppendixA and themethods
describedin thissection.
Mean Exposure-to-FailureL vels
Failureexposurelevelsfor individualequipmentsat eachtypeof
facilityare shownin Table7.2. Theseequipmentsare thoseshownpreviously
in Figures7.2. Notethatthe primarypowerreferredto undereachfacility
is the powersourcerepresentedby the publicutility(SIC49). Note that
•electricmotorsare assumedtonot be vulnerable(basedon limitedtestdata).
FacilityEquipmentEnclosures
Table7.3 showsthe enclosurecategoriesassociatedwitheachSIC
Codefor the equipmentshownin Figure7.2. Whenan enclosureis located
insidea building(doubleenclosure),the buildingcategoryis listedunder
levell and the equipmentenclosurecategoryis listedunderlevel2. Enclo-
surecategorieswere definedin SectionVI. NotethatTable7.3 reflects
manyof the SIC specialcaseswithinthe broadindustrycategories
discussedpreviously.
FacilityFailureParameters
The facilityfailureparameters,KFoSW,KF,AUX,KF,C,and KF,D
foreach pertinentSIC numberare obtainedby applyingEquations(7.3)
and (7.4)to eachequipmentforeachSIC number,and thenusingthe
methodsdescribedaboveto relateindividualequipment ypesto overall
failureparameters.Themean exposure-to-failurevaluesare obtainedfrom
Table7.2, the enclosuretypesfromTable7.3,and the penetrationfactors
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TABLE7.2
MEAN EXPOSURE-TO-FAILUREVALUESFORTYPICALEQUIPMENTSBY SIC NUMBER
Mean Exposure I
Facility and SIC Code Facility Equipment to Failure 3(Fiber-see/Meter)
Electric Utiiiw Communications i 5 x 106
SIC-49 Common Controls 7 x 10 u
High Voltage Switch Gear 7 x 105
High Voltage BUS 1.6 x 107
Light Industries Primary Power (51C-49)
Small = ServiceSwitch Gear 7 x 105
SIC-20.23, 24, 27, 38 Power Distribution 1_5 x 106
Large = Auxiliary Power 2.2 x 105
SIC-22, 25, 34.35, 36 Controller 1 x 107
Small Motors (Not Vulnerable)
Interface Units 1.4 x 105
High Volta=je Motor Controls 1.4 x 105
Servo Motor Circuits 1 x 108
Heavily Automated Industries Primary Power (51C-49)
SIC-26, 28.29, 30, 33, 37 ServiceSwitch Gear 7 x 105
Auxiliary Power 2.2 x 106
Computer 5 x 105
Keyboard/Display I 4.5 x 105t
Controller ; 1 x 107
Interface Units j 1.4 x 105
Servo Motor Circuits I " 1 x 108
High Voltage Motor Controls il 1.4 x 105
High Voltage Motors I Not
Vulnerable)
BusinessService Primary Power i (SIC-49)7 x 105
SIC-60.62; 63, 73 ServiceSwitch Gear ! 2.2 x 106
Auxiliary Power J 1 x 106Convener
Computer ! 5 x 105
Keyboard/Display I 4.5 x 105
Processor ! 1 x 107
I/0 Interface J 1 x 10 7I
I 4.5 x 105 "
Keyboard/Display . !
Health Service Primary Power (SIC-49)
SIC-80 Service Switch Gear 7 x 105
Auxiliary Power ! 2.2 x 106I
Communication Service (TELE) Primary Power (SIC-49)
SIC-48 Service Switch Gear 7 x 105
Auxiliary Power 2.2 x 106
Marker/Connectors " 1 x 107
Re_listers 1 x 107
Relay Switches I 7 x 105I
Small Business Primary Power i 1SIC-49)
SIC-50-59.99 Power Distribution i 1.5 x 106i
Residential; Hi_lh Fidelity Set I 6.6 x 105
TV Set I 1.7 x 107
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TABLE7.3
ENCLOSURETYPESFORSIC-CODEDBUSINESSANDINDUSTRYE(UIPMENTS
EnclosureType
FacilitySIC Code Equipmentor EquipmentModule Level1 Level2 "
Electric Utility Communications & Controls 1 -
SLC-49 High Voltage Switch Gear 1 7b
High Voltage Bus -- --
Small Light Industry ServiceSwitchGear 5b 7b
SlCo20, 24, 27 PowerDistribution 2 - °
SIC-23, 38 Controller & Servo 2 -
SIC-20, 38 ServoInterface Unit 2 7b
SIC-20, 38 Controller 2 --
SIC-23, 27 Motor Control Switch Gear 2 7a
SIC-24
LargeLight Industry ServiceSwitch Gear 5b 7b
SIC-22, 25, 34, 35, 36 Auxiliary Power 5b -
SIC-22, 36 Controller& Switch& Servo" 3 -
SIC-25, 35 Motor Control Switch Gear 3 7a
SLC-34,35, 36 Line Controller 3 -
HeavilyAutomated Industry ServiceSwitch Gear 5b 7b
SlCo26,28, 29, 33, 37 Auxiliary Power 5b -
Computers& Keyboard/Displays 4 -
SIC'26, 33 Controller & Motor Control Swo 3 -
SIC-28, 29, 30, 37 Controller & Switch & Servo 3 -
BusinessService Power Distribution& Auxiliary Power 5a -
SIC-60, 61, 62, 63 Cony.& Comp. & Keyboard/Displays 4 -
SIC-73 Processor& I/O & Keyboard/Displays 4 -
Air Transportation ServiceSwitch Gear 5b 7b
SIC-45 Auxiliary Power 5b -
Computer& Keyboard/Displays 4 --
Health Services ServiceSwitch Gear 5b 7b
SIC-80 Auxiliary Power 5b -
Communications(TELE) ServiceSwitch Gear 4 7b
SIC48 Auxiliary Power 4 --
Marker & Register 4 9b "
Line Switches 4 -
SmallBusines= PowerDistribution 11 --
SIC-50-59, 99
ResidentialWith Air Conditioning HIFI & TV Set ..... 10a -
Without Air Conditioning HIFI & TV Set 10b -
Note: Enclosuretypes are defined in Table 6.1
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from Table 6.2. The technique is illustratedby the following example for
SlC 20:
I.. From Figure 7.2 it can be seen that SIC 20 has service
switchgear but no auxiliary power, no commonequipment,
and distributed modules consisting of controllers, inter-
face units and servo circuits.
2. From Table 7.2 the following mean-exposure'to-failure
values are obtained (in units of fiber-seconds per cubic meter):
• service switchgear; E" : 7 x IOs
# controller; _: 1 x IOT
# interface unit; _ : 1.4 x IOs
• servo circuits; _: 1 x 108
3. From Table 7.3 it can be seen that service switchgear has two
enclosures, Type 5b and Type 7b; controller + servo are in a
single Type 2 enclosure, while the servo interface unit is
inside a Type 7b enclosure within a Type 2 enclosure.
4. Table 6.2 shows the following penetration factors:
• Type 2; E/Eo : .00989
• Type 5b; E/Eo = .0938
• Type 7b; E/Eo = .0164.
5. Applying Equations (7.3) and (7.4) (cf p. 7-15):
KF,SW= (Penetration Factor, 5b) • (Penetration Factor, 7b)
• (I +service switch failure parameter)
: (.0938) (,0164) (I+7 x IOs) : .22 x 10-8
KF,c : 0
KF,D : (Penetration Factor 2) [(l-controller mean exposure-to-failure)
+ (PenetrationFactor 7b) (l-interface mean exposure-
to-failure)
•+ (l+ servomean exposure-to-failure)]
= (.00989)[(l-lO _) + (.0164)(l-l.4 x IOs)
+ (l+lOB)l = .22 x 10-8
J
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VIII. COSTSASSOCIATEDWITHEQUIPMENTFAILURES
This sectionof the reportpresentsORI'smethodologyfor deter-
miningthe costsassociatedwith equipment•failuresresultingfroman air-
craftaccidentinvolvingthe releaseand subsequentdispersionof graphite
fibers. Thesecostsmay be dividedintotwo categories:
• costof cleanupand repairof affectedelectricalequipment
• impactdue to businessand industry"dislocation."
BUSINESS-INDUSTRYIMPACT
The majorgoal in developingthe methodologyto use in thispart
of the modelwas to providea rationalmeansof relatingimpactsin dollar
valuesto graphitefiberincursionsand theresultingequipmentfailures.
A secondarybut stilllargefactorwas therequirementhatthe method
selectedenableus to make useof availabledata. Severalpotentialmethods
clearlyrequiredthe collectionof substantialamountsof data,so that
candidatemethodswere screenedrathercriticallyagainstthe dataavail-
abilitycriterion.We arguedthateconomiclossesresultingfromequip-
ment failuresconsistprimarilyof lostproduction,sales,andwages. We
alsorecognizedthat,at leaston the nationallevel,the GrossNational
Product(GNP)measuresthe grandtotalof all goodsand servicesproducedin the
• countryin oneyear. A relatedmeasure,the GrossDomesticProduct(GDP)is a
moreusefulmeasurefor our purposessinceit includesall goods:and
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services produced within the united States in a somewhat more rigorous way
then the GNP. The value of goods andservices produced by American corpora-
tions overseas is included in the GNPbut excluded from the GDP; similarly
the GDPincludes goods and services produced in the United States by
t
foreign corporations.
The selection of these measures as the major inputs for the cost
calculations makes available a wealth of data collected primarily for
other purposes. For example, projections of the national economy are typi-
cally made in terms of the growth of the GNP, and in many cases, for parti-
cular economic sectors. More pertinent to our requirements is the infor-
mation tabulated by the Department of Commerceon a routine basis; it pro-
vides national gross domestic product values for individual industries
classified by their two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
designations. Sample SIC numbers were shown in Table 7.1 previously. With
these data available at the national level, we sought to develop a method
of allocating an appropriate fraction to each local area for which risk
assessment calculations were to be made. This allocation was made on the
basis of the ratio of the local payroll for a particular industrial sector
to the national payroll in the same sector. Again this operation was
facilitated by the availability of a major data base: the Bureau of Census
publication County Business Patterns. These reports provide the number of
establishments in different size groups, payroll, and employment for each
SIC-coded business and industry category. A sample excerpt from this docu-
ment appears in Figure 8.1. The basic assumption required in order to apply
this allocation scheme is that the local productivity as measured by
output per payroll dollar is equal to the national average productivity.
The risk assessment model thus assumes that the impact of a car-
bon fiber incident on the economy can be measured by the fraction of the
local GDPallocated to a particular industry over the period of time that
the industry is "down." In the absence of any other information we assumed
that the down time would be of the order of one day and that cleanup costs
could be satisfactorily representedby the GDPimpact calculation. That is,
we feltthat the cleanupcosts would be no more than of the same order
of magnitudeas that measuredby the impact calculation. In view of the
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FIGURE 8.1 EXCERPT FROM COUNTY BUSINESS PATTERNS,
1976, FOR NEW JERSEY
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estimatedcleanupcostspresentedbelow,thisassumptionappearsjustified.
It is recognized,however,thatcleanupand restartcostsare probablysen-
sitiveto industrytypeand thisproblemshouldreceiveadditionalatten-
tionin the future.
The nextmajorstepin developingthe costingalgorithmis the
introductionof an expectedvaluecalculation,The calculationdescribed
in SectionVllof thisreportis donefor a particularsmallarea. It is
an estimateof the probabilitythata unit-- buildingor plant-- of a
particularclassof businessor industrywouldhavefailedas a result
of the graphitefiberincident.We then use it as an estimateof the
fractionof thatindustryor businessat that locationthatwouldbe "knocked
out" as the resultof the graphitefiberincident.
Themethodof calculatingthe impactin dollarsfor a particular
locationis to use the resultsof the calculationsdescribedin SectionVII,
PF,SIC'the probabilityof failureof a plantor businessfacilityin a
particularSIC numbercategoryin the followingalgorithm:
£ LPsIc GDPsIc PF,SIC (8.1)
Business-lndustryImpact= SIC NPsIC
National-level inputs from the Department of Commerce provide the national
payrollbrokenout by SIC number,NPsIC, and the GrossDomesticProduct
brokenout by SIC number,GDPsIc. Availabledatafor countiessurrounding
theparticularairportincludethe payrollforeach SiC-codedbusinessand
industry;the localinputfor eachindividualgeographicalarea is defined
as LPsIC.
In orderto treatthe government"business"impactwe defineda
new SIC number99 for that industry.The nationalpayrolland GrossDomestic
Productwere bothassignedthe valueone, i.e.,
NP99= GDP99= l
so that the resultinglocaldomesticproductfor thatclassof businessis
equalto the localpayrollonly. The government•payrollforeach countyis
also reportedin CountyBusinessPatterns.
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The modelcomputesthe failureprobabilityfor each businessand in-
dustrycategoryat one location.The resultingcostsare thencomputedat that
location,_usingEquation(8.1). Thisprovidesthe sumover all categoriesof
businessand industryat thatlocation,whichisthen adjustedto accountfor
theone-dayimpactassumption.The modelthendoes the householdimpactcost-
ingat that location.
HOUSEHOLDIMPACT
In orderto computethe costsassociatedwiththe repairof household
applianceswe estimatedthe fractionof householdsthat are air conditioned,
definedby FAC. Usingthe methodsdescribedin SectionVII,we obtainedthe
failureprobabilitiesfor householdappliancesin air conditionedand non-air
conditionedhouseholds.The overallfailureprobabilitydependson the ventila-
tion parametersfor typicalresidencesthatare air conditionedand thosethat
are not airconditioned,and themean exposure-to-failurefor the equipmentin
question. If the resultingfailureprobabilitiesare PF,ACin the air conditioned
householdand PF,NACin the non-alrconditionedhousehold,thenthe estimated
costto repairall damagedequipmentsof a particularclassat all households
in the geographicalarea is givenby:
RepairCostx Numberof Householdsx Numberof Equipmentsper
Household{PF,AcFAC+ PF,NAC(I- FAC)}
The locationsand numbersof residentialunitswereobtainedfromthe
latest(1977)Bureauof Censuspublication,Countyand City DataBook. Based
on a generalconsensusof the NASA-ORIrisk assessment eammembers,our atten-
tionwas limitedto householdtelevisionand highfidelityequipment.Other
householdequipmentsare reportedto be relativelyinvulnerable.In manycases
we wereable to use localinformationsourcesto estimatethe fractionof house-
holdsthatare air conditioned;in any casewe appliedjudgmentalfactorsto
adjustthisfactoras a functionof geography.The grandaveragenumberof tele-
visionsetsand highfidelitysets(or lowfidelitymusicsystems)appearsto be
aboutone each perhousehold.Wherelocalinformationwas availablewe were able
to adjustthis ratio,but no generallyavailabledata sourcewas identifiedas
a resultof contactsmadewithnationalorganizations.Cleanup and repaircosts
for residentialtelevisionsetsand homemusic systemsweredevelopedfroman in-
formalsurveyof localserviceshops,as wellas someconversationswith the national
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industrygroups. The typicalaveragecost to clean and repaira home tele-
visionset is estimatedto be fifty dollars;the averagecost to clean and
repaira stereo or high fidelityunit is estimatedto be seventy-fivedollars.
While these costs are relativelymodest,the generalpositionof those in
the businesswas that these repair costs were typicalof equipmentthat
would be repaired;in many cases a potentiallyhigher repair cost for poor
equipmentwould result in a similaroutlay for newequipment.
DEFINITIONOF GEOGRAPHICALAREAS
The descriptionof the method used to define geographicallocations
at which the impact calculationsare made is placed here since it is to a
large extentdictated by the selectionof the cost impactmethod just
described. The use of a method that has as one of its major advantages
the availabilityof a ready-madedata base, also carrieswith it something
of adisadvantage - namely,the fact that the data base is primarilyat the
county level. The individualcounty is not a uniformlydefinedentity in
theUnited States. Fortunatelythe County BusinessPatternsdoes completely
span the United States. That is, where an individualcity, for example,
FairfaxCity, in the Virginiasuburbsof Washington,D.C., is not a true
county,it is neverthelessreportedin the County BusinessPatternsas a
separateentity. Further,countiesare not of uniformsize, businessor
populationdensity,etc.
In adaptingthehousehold and businessdata for computerinput,
we subdividedthe countiesinto smaller,essentiallyhomogeneousgeographical
units. In some cases differentdivisionswere made for householddata
and business-industrydata. In each case the centerof the countyor
sub-countygeographicalunit was selectedand a representativecirclet
inscribedwithin the area. The input data set includesthe coordinates
of the centerand the associatedradius. The exposureand resultingimpact
calculationswere made at five pointswithin the circle. These points are
the center and points a distanceequal to two-thirdsof the radius to the
east, west, north and south of the center. The two-thirdsvalue was selected
as a resultof the argumentthat, if the countieswere equally spaced squares,
say, these valueswould result in an equallyspacedmesh. Our first inclination
to use points on the circumferenceof the circlewas discardedsince itlcould
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haveresultedin calculationsmade at the samepoints,selectedas repre- i
sentativeof neighboringcounties.In each caseone-fifthof the input
industrialbusiness-industrypayrollassociatedwith the geographicalunit
is allocatedto each of the fivepoints. The calculationdescribedin the
precedingsectionis performedfor eachof the fivepointsand totalled.
Thus the resultis an averageof the impactoverthe geographicalarea,where
• the averageis made afterthe finalcostcalculation.Thismethodretains
the necessaryareasensitivityof the riskpheonomenonwhichis lostif all
the businessor industryis consideredlocatedat onlyone point. In that
casewe wouldtendto havea stronglybinaryriskmechanism.
The conceptis illustratedschematicallyin Figure2.4,and by an
actualexamplein Figure8.2. This figureshowshow HowardCounty,Maryland
was definedfor purposesof the graphitefiberriskassessmentmodelinput
structure.The uppermap in FigureII showsthe locationof HowardCounty
relativeto theWashingtonNationalAirportand theWashington,D.C.,Balti-
more,Maryland,and Wilmington,DelawareSMSA's. ThoseSIC codenumbers
associatedwithmanufacturingwere locatedwithinthe circleaboutthe
industrialcenterencompassingthe industrialsitesshownon the lowermap.
Thosebusinessesidentifiedas service-oriented,andwholesaleand retail
tradewere placedwithinthe circleaboutthe pointidentifiedas the
commercialcenter. Residentialunitswere dividedbetweenthe two points
definedas "residential"and "commercialand residential."
CLEAN-UPAND REPAIRCOSTS
The ORI risk assessmenteamcontactedrepresentativesof several
agenciesparticipatingin the nationalgraphitefiberriskassessmentprogram
in its searchfor informationconcerningthe costof clean-upand repair
of damagedelectricaland electronicequipment.Althoughwe determinedthat
standardclean-upproceduresappearto havebeenestablished,the costand
effectivenessof theseprocedureshas not beenthoroughlydocumented.
Inthe absenceof repairandclean-upcostestimates,ORI team
membersworkedwith the maintenancestaffat WashingtonNationalAirportto
developoriginalestimatesof the laborrequired,and theassociatedcost,to
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FIGURE8.2 DESIGNATIONOFAREASFOREXPOSUREANDCOSTCOMPUTATIONS:
HOWARDCOUNTY,MARYLAND(LOWER)IDENTIFIEDBY DARKBORDERIN MAPOF
WASHINGTON-BALTIMOREAREA (UPPER).
• TABLE8.1
ESTIMATEDCLEAN-UPAND REPAIRCOSTS*
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLEQUIPMENT
Equipment Labor in Man Hours **Cost ($)
TerminalBoard l S 13
Motor or Generator 3 39
Processor 24 312
Computer 48 624
Communications
: (transmitter or receiver) 1 13
VOR
- Solid State 40 520
- Tube 80 1040
ILS 20 260
Radar 48 624
Console 4 52
* Source: Maintenance staff, Washington National Airport and area abor
rates. ($13 per hour).
** Based on estimated time required.
8-9
cleanup specificair trafficcontrolequipments.The resultsare sum-
marizedin Table8.1. Clean-upcostsfor generictypesof equipment,such
as computersand generators,may be transferrableto othersettings,where
similarpiecesof equipmentare used.
Althoughclean-upand repaircostsappearsmallrelativeto the
economicimpactof a completeshutdown,it may be necessaryto consider
thesesmallercostsif theyoccurwith greaterfrequency.Thisfactor,
as wellas vulnerabilityof otherhouseholdequipmentshouldbe considered
in furtherrefinementsof thisstudy. Alsoworthyof furtherexamination
is the impactof the one-daydown timeassumptionon thevariance.The use
of theGrossDomesticProductin the calculationof impactsof carbonfiber
on businessand industrydoes providesomesensitivityto secondaryeconomic
effects. A more detailedanalysisof theseeffectsshouldbe considered.
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IX. DETAILEDRESULTSFORNATIONALAIRPORT
WASHINGTON,D.C.
SELECTIONOF AIRPORT
National• Airport was ORl's choice for the pilot analysis of its
graphite-fiber risk assessment model. We had several reasons for selecting
this airport for the initial study. ORl's Silver Spring, Maryland loca-
tion is less than 20 miles from National. The airport is also close to
densely populated areas in Northern Virginia, the District of Columbia,
and the Baltimore-Washington corridor including the "new town" of Columbia.
Of course, National is among the nation's busiest airports •thereby giving
it a greater potential for commercial aviation accidents than other,
less heavily trafficked airports; National Airport's traffic load makes
it about the tenth busiest airport in the country.
National Airport and the surrounding area do not represent a great
at-risk combination, however, because there is less industrial development
in this region than in the metropolitan areas served by other major air-
ports with similar traffic levels. This effect will become apparent in the
comparativeresultsprese,ntedin ChapterX. A map of the airportand sur-
roundingareas was shown previouslyin Figure8.2. The technique
. representingcountiesby inscribedcircles,describedearlier,was applied
to Washington,D.C. and to the areas of Marylandand Virginiawithin about
50 miles of NationalAirport. The methodsdescribedin ChaptersVII and
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VIII were used to prepare all model inputs for the transfer and business
and residential impact calculations.
The Washington National Airport calculations were carried out for
the two periods of specific interest to NASA, 1985 and 1993, as is the case
for all results presented in this report; the basic aircraft - carbon
fiber inputs for these calculations were shown in Table 3.2. These values
J
were essentially developed collectively by NASAand its contractors. The
table shows that the amount of fiber per aircraft is expected to increase
by approximately a factor of five during the 1985-1993 period, while the
fraction of aircraft expected to have graphite composite in their structures
increases by approximately a factor of two to three. Projected operations at
Washington National Airport are shown in Table 9.1.
Using theresults presented in Section Ill for fraction of air-
craft involved in a fire for accidents indifferent operational phases, and
the estimated factor of 20 percent for the fraction of fiber released, we
obtain the resultsshown in Table 9.2 for amount of fiber released in an
aircraft accident with fire. These are tabulated for accidents involving
different aircraft (by size) in different operational phases.
As an example of the calculation of the number of accidents, con-
sider the 1993 scenario for Washington National Airport. The expected
annual accident rate is obtained by using Equation (3.2) and the data pre-
sented in Tables 3.2 and 9.1. The annual fire-fiber accident rate for
large aircraft is given by (1993):
29_621
13,800,000 x .50 x 6 : .00644 accidents/year
This is the mean (_) used in the Poisson distribution that is sampled to
determine the number of accidents for large jets in each replication of the
stochastic model. As expected, the rate is quite small.
In 50,000 replications (samples) of the 1993 scenario for
Washington National Airport, the results for large aircraft were:
• 49678 Sampleswith no accident
• 321 sampleswith one accident
• l sample with two accidents.
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TABLE9.I
PROJECTEDWASHINGTONATIONALAIRPORTOPERATIONS*
Aircraft
Category 1985 1993"*
Large 18,850 29,621
Medium 124,766 143,669
Small 60,284 24,710
TotalU.S. 11,700,000± 13,800,000#
* EPA-FAAaircraftemissiondatabasemaintained
by ORI.
** Projectionsare for 1995 - the closest-to1993
forwhichdataunavailable.
# FAAAviationForecasts,FiscaiYears1978-1989,
U.S.Departmentof Transportat'ion,FAA,September1977,
Washington,D.C.and FAA Officeof AviationPolicy
(AVP-120).
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TABLE9.2.
AMOUNTOF FIBERRELEASED(KILOGRAMS)
PER FIRE-ACCIDENT
Scenario Aircraft ..L Operational.Phase
Year Size Tal_eoff Landing In-Flight
Large 18.l 45.3 27.2
1985 Medium 5.4 13.6 8.2
Small 3.6 9.1 5.4
i
Large 81.6 204.l 122.5
1993 Medium 27.2 68.0 40.8
SmalI 18.l 45.3 27.2
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Correspondingestimates,based on the Poisson distributionare 49679, 320,
and l, respectively. The total numberof accidentssimulatedis thus 323,
while the rate (.00644)computedabove,when multipliedby50,OOOyields
322. For all three aircraftcategories,the total numberof accidents
• generatedas a result of the random samplingprocesswas 2430, while
exact mathematicalcomputationusing the closed-formexpressionfor the
Poissondistributonwould have led us to expect 2464, showinga deviation
of only about one percent.
For each accidentthat the Monte Carlo model generates,an opera-
tional phase is randomlydrawn from the relativefrequencydistribution
obtained in Section Ill. The amount of fiber releasedis obtainedfrom
Table 9.2 and convertedto individualfibers using the standardplanning
factorof lO9 fiber fragmentsin one pound (.4536kg) of carbon fiber.
RESULTSFOR 1985 SCENARIO
Most Costly Accidents
The 1985 analysisis based on the resultsof 50,000 replications,
using the inputsdescribedabove. An insight into the types of accidents
and relateddamage and costs is obtainedby inspectingthe "ten worst
accidents"shown in Table 9.3; prepareddirectlyfrom outputsof the stochastic
model. The highestcost accidenthad an estimatedimpactof $324,420.
This accidentoccurred in replicationnumber 47277. Costs of other acci-
dents among the most costly ten fall off to a low of $95,519. Other in-
formationin Table 9.3, shows that the ten worst accidentsalways in-
volve the large and medium aircraft. Operationalphasesat the time of
the accidentare all landing,except for one takeoff. The stabilityclass
is always the most Stable (Pasquill,GiffordF). Wind speed is always the
lowest input,value, 1.7 meters per second. Plume height is always lO0
meters,which is the value associatedwith the most stable condition.
The table alsoshows the amountof fiber releasedin numbersOf fibers,
which is a functionof aircraftcategoryand operationalphase at the
time Of the accident. _ . - ,.
The result that the ten worst accidentsoccur under the most stable
meteorologicalconditionsand lowestwind speed isconsistent with the
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TABLE9.3
CHARACTERISTICSOF
TEN HIGHESTCOSTACCIDENTSIMULATED
1985- WASHINGTONATIONALAIRPORT_ 50,000REPLICATIONS
'' Wind Release Cost ($ 000)
Sample Aircraft Op.* Stability Speed (lO9 Fibers)
Number Category Phase Class** (m/sec) Direction Res. Bus/Ind. Total
47908 Med TO F 2 162° 12 15 81 96
26860 Med L F 2 211° 30 16 86 I02
20948 Med L F 2 214° 30 9 I05 ll4
If411 Med L F 2 16° 30 2 143 145
15613 Large L F 2 194° lO0 26 151 177!
1778 Large L F 2 212° lO0 40 179 219 .
21900 Large L F 2 243° lO0 65 182 247
39020 Large L F 2 153° lO0 46 224 . 270
13033 Large L F 2 230° lO0 62 243 305
47277 Med L F 2 169° 30 7 317 324
* T.O. = Take-Off
L. - Landing
** See Figures5.1 and 5.2.
dispersionmodeldescribedin ChapterV. Themost stablemeteorological
conditionimpliesthe smallestdispersionand thereforethe greatestdown-
wind exposure.The most stableconditionsare oftenassociatedwith fog
and hazewith reducedvisibility;theyare most likelyto occurin early
• morningand at night. In everyaccidentidentifiedin the table,the cost
associatedwithequipmentfailuresat industrialsitesis greaterthan
the costassociatedwith equipmentfailuresat residences.
StatisticalDescriptionof Results
The frequencydistributionof annualaccidentcostsis shownin
Table9.4. The tableshowsthe numberof replications,or samples,in each
costclassinterval.The classintervalswere selectedto facilitate
subsequentpreparationof the riskprofile;eachintervalis of equalsize
on a logarithmicscale. The frequencY!s tabulatedfor household amage
cost,business-industryimpactcost,and totalcost. For example,out
of 50,000samples,the lastcolumnshowsthat84 were associatedwith Costs
lessthan$178but equalto or greaterthan$I00. The lastentryin the
tableshowsthatone accidenthadassociatedcostsgreaterthanor equal
to $316,200but lessthan$562,300.We identifythisparticularaccident
with theworst-caseaccidenthavinga totalassociatedcostof $324,420
whichwas shownin Table9.3. Also shownin the tableis the meancost
of $110peryear and the standarddeviationof $3,377.
Table9.5 reorganizesthe model'soutputdatatabulatedin Table9.4.
The dataare accumulatedover costintervalsand presentedas a fractionof
all samplesforwhichthe costexceedsthe statedlimit, This is precisely
thedesiredriskprofile.Thus thefractionof samplesin whichhousehold
damageexceeded$I00is0.00926;the fractionof samplesin whichindustry
damageexceeded$I00is 0.01288,and the fractionof samplesin whichthe
total damageto residencesand industrycombinedexceeded$I00 is 0.01416.
The resultsshownin Table9.5 are plottedin Figure9.1,whereboth 1985
and 1993resultsare given. The curvesare for totalrisk,usingthe sum of
residentialand industrialimpact.
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TABLE9.4
FREQUENCYDISTRIBUTIONOF 50,000 SAMPLESBY COST
WASHINGTONATIONALAIRPORT, 1985 SCENARIO
Upper Limit Number of Samples "
of
Class Total
Interval ($) Household Industry Costs
I00 49,537 49,356 49,292
• 178 76 88 84
316 85 79 78
562 72 75 85
1,000 71 85 86
._ 1,778 50 64 84
3,162 46 77 87
5,623 25 55 62
I0,000 18 41 45
17,780 12 30 39
31,620 2 20 24
56,230 4 16 14
I00,000 2 6 II
177,800 0 3 4
316,200 0 4 4
562,300 0 1 1
Mean 21 89 II0
Standard
Deviation 641 2,863 3,377
Minimum 0 0 0 "
Maximum 64,922 317,267 324,420
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TABLE9.5
FRACTIONOFSAMPLESIN WHICHCOSTEXCEEDEDAMOUNTSHOWN
. WASHINGTONNATIONALAIRPORT- 1985; 50,O00.REPLICATIONS
L
Fractionof Samples
cost($)
Household Industry Total
lO0 0.00926 0.01288 0.01416
178 0.00774 O.Olll2 0.01248
316 0.00604 0.00954 0.01092
562 0.00460 •0.00804 0.00922
l,O00 0.00318 0.00634 0.00750
1,778 0.00218 0.00506 0.00582
3,162 0.00126 0.00352 0.00408
5,623 0.00076 0.00242 0.00284
lO,O00 0.00040 0.00160 0.00194
17,780 0.00016 O.OOlO0 O.OOll6
31,620 0.00012 0.00060 0.00068
56,230 0.00004 0.00028 0.00040
lO0,O00 0.0 0.00016 0.00018
177,800 0.0 O.O0010 O.O0010
316,200 0.0 0.00002 0.00002
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RESULTSFOR 1993SCENARIO
The 1993calculationsforWashingtonNationalAirportwere carried
out in the samefashionas the 1985calculations.The differencesbetween
the 1993and 1985scenariosconsistof increaseduse of graphitecomposite
per aircraft,and increaseduse of aircraftwith graphitecompositein
their structure,as Well as projectedchangesin the numberof aircraft
operationsfor the differentaircraftcategories.The 1993scenario
inputsfor graphitefiberreleasedin the simulatedaircraftfire-
accidentsare givenin Table9.2 as a functionof aircraftcategory
and operationalphase;eachaircraftwith graphitefibercompositeon
boardis expectedto haveaboutfivetimesas much in 1993as in 1985.
The projectedfractionof thecivilaircraftfleetincorporating
graphitefiberin theirstructurefor the twotimeperiodsof interest
is shownin Table3.2. The fractionof aircraftin eachsizecategoryin-
corporatingraphitefibergoesup by a factorof abouttwo. Another
factorto considerin lookingat WashingtonNationalAirportis thepro-
jectedchangein operations,shownabovein Table9.1. Operationsof
jet aircraftin the largestcategoryare projectedto increaseby about
50 percent(from18,850to 29,621),medium-sizedaircraftoperationsin-
creaseabout15 percent,whileoperationsOf the smallestaircraftare
expectedto decreaseby approximately60 percent. Thus,the outlookis
for considerablymoreflightsby the largestaircraftwith the largest
amountof fiberper aircraft.
In summary,we projectfivetimesas much fiberper aircraft
and approximatelytwiceas manyoperationsof aircraftwith fiberon
board(cfTables3.2 and 9.1);thissuggeststhatwe mightexpectabout
ten timestheannualdamage,whichis whatwas foundin the simulation
results.The mean annualimpactwas $110for 1985and $I,167for 1993.
• On the otherhand,the averageimpactper accidentwas $4,991for 1985
and $24,000for 1993. Thisfactorof aboutfivecorrespondsto the five-
fold increasein amountof fiberper aircraft,indicatingthatat least
in the low-riskdomaintheaccidentcost is approximatelylinearin.amount
of fiberreleased.
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The riskprofilesin Figure9.1 showthatthe chanceof exceeding
$I00in totaldamageincreasedfrom ,014in 1985to .038in 1993. For
$100,OOO_theincreaseis from .00018in 1985to .0024in 1993. This cor-
respondsto an increasein riskby a factorof about2.5 for the low-
costend of the curve,and morethanan orderof magnitudeincrease-13-
at thehigh-costend. Fora fixedriskprobabilityof .Olthe associated
cost in 1985 is about$400,whilefor 1993it is about$I0,000.
As in the 1985calculations,all of the tenmost costly1993ac-
cidents(Table9.6)occurredwith the lowestwind speed,1.7metersper
secondunderthemost stableatmosphericondition;theseaccidentsall
occurredduringlanding.As pointedout earlier,the numberof opera-
tionsat NationalAirportof aircraftincorporatinggraphitefiberis
expectedto increaseby a factorof approximatelytwo between1985and
1993. Thisshouldbe reflectedin the statisticsfor thenumberof acci-
dentsin 50,000samplereplications.In fact,we foundthatfor 1985there
were 1,068samplesin whichone accidentoccurredand 17 in whichtwo
occurred.For 1993therewere 2,312samplesin whichone accidentoccur-
red and 59 in whichtwo occurred.Thus,the simulationresultsreflect
the projecteddoublingof operationsby fiber-carryingaircraft.
IMPACTOF CHANGEIN AMOUNTOF COMPOSITEON BOARD
Two additionalsetsof simulationswere conductedfor the 1993
scenarioat WashingtonNationalAirport. For eachset all factorswere
the sameas definedabovefor the 1993scenario,exceptthat in one case,
the amountof graphitefiberper aircraftwas increasedby a factorof ten,
and in the other,itwas increasedby a factorof lO0. The increasein
fibertranslatesdirectly(linearly)intoincreasedexposure.The in-
creasedexposureappearsto producea less-than-linearcorrespondingin-
creasein the resultingcosts.
The worstaccidentresultswere:
• $4.1million- 1993scenario
• $16.8million- ten timesthe 1993fiber
• $31.4million- lO0 timesthe 1993fiber.
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TABLE 9.6
CIIARACTERISTICSOF
TEN IIIGIIESTCOSTACCIDENTSIMULATED
1993- WASHINGTONATIONALAIRPORT 50,000REPLICATIONS
Wind Cost ($ 000)
Sample Aircraft Op. * Stability Speed Release
Number Category Phase Class ** (m/sec) Direction (l,O_ Fibers) Res. Bus/Ind. Total
_.
6954 Med L F 2 181° 150 17 593 610
15294 -Large L F 2 194° 450 93 564 657
21462 Large L F 2 244° 450 241 698 939
1746 Large L F 2 212° 450 174 782 956
2744 Med L F 2 161° 150 70 903 973
(_
16280 Med L F 2 183° 150 9 1021 1031
I1977 Med L F 2 171° 150 lO0 I003 If03
12756 Large L F 2 2300 450 206 984 ll90
32749 Med L F 2 165° 150 142 1214 1355
46354 Large L F 2 169° 450 lOl 4023 4124
* L = Landing
** See Figures5.1 and 5.2.
The averagetotal annual cost went from $1,167 (1993 scenario)to
$9,296 (lO x 1993 fiber) to $48,602 (lO0 x 1993 fiber). These increases
are roughlyfactorsof 8 and 5 for each successivelO-foldincreasein
\ fiber liberated.
Figure 9.2 presentsthe test case risk profileswith the 1993
_cenario risk profilerepeatedfor comparison. Where the annual costs
are low and the associatedlevel of risk is relativelyhigh, the risk is
relativelyinsensitiveto the amount of fiber. For example,at the $I00
cost level the risk goes from just under .04 to just under .05. On the
other hand, the .O001 risk of producing$I milliondamage for the basic
1993 scenariorises to .002with ten times the fibersand to .Ol with lO0
times the fibers.
The principalterm influencingthe final cost impact is of the
form:
v
m
E
where _ is the mean exposure to failureof a specifictype of equipmentand
V is the fractionof exteriorexposure E that is experiencedinside,where
vulnerableequipmentis located. The exteriorexposureE is directlypro-
portionalto the amount of fiber releasedin the accident. Therefore,the
ten-fold increasein fiber releasedcan be considereda proxy for a ten-
fold increasein V, or a decreaseof E by a factor of ten, or an appro-
priate combinationof these.
EXAMINATIONOF DETAILEDOUTPUT
To this point the presentationhas dealt almost entirelywith ag-
gregatestatisticsfrom the WashingtonNationalAirportcomputer runs. In
order to give the readera better understandingof the calculationsthat
lead to the aggregatestatistics,we will devote some space to a discussion
of sample detailed resultsfrom the lO0 times- 1993 scenariofiber re-
lease impact set. This set of runswas selectedfor illustrativepurposes
because it is somewhatmore dramaticthan the base scenariosimulations.
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The worst accident identifiedfor the I00 x 1993 fiber release
simulationsoccurred in sample number 1,746 with a 1.7 meter per second-
212° wind, 4.5 x lO13 fibers released,Stabilityclass F; the cost of res.....
identialrepairswas $4,467,600,the industrialimpactwas $26,961,000,
and the total cost was $31,429,000. We exercisedan option availablein
the computerprogramto producedetailedoutput;the result for this ac-
cident appearsin Table 9.7.
The accidentlocationcoordinatesare X = 400, Y = -lO0 meters
(measuredfrom the tower at NationalAirportwhere X is positiveto the
east; Y is positiveto the north). Residentialpoints that were impacted
are identifiedas l, 6, 7, 8, 19, 20, 25, 30, 31, and 32 with X and Y
coordinatesgiven. The industrialpoints impactedwere l, 3, 7, 9, 13,
23, 24, 25, 29, 31, 32, 35,-ana36 with their X and Y coordinatesalso
given. The coordinatesare for the center of the circlesdrawn to re-
presentspecificclustersof residencesor businesses;the table also shows
the radius for each circle (cf. Figure 2.4). Also shown in the table are
values of the exteriorexposure in fiber-secondsper cubic meter, the
Gross DomesticProductper day for each business-industrylocation;
and the cost associatedwith the failuresat each location. The model
providesan output for each exposurevalue greaterthan 0.5 fiber-second
per cubic meter; for completenesswe have tabulatedall computermodel-
generatedoutput results,even when the exposureand/or impact is essentially
zero. The exposurevalues are for the center (X,Y) of each circle,while
the dollar impact is the sum over all pointswithin the circle of radius
R about the center.
The impactedpoints and the accident locationare plotted in Figure
9.3. Round dots representresidentialsites; triangles,industrialsites.
Site-identifyingnumbersappear to the left of the plottedpoints. The
dashed line is in the downwinddirectionfrom the accidentsite.
The largestexteriordosage IO6 x lO6 fiber-secm-3, was received
at industrialsite 13, which experiencedonly $34,000damage. This was an
almostcomplete shutdown (92%) at that_site,which has a local daily Gross
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_ TABLE9.7
DETAILSOF MOSTCOSTLYACCIDENT
WASHINGTONATIONALAIRPORT-lO0 X 1993 FIBERS
•(Sample1746,LargeAircraft,LandingAccidentat X=400,Y=-lO0meters,
StabilityClassF, Wind 1.7metersper second,212°)
Location
Exterior
No. X(Km) Y(Km) Exposure 3- R(Km) GDP/Day* Cost
(Fiber-sec/M) ($ 000) ($ 000)
l 4 7 6.2 x lO6 3 536
6 35 59. 27_9x lO6 4 I078
7 25 57 0 2 0
8 30 69 0 lO 3
19 15 37 0 3 0
20 21 44 71.4. 2 0.05
25 70 12 38.2x lO6 4 251
30 30 45 37.6x lO6 2 1392
31 35 50 4.9 x lO6 3 732
32 38 55 7.4 x lO6 l 475
l 4 7 6.2 x lO6 2 853 496
3 2 3 9.5x iO6 2 4021 979
7 25 55 0 2 458 0
9 36 60 35.2x lO6 l 18976 16,940
13 20 32 I06.6x lO6 2 37 34
23 9 17 .46x lO6 5 43 26
24 13 23 12 x lO6 5 58 33
25 lO 8 0 4 1774 0
29 38 44 0 4 356- 0
31 32 47 18.5x lO6 5 890 438
32 30 50 41.8x lO6 2 890 667
35 35 47 .llx lO6 6 24574 7348
36 33 43 .Oilx lO6 l 593 .. l
* Shownonlyfor•business-industrylocations.
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domesticProductof only $37,000.Thelargestlosswas a resultof an ex-
posureof 35 x lO6 fiber-secm-3 at industrialsite9. The losswas
$16,940,000,more thanhalf (54%)of all costsresultingfromthis acci-
dent. Industrialsite9 had an associatedvalue(GDP)of $18,976,000,
• experiencingan 89 percentover-allimpact. This site is the centerof
wholesale,retail,and financialservicesin Baltimore.The Baltimore
residentialarea representedby site6 and the suburbanarearepresented
by site30 accountfor $1,078,000and $1,392,000costsrespectively.The
heavyfinancialimpactof thisparticularaccidentis the consequenceof
a windblowingdirectlyfromWashingtonNationalAirportto Baltimore.
As a checkon themannerin whichaircraftaccidentsare seento
causeresidentialand industrialdamagein thismodel,we alsoexamined
the 1993basescenarioforWashingtonNationalAirport. The most costly
accidentoccurredunderthe samemeteorologicalconditions.The resi-
dentialcost forthis accidentwas $174,410;the industrialimpactwas
$781,590;and the totalcostwas $956,000.Thusthe costassociated
with thisaccidentchangedby a factorof about35 when the amountof
fibersreleasedchangedby a factorof lO0.
As a matterof consistency,sinceall factorsotherthanthe
amountof fiberis the samein the two calculations,we expectexposure
in thebasecase to be relatedto exposurein the lO0 x fibercaseby a
factorof lO0. Comparisonof the resultsshowedthatthisdid indeed
occur. For instance,in Table9.7, industrialsites24 and 13 haveex-
posuresof 12 x lO6 and I07 x lO6 fiber-secondsper cubicmeterre-
spectively.The correspondingsitesin the 1993scenariohadexposures
of 12 x lO4 and lO0x lO4. The costsdo not decreaselinearlywith the
decreasein exposure.This non-linearityis relatedto the factthat,in
somecases,theoverallfailureprobabilityis near lO0percent,indi-
catinga saturationeffect. The singlelargestimpactcostfor the base
case appearsat industrialsite9 justas it did in the lO0x 1993fiber
case. Againdamagein the Baltimoreareawasthe majorcontributor.
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X. FURTHERANALYSISOF SINGLEAIRPORTRESULTS
COMPARISONOF DIFFERENTAIRPORTS
Inthissectionwe presenthefindingsforthreeof themajorairports
treated in the risk analysis. These resultssupplementthe detailed information
on WashingtonNationalAirportthat was presentedin the precedingchapter.
The three airport-citycomplexesdiscussedhere are O'Hare/Chicago,Lambert/
St. Louis and Hartsfield/Atlanta.O'Hare is a busy airport(the nation's
busiestcommercialairport)servinga major metropolitanstatisticalarea
(SMSA). St. Louis has half the number of aircraftoperationsand serves an
SMSA with a considerablylower population.•Atlanta has two-thirdsthe number
of annual aircraftoperationsand serves a smallerSMSA.
Populationand aircraftoperationsdata are shown in Table 10.1, with
the averageannual impact results,for these airport-citycomplexes,as well as
WashingtonNationalAirport. As we might have expected,Chicagohas the highest
values for both householdand business-industrycosts, and therefore,in total
costs. St. Louis shows by far thesmallest costs. The ranking in terms of
• costs,whether residentialor industrialimpactor the sum of the two is:
. 1 - Chicago
2- Washington
3 - Atlanta
4 - St..Louis
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TABLE 10.1
COMPARISONF AVERAGEANNUALIMPACTSAT
FOUR AIRPORTS,1993 SCENARIO
ADJACENTSMSA NO.OF AVERAGEANNUALCOSTS
AIRPORT POPULATION A/C OPERATIONS RESI- BUS/
(Millions 1970) (Thousands, 1976) DENTIAL IND. TOTAL
National/
Washington 2.9 203 $207 $.961 $1,168
O'Hare/
Chicago 7.0 577 647 2,093 2,740
Lambert/
St. Louis 2.4 178 93 194 287
Hartsfield/
Atlanta 1.6 417 198 574 772
In costs due to damage to residences, Washington and Atlanta are very close
(within 5 percent), but otherwise, mean damage costs tend to differ by factors
of one and a half or more. In every case costs due to damage to industry are
at least twice the costs associated with residential impact.
It is also of some interest to compare the extreme values as well as
averages. For this comparison we list the most costly accident that occurred
in the simulated history at each of the airports. The most costly accidents
that occurred at each airport in the base 1993 scenario cases were:
Chicago $6,209,800
Washington 4,123,800
Atlanta 1,317,500
St. Louis 1,135,600
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This rankingby most costlyaccidentis the sameas the orderingof airports
by averageannualimpact.
As notedfor Washington,the tenworstaccidentsoccurwith the lowest
wind speedand themost stableconditions.We recordedone serious(i.e.,
amongthe tenmost costly)accidentwith a 5.7-meterper secondwind at O'Hare
Airport,and two suchcasesat St. Louis. St. Louisaisodiffersfrom theother
airportsin havingtwo in-flightaccidentsand one take-offaccidentamongthe
tenworstaccidents.Essentiallyall of the tenworstaccidentsat the other
threeairpoTtsoccurredduringthe landingphase. The assumptionsregarding
the relationof fiberliberatedto operationalphasewere set forthin Chapter
VIII. Itwas showntherethatthe landingphaseaccidentsleadto twicethe
amountof fiberliberatedin a crashand firethatwouldoccurduringa takeoff
or in-flightcrashand fire. We would,therefore,expectlandingaccidents
to predominateamongthe tenworstaccidents.
Figure10.1showsthe riskprofilesfor thesethreeairportsand
WashingtonNational,for the base1993scenario.It illustratesthe different
riskprofilesthatresultfromdifferingdemographicand economicpatterns.As
expected,thebusiestairportwith themost wealthin termsof both residences
and industryat risk,Chicago/O'Hare(ORD)alwaysshowsconsistentlyhigher
risk thantheotherairports.St. Louis/Lambert(STL)alwaysshowsthe lowest
risk. We accountfor thisby bothreducedaircraftoperationsand smaller
population(andimpliedlowerbusiness-industryconcentration)thatmaybe
impacted.The curvesfor Atlanta/Hartsfield(ATL)andWashingtonNational
Airport(DCA)liebetweenthosefor Chicago/O'Hareand St. Louis/Lambertand
also crosseachother. At the low-costend Atlantashowsa higherprobability
of damagethanWashingtonby a factorof two. At the high-costend,the
reverseis true. ThereDCA showsa higherprobability,and againby approxi-
matelya factorof two. Thereis a greaterchanceof impactinghigh-value
business-industryconcentrationsin the WashingtonNationalAirportvicinity
thanthereis nearthe Atlantaairport.
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%_ AIRPORTLEGEND:
ORD- O'Hare/Chicago
• _. ATL - Hartsfield/Atlanta
DCA- National/Washington, D.C.
STL - Lambert/St. Louis
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To roundout thediscussionof theseairports,we summarizethe risk
resultsthatwere obtainedfor the 1985scenario.The samegeneralcomments
applyto the 1985riskprofilesthatappliedtothe 1993risk profiles:Chicago
showedthehighestimpact,St. Louisthelowest. The riskswereconsiderably
lowerfor 1985thanfor 1993. Chicagohas a .09riskat the $100annuallevel
for 1993,it hasa .03riskat the samelevelfor 1985. The riskfor Chicago
is 0.005at the $100,000levelfor 1993whileit is 0.00045at the samelevel
for 1985. Similarly,for 1993,St. Louisshowsa .003riskof at least$100
costswhichis .007in 1985. Wheretherewas a .0005riskof at least$100,000
costat St. Louisin 1993therisk is .00002for 1985.
EFFECTOF INDUSTRYAT RISK
Clearlyone of the importantfactorsin the graphitefiberimpactis
the presenceof industryor populationat riskwithinrangeof thedownwind
zoneto be hit by thediffusingcloudof fibers. In orderto demonstratethis
effectdramaticallywe ran theORI riskassessmentmodelfor Philadelphia
InternationalAirport,for the 1993scenario,for a specialsensitivitytest
case-- for whichPhiladelphiaCountywas omittedfrom the inputdata set.
All of the countiesthatlie at leastpartlywithina 50-milecirclecentered
on the PhiladelphiaInternationalAirporthavea totalbusinessand industry
payrollof approximately18 billiondollarsa year (1976). PhiladelphiaCounty,
whichcontainstheCityof Philadelphiahas an annualbusinessand industry
payrollof 5.5billiondollarsor more than30 percentof the totalwithinthe
50-milecircle. The resultsfor thisspecialrun are shownin Figure10.2
wherewe haveplottedthe resultingriskprofileas well as the riskprofile
for the PhiladelphiaInternationalAirportwith all dataentered. We note
thatthe removalof the industryand businessin downtownPhiladelphiafrom
the riskcalculationhas itsmost significantimpacton the high-costportion
" of the riskprofile. The meanand extremevaluesalsoshowa considerable
changeas a resultof droppingPhiladelphiaCountyout of thecalculation.
Theseresultsare summarizedin Table10.2. The impactis greatestfor the
highcostaccidents;the averageannualcostis decreasedby a factorof 2.5
whiletheaverageof the tenmost costlyaccidentsis decreasedbya factorof
about3.5 when PhiladelphiaCounty'sdata is removedfrom the inputset.
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TABLE10.2
SELECTEDRESULTSFOR
PHILADELPHIAINTERNATIONALIRPORT
1993 SCENARIO
PHILADELPHIACOUNTY
MEASURE With Without"
Average Cost/Year $ 890 $ 352
Average Cost/Accident $ 17,396 $ 6,880
Average Cost/lO Most
Costly Accidents $1,299,000 $376,000
MaximumCost/Year $3,500,500 $631,600
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STATISTICALCONFIDENCELIMITS
One of the importantquestionsto be addressedin thisriskassessment
is the confidencewithwhichour resultscanbeviewed. One partof this
questionis addressedto the statisticalconfidencelimitsassociatedwith the
MonteCarlomodelused to generateour risk profiles.This is the confidence
withwhichthe resultscan be acceptedon the assumptionthatall inputvalues
are valid.
To developan expressionfor the statisticalconfidencelimits,let
Pa be the (unknown)probabilityof exceedinga damagelevela at one airport-
urbanareacomplexin oneyear. Supposethatwe haveexamineda sampleof n
yearsand that,of the n, we foundr thathad damagein excessof a. This is
clearlyone way of viewingthesimulationmodelruns. In eachreplicationour
goalis to determinewhetherthecostdue to graphitefiberrelatedeventsis
aboveor belowthe valuec. Thisleadsto ourestimationof the probability
of thecostbeinggreaterthanx - theriskprofile. Nowwe estimatethe
probability Pa by:
^ r
= m
Pa n
and our statisticalmodelis exactlythatof Bernoullitrials. Eachtrialleads
to a success,say, inwhichthe annualaccident-relatedcost is greaterthanor
equalto Sx or a failure,inwhichcase thecost is below$x.
Then,r is a randomvariable,the numberof successesin n trials,and
the probabilitythatr = i is givenby:
i (1 - Pa)n-1Prob (r = i) " (V)Pa
and the expectedvalueof r is
E (r)= nPa
and thevarianceof r is
• Var (r)=nP a (I-Pa)
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For thesamplestatistics,we canuse the expressionforPa and write,for ......
the expectedvalue:
^ 1
E (Pa)= _E (r)= Pa
Similarly,thevarianceof Pa is givenby:
^ 1 1Var (Pa)=_2 Var (r)= _P (1-Pa).
In the absenceof the completepopulationwe only havethe sampleof
runsthatwe haveexamined. In standardstatisticalfashionwe estimatethe
samplemomentsfromthe samplestatistics:
Var (Pa)= Pa (1-Pa)
n
for a greaterthanzero. In many casesof interestPa is verysmalland we
canwrite:
^
Var (Pa): Pa
n
with negligiblerror. It has beendemonstratedthat,for thenumberof
replicationsof the orderof magnitudeused in our analysisthedistribution
of sampleresultsaboutthe populationresultsis approximatelynormal.
Therefore,we can use the variancejustderivedto defineconfidencelimits
in the sensethat95 percentof the resultsobtainedfromadditionalsets
of n replicationswill be within:
Pa _ a (1-Pa)
n
• Statedanotherway, the probabilityis 0.95 thattheactualvalueof the
probabilityPa is withintheselimits.
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To illustratethisresultwe haveshownthe 95 percentconfidence
limitsin the riskprofilefor the WashingtonNationalAirport1993scenario
in Figure10.3. In thatcase 50,000replicationswere run. The statistical
confidencelimitsshownat differentpointsalongthecurveclearlydemonstrate
one featureof the problemthathas been notedearlier:our relativelylarge
uncertaintyat the high-cost,low-probabilityend of the riskprofile. This
suggeststhat in futurework the samplingplanbe structuredso thatthe tail
of the distributionis oversampled.It is relativelyuneconomicalto simply
increasethe numberof runsin orderto getmore datafor thetailof the
distribution,The squarerootof n appearsin thedenominatorof our expression
for theconfidencelimits- implyingthatwe mustdo four timesas many repli-
cationsin orderto reducetheconfidencelimitsby one-half.
STABILITYOF THE SIMULATIONMODEL
One of thequestionsto be consideredin runninga modelsuchas the
ORI riskassessmentmodelis the numberof replicationsrequiredand the related
questionof reproducibility.We haveseenthe numberof runsrequiredapproached
from the statisticalconfidence-limitpointof view above. We now takea more
pragmaticviewof the problem.On a heuristicbasisonlywe settledduring
early"production"runson choosinga numberof replicationsguaranteedtoyield
at leastan expected2,500accidents.Computertimeis essentiallya linear
functionof the numberof accidents imulatedoncea relativelysmallnumber
of accidentsis exceeded.Typicalcentralprocessingunit timeis 10-15minutes
to simulate2,500accidentsand handleall associatedinputand outputoperations
on an ITELAS/5 computer. In orderto furtherinvestigatethe questionof the
appropriatenumberof replicationswe now use the simulationmodelresults
themselves.
Impactof Numberof Replications ,
To examinethematterof theappropriatenumberof runswe ran the
LaGuardiaAirportriskassessmentcalculationfor the standardnumber. In
thiscase°35,000replicationswas selectedtoyieldan expectednumberof
approximataly2,500accidents;as a testwe alsoran 18,000replications.The
resultsindicatea differencein meanannualcostof lessthan20 percent
10-10
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betweenthe two setsof simulations,as shownin Table10.3. Thedifference
in the meanof the tenmost costlyaccidentsis greaterthana factorof two,
suggestingthatthe occurrenceof themore costlyaccidentsin the 35,000-
replicationcasehas a strongimpacton themeanannualcosts. In Table10.4
we havetabulatedthe probabilityof theannualcostexceedingthe valuesshown-
the riskprobabilities.The resultsare essentiallyidenticaluntilwe get
to themillion-dollarend of thecurve. Thisresultreinforcesthe earlier
conclusionthatwe mustbe lessconfidentaboutthe resultsat the low-proba-
bilitytailof the riskprofilethanaboutotherportionsof the riskprofile.
With thiscaveatwe concludethatthe shapeof theriskprofileovermost of its
lengthwouldnot be significantlyinfluencedby morereplications.
Changein AccidentRate
In anothertestof the sensitivityto parametrichangewe repeated
the 1993WashingtonNationalAirportcalculationsfor twicethestandardinput
accidentrate. Usingour basicruleof generatingapproximately2,500accidents,
we conducted50,000replicationsresultingin 2,430accidentsfor the standard
accidentrate(6 fire-accidentsin the U.S.peryear)and 25,000replications
resultingin 2,480accidentsfor the double-accidentrate. It can be shown
that, if the probability of exceeding a given cost in a year is the product
of theprobabilityof havingan accidentand the conditionalprobabilityof
exceedingthe givencost,givenan accident,the two setsof calculationshave
essentiallythe samestatisticalconfidencelimits.
Our intuitivexpectationin comparingthedifferentaccidentrate
resultsis thattheannualriskshouldbe doubled,but thattheaccident
characteristicsshouldbe essentiallyunchanged.The riskprobabilitiesare
tabulatedin Table10.5. The 12 accident-per-yearexceedanceprobabilities
are doublethosefor the6 accident-per-yearcaseexceptfor the probabilityof
exceeding$1 milliona year. The meancostperyear is $1,167for the 6-accident
caseand $2,067for the 12 accidentcase. Theseresultswere influencedby one
high-costaccidentat $4 million. Thisaccidentoccurredin replication46354
of the 6-accidentrunsandexceededby abouta factorof threethe mostcostly
accidentin the 12-accidentsimulations,$I.4million. Otherwisethemost
costlyaccidentcharacteristicswere quitesimilar.
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TABLE10.3
COMPARISONOF RESULTSFORDIFFERENTNUMBERSOF REPLICATIONS
LA GUARDIAAIRPORT, 1993 SCENARIO
NUMBER NUMBER MEAN MEAN OF
OF OF ANNUAL TEN MOST
ACCIDENTS IMPACT COSTLYACCIDENTSREPLICATIONS GENERATED
18,000 1449 $1390 $613,000
35,000 2856 $1660 $1,400,000
TABLEI0.4
EXCEEDANCEPROBABILITYFORDIFFERENTNU_ER OF REPLICATIONS
LAGUARDIAAIRPORT, 1993
NO. OF REPLICATIONS
ANNUALCOST 18,000 35,000
$ I00 .064 .066
$ 1,000 .045 .046
$ I0,000 .014 .015
$ I00,000 .0038 .0037
$I,000,000 .00006* .00017**
* 1 Case
** 6 Cases
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TABLE 10.5
RISK PROFILEFORDIFFERENTNATIONALACCIDENTRATES
WASHINGTONATIONALAIRPORT/1993
ANNUAL PROBABILITYOF EXCEEDINGCOSTS
COST 6 ACCIDENTS/YR. 12 ACCIDENTS/YR.
$ I00 .038 .075
$ 1,000 .026 .052
$ I0,000 .012 .024
$ I00,000 .0024 .0048
$I,000,000 .0001 .00016
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XI. NATIONALRISK
METHOD
In order to compute the national risk profiles we performed convolu-
tions of various combinations of the probability density functions from which
the individual airport risk profiles were obtained. The convolutions were run
using the individual risk profiles which were generated for both the 1985 and
1993 scenarios for the following nine airports:
O'Hare/Chicago
John F. Kennedy/New York City
• Washington National Airport/Washington, D.C.
Lambert/St. Louis
La Guardia/New York City
Logan/Boston
Hartsfield/Atlanta
Miami International/Miami
Philadelphia International/Philadelphia.
In order to develop•expressions for the probability of a given risk
° for the nation, or more specifically, for a group of airports, we first adopt
the convention of replacing the continuous probability distribution for acci-
•• dent-related costs at each airport by a discrete distribution. Since the
classinterval used for the discrete distribution can •be made arbitrarily •
small, this implies very little loss in generality of the results. The cost
II-I
due to the impactof carbon fiber accidentson a nationalbasis is a random
variablethat is the sum of random variables,the costs of accidentsat
individualairports. For ease of development,we first treat the case of
only two airports. Let the probabilityof the cost at airport-cityA due
to aircraft-CFaccidentsbeing equal to ra$ be P(X=r_$): ar. For the second
city B define the correspondingexpressionP(Y=ra$)= br. The sum of the
costs incurredat both cities is a new randomvariableS=X+Y. The event S is
the union of events:
(X=O,Y:rA$),(X:A$,Y:(r-I)A$),(X:2_$,Y:(rr2)_$)...(X:rA$,Y=O).
If we let P(S=rA$)= cr, then
Cr = aobr + albr + ... arbo (ll.l)
and the sequence{cr} is by definitionthe convolutionof the sequence
{ar} and the sequence{br}.
Now, define a generatingfunctionfor the sequence{ak}:
A(s) = _aksk
and for the sequence {bk}:
B(s) = Zbksk .
FellerI shows that the generatingfunction
C(s) = Scksk
is the product
C(s) = A(s) B(s)
or the randomvariableS=X+Y has the generatingfunctionA(s')B(s). The'
random variableX can representthe costs at a total of n city-airportcom-
binations,in which case the variableX+Y is the total cost for n+l cities.
In applyingthis result to the problemat hand, the probabilitydistri-
bution for the costs at each city derivedfrom the Monte Carlo simulationsis fit-
ted by a discrete distributionwith a uniformclass interval. The intervalwas
WilliamFeller, An IntroductiontoProbability Theory and Its Applications,
VolumeI, Third Edition. Wiley & Sons, 1968. pp'266-267.
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conveniently set at $50,000; comparisons were madeto indicate that the final
results wereessent.ially unchangedfor smaller class intervals. The proba-
bility at the center of each interval is considered the coefficient of a
term in a polynomial expansion, the generating function, with the power
corresponding to the number of the class interval. This polynomial is then
multiplied by the polynomial previously obtained for n cities (n : 1 the
• first time through the procedure). The coefficients in the product polynomial,
which is the generating function for the sumvariable, are the probabilities
for the costs in each class interval due to accidents at the n+l cities. This
result can be converted to a cumulative probability distribution, to provide
the risk profile for the n+l airports.
APPLICATION
The computer program which implemented this method is written so
that it can accept an essentially unlimited numberof input risk profiles.
Each is first converted to a probability distribution - density function -
prior to the convolution operation described above. The algorithm can also
repeat the convolution operation using each distribution more than once if
necessary; this is controlled by a set of inputs for each risk profile. The
program also provides the meanvalue and standard deviation after each
successive convolution is performed.
In order to prepare an estimate for the national risk that we would
expect to be on the high side, i.e. to bound the true value from above, we
first note that the nine airports that were treated individually account for
approximately 25 percent of all commercial air operations in the United
States. Our concept is to allow the nine airports for which the risk profiles
were available to represent all of the air Carrier operations in the U.S.
We, therefore, generated a risk profile from the convolution of these nine
airport risk profiles, with each airport's probability distribution convoluted
with itself four times. This is essentially equivalent to assuming that the
national risk is associated with 36 airports, of which 4 are identical to
PhiladelphiaInternational,4 to La Guardia,etc. Heretheword "like"means
withregardto graphitefiberrisk. The resultingnationalrisk profilesfor
the 1985and 1993basicscenariosare shownin Figure11.1.
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The convolutiondescribedabovedoesnot takeaccountof thediffer-
encesin risk thatmightbe relatedto sizeof airportand surrounding
industrialization.We, therefore,usedthe nineairport-urbancomplexcom-
binationsin a more structuredapproach.Withthe exclusionof Atlanta,
Philadelphia,and Miami,all of the airportsare characterizedas large,both
in numberof operationsand in adjacentpopulation.Eachis in a Standard
. MetropolitanStatisticalAreawithmore than2,000,000population.Eachhad
more than 150,000operationsin 1976. Thisgroup,becauseof the obvious
concentrationof risk,receivedmostof our attentionin the conductof the
individualairportriskassessments.In performingthe secondnationalrisk
convolutionseveralof the airportswere usedtwice(allexceptO'Hare/
Chicagoand Lambert/St.Louis)in orderto accountfor all operationsin this
numberof operations- populationgroup.
The remainingairportsrepresentdifferentpopulationconcentrations
and/ornumber-of-operationscategories.Atlantaand Miamiare bothbusyair-
ports,with morethan 150,000operationsa year but are adjacentto metro-
politanareaswith populationsonlybetweenone and two million. Philadelphia
is in a metropolitanareawith a populationgreaterthantwo millionbut has
lessthan150,000operationsayear. The probabilitydistributionsfor the
riskat thesethreeairportswere usedninetimesin orderto simulatethe
impacton the nationalriskof the remainderof the nationalair carrier
traffic. The resultingnumberof air carrieroperationsis equalto all
operationsnot previouslyaccountedfor by the busierairportsservinglarger
populationcenterstreatedin the precedingparagraph.Theseairportsare
thusproxiesfor Smallerairport-populationcentercombinations.The resulting
riskprofilesfor 1985and 1993are alsoshownin Figurell.l. The expected
annualfinancialimpactdue to graphitefiberincidentsassociatedwith air-
craftaccidentsin theUnitedStatesare tabulatedin Tablell.lfor the
differentcasesdescribedhere.
" For purposesof comparisonwith otherresultsin the riskassessment
fieldwe havesuperimposedthe ORI 1993nationalriskprofile(9 airports
convolutedfour times)on the resultspublishedby the U.S.NuclearRegulatory
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TABLE II.I
ESTIMATEDU.S. ANNUALIMPACTAIRCRAFT-
ACCIDENTRELATEDGRAPHITEFIBER INCIDENTS
CONVOLUTIONRESULTSUSINGNINEAIRPORTRISK PROFILES
TOACCOUNTFORALL U.S. AIR CARRIEROPERATIONS
CONVOLUTIONDESCRIPTION 1985 i 1993
Each airport convoluted Mean $ 3,499 i$ 38,541
four times Standard
deviation $ 32,423 $ 242,946
Numberof convolutions Mean- $ 2,556 $ 27,709
adjusted by airport-city Standard
size category deviation $ 26,070 $ 173,560
11-6
Commission2 (TheReactorSafetyStudy,sponsoredby the U.S.AtomicEnergy
Commission,performedunderthe independentdirectionof ProfessorNorman
C. Rasmussenof the MassachusettsInstituteof Technology)in Figurell.2.
The resultsindicatethatthe nationalgraphitefiberriskappearsto be
somewhatbelowthatwhichthe nuclearreactorsafetystudygroupestimated
for lO0 nuclearpowerplants,at leastoverthe damagerangeforwhichthe
resultsare plotted.Apparentlythe graphitefiberriskis somewhathigher
for lowervaluesof propertydamage,whichin the ORI caseis the sumof
businessdislocationand householdimpact. Amongthe approximationsmade by
theORI team,we notethatour 1993calculationswerecarriedout in 1976
dollars,using1976GrossDomesticProductdata. The use of constantdollars
is reasonablein orderto makeresultsinterpretablein the currenttime
frame. The GrossDomesticProductwas not adjustedin orderto facilitate
the 1985-1993comparisons.Oncewe considercomparisonswith otherinvesti-
gators,however,itwouldprobablybe desirableto adjusttheseinputsfor
the timeframeof interest.
STATISTICALCONFIDENCELIMITS
The calculationof statisticalconfidencelimitsfor the convoluted
probabi]itydistributions,giventhosefor the individualriskprofiles,is
by no meansa trivialproblem. In thissectionwe presenta briefderivation
of an approximateformfor the calculationwhichwe haveused. Itdependson
standardmethodsusedin similarproblems,as well as particularinsights
uniqueto the problemathand.
As in the derivationof theexpressionfor the convolution,first
assumethat the probabilitydistributionis a discretefunction.Thisdoes
notaffectthe generalityof the resultbut doessimplifythe notation;it
is equivalent o allowingthe dollarvalueof the annualimpactto takeon
onlydiscretevalues,ratherthanconsideringit a continuousvariable.The
probabilitythatthe sum of the costsat two citiesis equalto ra$ dollars
2 U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission,ReactorSafetyStudy: An Assessment
of AccidentRisksin U.S.CommercialNuclearPowerPlants,Wash-1400
(NUREG-75/O14)October1975. . "
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is givenby Equation(II.I)whichrepresentsthe resultof the convolution
of the probabilitydistributionsfor the two airports.Now invokeseveral
featuresof the problemat hand. The dominantfactorin the analysisof the
airportsreportedearlierin thisdocumentis thatthe probabilityof the
- costbeingzeroin anyyear is verylargecomparedto the probabilityassoci-
atedwith any othercost. Thisis due,as notedearlier,to the factthatan
aircraftaccidentaccompaniedby fire is a relativelyrareeventat anyone
airport.This can be expressedas:
ao >> ai for i>O
and
b0 >> bj for j>O.
As longas the numberof term_sin Equation(11.1)isfinite,the sum of terms
of the formanbk_n for n>O is smallcomparedto the sum of aobk and akbo"
This leadsto thefollowingapproximationfor Cr:
Cr _ aobr+ arb° (ll.2)
Sincethe cost probabilitiesat eachcityfill the entiresample
space:
ao = l - Z aii=l
and
= bj.bo l - j_l
Eachsum is equivalento theprobabilityof havingat leastone accidentin
a year at eachairport,typicallyof theorderof magnitudeof I/lO0. Taking
advantageof this fact,the estimateof the probabilitythatthe totalcost
at thetwo airportsis equalto rA$ dollarsmay thenbe written:
Cr : ar + br (ll.3)
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The risk profi'leshows the probabilitythat the cost equals or
exceeds a given value in a year. Define the probabilityof this event as:
Cr = P (S>ra$) = Ar + Br-
Definethe estimateof Cr by the symbolCr. In ChapterX it was shownthatA
the varianceof Ar and Br may be estimatedby:
^ ^ Rr)]var Ar = [Ar (l- / n
var Br = [Br (l-Br)]/ m
where n and m are the number of trials (replications) used to estimate Ar and
Br, respectively.Sincethe accidentsat two or moreairportsare assumedto
be independent events, that is, uncorrelated, we may write the variance of
A
Cr as:
A ^ ^
var Cr = var Ar + var Br
If M is definedas the smallerof n and m, then
A _ A A
var Cr _ (I/M)[Ar (l-Ar) + Br (l-Br)]
and introducing an approximation of the same order as previously employed,
A A
var Cr = (I/M) [Ar+ Br]
^ ^
var Cr _ Cr / M (ll.5)
Equation(ll.5)appliesto two airports.To extendthe resultto
themore generalcaseof n airportsconsiderthe expressionfor threeairports.
Let
D(s)= Edksk
be the generatingfunctionfor the sequence{dk}representingthe probabili'
tiesat the thirdairport,in exactanalogyto therelationspresentedearlier.
The convolutionoperationis associativeand commutative.The probability
11-10
thatthesum of the costsof accidentsat all threeairportsis equalto r
can be written:
er = doCr + dlCr_l + d2Cr_2 + ....dr_iCl + drCo
as in Equation(ll.l). Substitutingforthe c's fromEquation(ll.2)this
expressioncanbe written:
er = do (aobr + arbo) + dI (aobr_l + ar_ibo) + ....dr_l (aobI + albo) +
draobo
Introducingthe sameapproximationusedpreviouslyin derivingEquation(ll.3)
providesthe followingapproximateresults:
er = doaobr + doboar + aobodr
and
er = ar + br + dr (ll.6)
Equation(ll.6)implies,by induction,thatthe expression(ll.5)can
be Used to estimatethe statisticalconfidencelimitsfor the convolution
usedto generatethe nationalriskprofile. It is relativelyconservative
to assumefurtherthatthe distributionof estimatesaboutthe truepopulation
valuesof the probabilitiesare normallydistributed.It can thenbe stated
that95 percentof the valuesresultingfromthesimulationrunsliewithin
2C_/Mof the actualcomputedvalue,as shownin FigureIf.3for M = 50,000.±
Theseresultsare statisticalconfidencelimitsfordifferentvaluesof the
riskprobability,and are relatedonlyto the confidenceassociatedwith the
MonteCarlosamplingerrors. They do not reflectuncertaintyin the input
parametervalues;some insightintoinputerroreffectscanbe gainedby
examiningthe sensitivityanalysesreportedin ChapterX.
II-II
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APPENDIXA
COMPUTERPROGRAMDOCUMENTATION
(Bound Separately)
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APPENDIXB
BASELINEFACILITYDESCRIPTIONS
INTRODUCTION
This appendix summarizes the facility descriptions used as a base-
line for developing the penetration values, failure constants, and failure
models described in Sections VI and VII of this report.
Methods
Facility definitions for this study are based on the U.S. Census
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code numbers. These SIC codes pro-
vide a standardized basis for defining facilities in a manner that is directly
relatable to demographic areas for which Census data are readily available,
The types and configurations of equipments which most generally typify
a facility identified by a specific SIC number were obtained through a broad
literature search supported by a limited number of site visits, augmented by
discussions with representatives of various industries. The equipment types
and their specific components identified by the SIC number with each SIC
facility are then compared against the equipment types and designs contained
in failure threshold data from the Ballistics Research Laboratory (BRL).
Exposure threshold values which appear to best fit the situation areassigned.
Buildings and:enclosures are specifie d for typical facilities and
equipments; these were:compared with air conditioning,and ventilation standards
published in several handbooks. Not____eethat the actual building size is not
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particularlyimportantas long as design is in accordancewith standardprac-
tice, since the standardsare aimed at maintainingventilationconstant in
terms of air changesper hour regardlessof the buildingsize.
Facilitydescriptionswere obtainedfrom the sourceslisted in
•SectionVII. Air conditioningand ventilationstandardsand practiceswere °
obtainedfrom the Handbookof Air Conditionin9 System DesignI and the
StandardHandbookof MechanicalEngineers2.
Problemsand Assumptions
There are, of course,a wide range of facilities,in terms of size
and type, of interestto us in this risk assessmentinvestigation. There is
also a wide range of types of equipmentfrom facility to facility,and even
within facilitiesof the same type. In some instancesthere may be greater
differencesbetweenequipmentsand designswithin facilitiescharacterizedby
the same SIC code number than betweenthose with differentSIC code numbers.
For example, the circuits used for relay-typetelephoneswitchingare very
similar to those used for supervisorycontrolsin transportationand utilities,
and not at all similarto the electronicswitchingused in newer telephone
centraloffices.
The only approachconsideredpracticalin this study was to define as
"typical"facilitiesbelievedto best representthe facilitiesidentifiedby
each SIC code number during the time frame of interest,and to base penetra-
tion values and facilityfailurecomputationson these "typical"facilities.
A facilityis definedon the basis of those equipmentsor components
which appear to dominatethe facility'svulnerabilityto carbon fiber penetra-
tion and subsequentequipmentfailure. A modularapproachwas used, synthesiz-
ing facilitiesfrom a few generic types of equipmentfor which mean exposure-
to-failurevalues are reasonablywell established. The relationshipbetween
CarrierAir Conditioning6. Handbookof Air ConditioningSystemDesign,
McGraw-HillBookCo.,1965.
2 Baumeisterand Marks,StandardHandbookforMechanicalEngineers,McGraw-
HillBookCo.,1967. •
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facilitiesof interestand the equipmentsfor whichgenericfailuredataare
availableis veryloose. The publishedvaluefor theequipmentwhichmost
closelyrepresentsthe equipmentof interestwas used. Inmany instancesthe
equipment of interestis assumedequivalento a multipleof thegenericcom-
ponents(e.g.,a processcontrolstationmightbe assumedequivalent o lO of
the TTL-PCboardsforwhichtestdataare available,and wouldthenbe assumed
to be lO timesmore vulnerable).
The publishedfailureexposurevaluesare oftenbasedon fibertypes
and sizes,air flowrates,etc.,not representativeof conditionsexpectedin
thisanalysis. Carewas takento selectthemost appropriatevaluepossible.
Specificassumptionsare definedbelowas theyrelateto particularfacilities.
ELECTRICUTILITIES
Conventionalelectricutilitystationsare consideredin thisstudy.
Itwas agreedearlyin thisprojectthatNASALangleyResearchCenterwould
investigatethe potentialvulnerabilityof nuclearpowerstations. Electric
utilitiescan be describedin termsof the followingfunctions:
• Generation
• Transmission
• Distribution
Thesefunctionsare performedby the followingbasictypesof subsystems:
• Highvoltage
• Control
• Communications
Electricutilityfacilitiesconsistof a networkof generatingStations,
transmission(switching)stations,and distributionstations.Oftenthese
threefunctionsare combinedin a singlestation.
SystemConfigurations
FigureB.1 illustratesa typicalconfigurationof generators(circles),
circuitbreakers(boxes),transformersand buses,and transmissionlinesin a
powersystem. Secondarystationsare discussedunderindustries,hospitals,
etc. Generatorsare usuallyarrangedin the generator--stepup transformer--
breaker--highvoltagebus segmentmoduleas shownso thatloss of a single
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generatorunit doesnot resultin the lossof a multi-generatorstation• Breakers
are arrangedto control,protect,and isolateeachbus segment,each transmission
lineandeachmajortransformer,as indicated,
StationConfigurations
FigureB.2 illustratesa typicalutilitystationor substationconfi-
guration.Communicationsand commoncontrolequipmentare commonto all station
• functions.Highvoltagebus structuresand theirassociatedtransformersand
breakersare usuallylocatedoutsidethe stationbuilding•Eachbus section,
eachgenerator,etc. has its own associatedcontrolsin a sectionof the
switchgearpanelinsidethe stationbuilding(orin a specialenclosurewhen
locatedoutsidein a unittypeof substation).
The highvoltagesubsystemat eachstationconsistsof highvoltage
buses,breakers,transformers,and highvoltagetransmissionlinestogether
with theirassociatedisconnectswitches,fuses,insulatorsand bushings.
Insulatorsand bushingsare themost vulnerablequipmentfromthe standpoint
of carbonfibers,
Generators,as well as transformersand breakersand otherhigh
voltageequipmentsuchas rotaryconverters,arewellsealedand oftenpres-
surizedso thattheycan be neglectedas faras theirvulnerabilityto carbon
fibersis concerned.
Switch,earControls•Generatorsand breakersare controlledand
protectedby meansof switchgearconsistingof switches,electromagneticand
solid-staterelays,terminalboardsand associatedwiring• Most breaker
trippingcircuitsare 125 VoltsDC althoughsomestationsuse 250 VoltsDC.
Switchgearpanelsat generatingstationsmay alsocontainfieldexciters(e.g.,
thyratrons)operatingat 125,250,or 375VoltsDC. Specificswitchgearpanels
or panelsectionsare usuallyassignedto eachgenerator,each transmission
line,and eachbus and associatedtransformerso thatswitchgearfailures
tendto affectonly theirassociatedportionsof the station. Switchgearis
highlystandardizedso thatpanelsare quitesimilarwhetherfor use with
generators,transmissionlines,or busesandassociatedtransformers.
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FIGUREB.2. ILLUSTRATIONOF A UTILITYSTATIONCONFIGURATION
Commoncontrolsconsistof interfaceunitsusedto inputsupervisory
controlsto the switchgearpanelsand to monitoroutputsignalsfromthe
panelsto producealarmsetc, fortransmissionvia the communicationssystem.
Communicationsare usedfor remotecontrolof unmannedstations,to
obtainloadmanagementand to obtainbettersystemcoordinationin the event
of systemfaults. The communicationssubsystemis particularlyimportantin
• restoringa systemaftera majoroutage. Communicationssystemsmay use
oldertelephone(relay)typeor newersolid-statesupervisorycontrols.Newer
stationsmay havesolid-stateminicomputersforA/D conversion,interfacewith
stationcontrols,etc. TTL logicis typicallyused. Communicationlinksmay
be via telephonelines,microwave,or via carrieron HV transmissionlines.
FailureParameters
Themethodsusedto estimatemeanexposure-to-failurevaluesare
describedin thissection. Eachgeneratorunit,eachtransmissionline,and
eachbus segment/transformeris assumedto consistof a highvoltagemodule,
a switchgearpanel,and associatedcommunicationinterface.The communica-
tions/commoncontrolsubsystemis assumedto be associatedwith theentire
station. No attemptis madeto accountfor the lengthof exposedtransmission
or distributionlines.
e All highvoltagemodules(orbays)are assumedto be similar.
The vulnerabilityof eachhighvoltagemodule,includingtrans-
formerbushings,is assumedequalto the averagevaluesobtained
by BRLat 25 KV. Vulnerabilityis assumedconstantwith voltage
sincethe designfactorsof insulators,gaps,etc.,are intended
to compensatefor voltage:_ _ 1.6 x 10_ 3
e All switchgearpanelsare assumedtobe similar. The vulner-
abilityof eachswitchgearpanelis assumedequalto the generic
valuefor relayand controllogicfromBRL: E _ 7 x 105
• The vulnerabilityof eachcontrolinterfaceassumesuseof a
singleTTL pri.ntedIC board:E_ 7 x 108
• The stationcommunicationsystemis assumedto consistof a
processorequivalento the PDP-8(E_ l x IOT) togetherwith
3 All valuesare expressedin fiber-seconds/meter3 unlessotherwisenoted.
B-7
a microwavetransmitter-receiver(E _ 1 x IOT), for an overall
vulnerabilityE _ 5 x 106.
Buildingsand Enclosures
Typicalsubstationbuildingsare small sheet metal buildingswith
industrialtype doors and windowswith weatherstripping. They are typically
air conditionedwith window units to provide2 or 3 air changesper hour.
Switchgearpanels are housed in standardmetal switchgearpanels without
forced ventilation(see, for example,WestinghouseConstructionSpecifications
Cat. 55-000,57H Edition,1978-1979). Enclosuresfor common controlsand
communicationscan be neglectedbecausethey are alreadyaccountedfor in
failuretesting.
INDUSTRIALPLANTS
From the standpointof vulnerability,an industrialplant can be
defined in terms of:
e Processcontrols
e Power
e Communications (will not be critical in many types of
industries).
Although there is a large variety of types and sizes of industrial plants,
modularization of process controls has been developed to the degree that
similar equipment modules may be added together to handle nearly any kind
and size of application. In the paragraphs below, generalized configura-
tions and equipment modules are first described, followed by pertinent
detailed applications.
Typical Configuration (and Notes on its Application)
Figure B.3 shows a typical arrangement of power inputs, communica-
tions, central computer, controllers, and machine stations in a highly
automated industrial plant. This type of configuration is found in industrial
systems of all types ranging from steel mills to bakeries, printing plants,
and test facilities. Each of the major elements in this typical configuration
is discussedin turn here:
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Powerfor a largeindustrymay includea substationequivalent o a
majorutilitydistributionsubstationwith primaryvoltagein themajortrans-
mission(e.g.,230 KV) range. Smallerindustriesmay havea secondaryunit-
typesubstationwith primaryvoltagesin the 13.8KV to 34.5 KV range. Heavy
industriesmay requiresecondaryvoltagesas highas13.8KV. Typicalpro-
cess industriesrequiresecondaryvoltagesof 120V, 208V, and 480 V AC.
The outside(highvoltageportionof an industrialpowersubstation)
is treatedas partof the publicutilitysystemeventhoughit may be owned
by eitherthe utilityor by the industrialplant. The failureof thathigh
voltagepartof thepowersystemis includedin thefailurecalculationfor
the primarypowersystem(SIC49). Primarypowerentersthe largerindustrial
plantsthroughserviceswitchgearlocatedinsidethe plant.
ServiceSwitchgearincludesstep-downtransformers,enclosedbreakers,
contactors,relaysandmanualswitches.Serviceswitchgeareceivesthe pri-
mary powerand delivers120V,208 V, 408 V, and sometimes480 V and 600 V to
the plantor installation.
DistributionPanels. Forsmall,low energy-consumingindustries,
primarypowermay be receiveddirectlyat 120/240V and entersthe industry
througha distributionpanelconsistingof breaker-switchesand fusedfeeders.
AuxiliaryPower. Mostindustrialplantsare assumedtohave engine-
drivengeneratorsto providepowerin the eventof failureto theprimarypower.
Smalllightindustriesare assumedto haveno auxiliarypower.
CentralComputers.Theseare usedin highlyautomatedindustriesto
provideoverall(executive)controlof the process. Redundantcomputersand
keyboard/displayterminalsare oftenusedto minimizeoutagetime in theevent
of failures.
StationControllers.Minicomputersor microprocessorsare usedto
providelocalprocessingat eachmachinestation.Thesemay be used in con-
junctionwith a CentralComputeror may standalone.
InterfaceUnits. In 1975the IEEEadopteda standardmodulefor the
interfaceunitand stationcontrollercalledCAMAC. (IEEESpectrum,April1976).
Thesemodulesprovidea flexibleinterfacebetweennearlyany typeof industrial
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processand any typeof centralcomputer. Futuresystemscan be expectedto
have thistype of modularity.The CAMACinterfaceunitcan accommodatea
largevarietyof availableconnectors,buffers,clocks,registers,readers,
displays,etc.whilethe controllermodulecan accommodatenumerousmini-
computerssuchas the PDP-8. Examplesof plantsusingthisconceptare an
aluminumplantin which23 CAMACmodulescontrol45 preheatfurnaces,a
computerizedsteelslabcastingmill,and a GeneralMotorstestfacility.
• A typicalvariationon the aboveschemeis the use of a low-cost
programmablecontrollerat eachmachinestationwithouta centralcomputer.
Originallydevelopedfor controlof machinetoolsand assemblyoperations,
programmablecontrollersare currentlyin use in chemical,petrochemical,
foodprocessing,pharmaceutical,paper,and otherindustries.
ProcessingComponents.Thesemake heavyuseof solidstateTTL
but theseare beingreplacedwith CMOSbecauseof betternoiseimmunity
and lowerpowerrequirements.Programmablecontrollersand interfaceunits
oftenusemicroprocessorchlps.
MachineDrivesand Sensor/Encoders.Thesecannotbe easilytypified
sincetheyare designedto fit the particulartypeof machinestation.
Machinedriveswill includecomponentsuchas motorcontrols,servos,in-
jectors,solenoids,etc. Sensor/encoderswill includecomponents uchas
pressureor temperaturetransducers,motionencoders,etc.
Whenmachinestationsperformlowenergyprecisionoperationsfor
_aterialhandling,millingmachines,etc.,it is assumedthatmachinedrive
functionswill be performedby servosystems. Whenmachinestationsconsist
of heavydutymotors(asin rollingmills)it is assumedthatmachinedrive
functionswill requirehighvoltagemotorcontactorsand controls.High
voltageswitchgearis requiredfor this.
SmallIndustrialPlants
Smallindustrialplantsare characterizedby machinestationswith
smallor medium-dutymotorsand/orservounits. Thesefacilitiesare assumed
to haveno auxiliarypower,and no centralcomputeror displays.The SIC
codeslistedbeloware assumedto fallintothiscategoryeventhoughthese
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SIC codes are sometimescharacterizedby large highly automatedfacilities.
Specific plants (identifiedby SIC number)typicallyhave the following
characteristics:
• SIC 20 - Food processin9 plants are assumed to have machine
stationsconsistingof.stationcontrollers,interfaceunits,
and servos togetherwith small motors. Power enters through
serviceswitchgear.
• SIC 23 - Apparelplants are assumed to have machine stations
consistingof small motors run directlyfrom stationcontrollers.
Primarypower is assumed to be receivedat 115/230V and goes
directly into low voltagedistributionpanels without use of
serviceswitchgear.
e SIC 24 - Lumber and wood productsplants are assumed to have
machine stationsconsistingof medium duty motors and high
voltagecontrolswitches (used to drive saws, planers,and
shapers),without use of stationcontrollers. Power entrance is
throughserviceswitchgear.
• SIC 27 - Printin9 and publishingplants are assumedto have
machinestationsconsistingof small motors run directlyfrom
stationcontrollers.
• SIC 38 - InstrumentsPlantsare assumedto have machine stations
consistingof controllers,interfaceunits, and servos. Primary
power is assumed to be receiveddirectlyat 115/230V and to go
directly to power distributionpanelswithout use of service
switchgear.
Large Light Industries o
Large light industriesare similarto small light industriesexcept
that they are assumedto have auxiliarypower available. All are assumedto
receiveprimarypower throughserviceswitchgear. Machine stationsare as
follows:
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• SIC 22 - Textilemill productsplantsare assumedto havework
stationsconsistingof stationcontrollers,interfaceunits,
and servounits,togetherwith smallmotorswhichare neglected
for failurecalculationpurposes.
• SIC25 - Furnitureplantsare assumedto haveworkstations
consistingof highvoltagecontrollersand motorsdriving
dimensionsaws,planers,shapers/routers,and sanders,without
the use of stationcontrollers(non-automatic).
• SIC 34 - Fabricatedmetalplantsare assumedto havework stations
with linecontrollers,highvoltagemotorcontrolandmotors
drivingmachinetools,presses,etc.
e SIC 35 - Machineryplantsare assumedto havework stations
similarto thoseof SIC 34.
e SIC 36 - Electricand electroniceQuipment'plantsare assumedto
havework stationsconsistingof linecontrollers,interface
unitsand servostogetherwith smallmotors.
HeavilyAutomatedIndustriesare assumedalwaysto receiveprimarypowerthrough
serviceswitchgearand to havecentralcomputerstogetherwith keyboard/displays
exercisingexecutivecontrolover all lines. Machinestationsare as follows:
e SIC 26 - Paperand alliedproductsplantsare assumedto havework
stationsconsistingof a stationcontroller,highvoltagemotor
controlsand heavydutymotors.
• SIC 28 - Chemicalsand alliedproductsfactoriesare assumedto
havework stationsdominatedby servosystems(consistingof
stationcontroller,interfaceunit,and servocircuits).
• SIC 29 - Petroleumand Coalproductplantsare assumedto be
similarto thoseof SIC 28.
• SIC 30 - Rubberand plasticproductplantsare assumedto be
similarto thoseof SIC 28.
_• SIC 33 - Primarymetalproductsare assumedto haveworkstations
dominatedby highvoltagemotor/control(consistingof station
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controller,motorcontrol,and heavydutymotors),driving
rollingmills,etc.
e SIC 37 - Transportationequipmentfactoriesare assumedto have
work stationssimilarto SIC 28. (Highlyautomatedmilling
machines,etc.)
FailureParameters
Meanexposure-to-failurevalues(fiber-seconds/meter3) for the equip-
ment identifiedin this sectionare:
• Powerserviceswitchgear,basedon genericvalues
for relayand controllogic: E = 7 x 105
• Powerdistributioncircuits,basedon genericAC powerdistri-
butionvalues:E =I.5x 106
• Auxiliarypower,basedon 220-440V engine-generatortests:
= 2.2 x 106
• Centralcomputers,basedon LSI-11averageover various
tests: E = 5 x 10s
• Keyboard/displays.,based.onTTL and CMOSoscilloscope:
= 4.5 x 105
• Station controllers, based on PDP-8minicomputer tests:
= 1 x 10T
e Interface units, based on use of power supply modules_ which
is probably the worst case: E: 1.4 x 10T
e ServoUnits,basedon genericservomotorcircuits(including
enclosure):E = l x 10s
• High-Voltagemotorcontrol,assumedto be dominatedby H.V.
powersupply:E = 1.4x 10T
• Motorsare assumedto havenegligiblevulnerabilityto carbon
fibers: E = Infinity
Used when H.V. is requiredfor X-ray measurements,etc.
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Buildingsand Enclosures ....
Industriesare assumedto be in factory,typebuildingswithweather-
strippeddoorsand windows. Smalllightindustriesare assumedto be located
in medium-sizedequipmentbuildingsventilatedto provide3 or 4 air changes
per hour. Largeindustriesare assumedto be locatedin largefactorybuild-
" ings,with l or 2 air changesper hour. Centralcomputersare assumedto
be locatedin a separateequipmentroom insidethe factorybuilding(butwith
an exteriorwall). Serviceswitchgearis locatedin standardmetalclad
enclosureswithoutforcedair. Highvoltagecontrolsand interfacepower
suppliesare assumedto be locatedinstandardmetalcladswitchgearcabinets
with forcedair cooling. Enclosuresforall otherequipmentare accountedfor
in the failurethresholdvalues. Powerand auxiliarypowerare assumedto be
locatedin unfilteredutilityrooms.
BUSINESSSERVICES
TypicalConfigurations
SystemArchitecturefor businessservicefacilitiesis verysimilar
to thatfoundin industrialprocesscontrols.Likeindustrialprocesscon-
trols,businessservicesystemsare foundin a varietyof sizesand config-
urations,althoughtheyare builtup fromthe samegeneraltypesof modules.
Typicalretailor bankingsystemsconsistof a smallcomputer,with
or withoutexternalstorage,interconnectedthroughdatainterfaceunits
(suchas multiplexers)to distributedkeyboard/displaystations.
Typicaldataprocessingcenterscompriseone or more largecomputers
withexternalcorestorageand program/controlconsolestogetherwith peri-
pheralunitssuchas disks,tapes,lineprinters,and card readers.The
centralcomputersare oftenconnectedthroughinput/outputprocessorsto
remoteminicomputersand keyboard/displays,to teletypelines,and sometimes
to microwavedatalinks. Dataprocessingfunctionsare sometimesdistributed
to severalminicomputers,for example,usinga minicomputertogetherwith a
keyboard/displayconsoleat datainputstations.With thisarrangement,
a computerfailurewill affectonlya portionof thedata system.
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Power for data processing systems is usually directly from the building
distribution circuits. A batteryoperated inverter is often used to provide
uninterrupted power during power outages of less than about 8 hours. _ Large
central computer facilities will usually have auxiliary power; however, local
systems in banks, brokerages, insurance offices, may not have auxiliary power.
Failure Parameters
Meanexposure-to-failure value thresholds are estimated to be:
e Converters, based on discrete PCrotary inverter: E = 1 x 106
• Central Computer,based on LSI-II test data: E: 5 x IOs
• Keyboard/Display, based on TTL + CMOSscope: E= 4.5 x IOs
• Processor, based on PDP-8tests: E = 1 x IOT
• I/0 Interface, based on use of TTL PC boards: E= 1 x IOT
e Communications, based on RF trans/receiver test data:
: 1 x IOT per channel.
Buildings and Enclosures
All computing equipment is assumed to be housed in an equipment room
with one exterior wall. Power and auxiliary power equipment are assumed to be
located in air conditioned and filtered utility rooms.
AIR TRANSPORTATION
Air traffic control systems are of prime interest to this study and
are used to represent the failure Probability of air transportation.
Air traffic controls are divided into:
e Enroute controls
e Terminal/airport controls.
R
Enroute controls consist of enroute centers (ARTCC's) at Albuquerque, Anchorage,
Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Denver, Fort Worth, Great Falls, Houston,
Indianapolis, Jacksonville, Kansas City, Los Angeles, Memphis, Miami, Minne-
apolis, New York, Oakland, Salt Lake City, Seattle, and Washington, D.C.
(Leesburg, Va.). Each enroute center is divided into about 15-20 sectors.
The ARTCChas a central computer with redundant backup. Each sector has a
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radarconsole/displayand a dataterminal.The ARTCC'sare suppliedwith
radardatafrom 97 longrange(200mile)L-bandradarsdistributedso as
to coverthe continentalU.S. (actuallocationsand ARTCCassignmentsare
listedin theATS FactBook). Radar-ARTCCdatais via C-bandmicrowave
links. VHF and UHF voicecommunicationscoverageis via about450 remote
- transmitter/receiverstations(RCAGS)connectedto ARTCC'sby telephonevoice
lines. (ActuallocationsandARTCCassignmentsare listedin theATS Fact
" Book).
EnrouteNav-aidincludesaboutlO00VOR stationsand 850 RF beacons
(lowand mediumfrequency)distributedalongthe airways(actuallocations
shownon aeronauticalcharts). Thereare alsoabout320 flightservice
stationswith about600 remotecommunicationssitesand 170 direction
findingfacilities(locationsare shownin theATS FactBook). Thereare
about500 airportswith towers,about200of thesehavingradarapproach
controlfacilities(includingabout25militaryfacilities).Thereare
about580 InstrumentLandingSystems(ILS).
A typicalairportapproachcontrolis dividedinto4 or 5 sectors
to covervariousfeeders,finalapproaches,and departures.Eachsector
has radarconsole/displayanda dataterminallocatedin separateRAPCON
roomand connectedto the terminalcontrol(e.g.,ARTS-Ill)computer
locatedinthe towerequipmentroom. Sectorpositionsare oftencombined
duringlighttrafficperiods. Radardata is providedby an airport
surveillanceradar(ASR)whichoperatesat S-bandand is locatedat the
airport. Air-groundcommunicationsis viaVHF and UHFwith transmitters
locatedin remotevanson theairportand with receiversin the tower
equipmentroom.
The towerroomhas severalcommunicationsconsoles,eachof which
can handleseveralVHF and UHF frequencies.A highdegreeof redundancyis
availablein the eventof a failureto a singleconsole. Majorrunways
haveILSlocalizer(VHF)and glideslope(UHF)locatedin vansnearthe
associatedrunways. Someof the VOR facilitiesmentionedunderenroute
Nav-aidare locatedat majorairports.
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Other ATC facilities of possible interest at airports include the
approach light controls which are currently electro-magnetic.
Typical ATC Configurations
Figure B.4 shows a simplified reliability diagram for terminal ATC.
o
Powe______[r.The terminal building, as well as each facility, such as ILS,
has a commercial power source, and each is backed up by an auxiliary engine- .
generator set. The airport terminal building typically will receive a distrib-
ution voltage (e.g., 13.8 KV) from the power company through disconnect
switches to a transformer, where it is stepped down to 120/208/408 V and distrib-
uted through a switchgear cabinet. The 480 V is distributed to various remote
sites where an enclosed self-contained transformer/breaker/controls unit steps
this down to voltage required at that site. Automatic transfer switches and
automatic engine start are used to restore power during an outage at each site.
Computers. Althoughno redundancy is shown in Figure B.4, there are
various functional redundancies and several levels of degraded modes designed
into the computing systems.
Communications. The air-ground transmitters and receivers and voice
consoles in the tower and RAPCONwere mentioned previously under enroute
and terminal controls. There is also vital voice and data communications
between the tower and RAPCONand also between the airport and its associated
ARTCC. Voice and data communication interfaces are through coordination
consoles, switches, and numerous terminal boards in the equipment room.
Communications consoles, transmitters, and receivers all have dual redundancy
with cross-strapping capability.
Radar. Radar transmitters and receivers have dual redundancy and
can be cross-strapped. There is at least dual redundancy with PPI displays
with additional displays available during sector sharing operations.
ILS has redundant glide-slope transmitters and redundant localizers.
VORTAChas redundant DMEtransporters and VORtransmitters.
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and terminal controls. There is also vital voice and data communications
between the tower and RAPC0Nand also between the airport and its associated
ARTCC. Voice and data communication interfaces are through coordination
consoles, switches, and numerous terminal boards in the equipment room. Com-
munications consoles, transmitters, and receivers all have dual redundancy
with cross-strapping capability.
Radar. Radar transmitters and receivers have dual redundancy and
can be cross-strapped. There is at least dual redundancy with PPI displays
with additional displays available during sector sharing operations.
ILShas redundant glide-slope transmitters and redundant localizers.
VORTAC_hasredundant glide-slope transmitters and redundant localizers.
Failure Parameters
Mean exposure-to-failure values are estimated to be:
• Service Switchgear (listedpreviously): _= 7 x 10s
m Auxiliary Power (listed previously): _ = 2.2 x 10G
• Central computer (listed previously): E= 5 x 10s
m Keyboard/Displays(listed previously): _= 4.5 x 10s
• Transmitters/receivers (listed previously): _= 1 x I0 _
m Radar transmitter (no filter), based on
test data: _= 3 x 106
m Radar receiver (no filter), based on
test data _ = 1 x 106
• ILS (no filter), based on ASR-3 receiver tests: E = 1 x 106
• V0R (no filter), based on ASR-3 receiver tests: E= 1 x 106
e Communications consoles, based on relay and
control circuits: _: 7 x 105
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FailureParameters
Mean exposure-to-failurevalues are estimatedto be:
• serviceSwitch,ear(listedpreviously):- • E = 7 x 10s.
• AuxiliaryPower (listedpreviously): E = 2.2 x lO6
a
• Centralcomputer (listedpreviously): E = 5 x 10s
" • Keyboard/Displaxs (listed previously): _= 4.5 x 105
• Transmitters/receivers(listedpreviously): _: 1 x 107
• Radar transmitter(no filter),based on
test data: _ = 3 x 106
• Radar receiver (no filter),based on
test data _= l x 106
• ILS (no filter),based on ASR-3 receivertests: E = l x 106
m V0R (no filter),based on ASR-3 receivertests:E= l x 106
m Communicationsconsoles,based on relay and
controlcircuits: E= 7 x 105
Buildingsand Enclosures
The terminal power equipmentis assumedto be in an unfilteredutility
room. Computers,keyboard/displays,PPI scopes,and communicationsconsoles
as well as communicationsreceiversare assumedto be locatedin an equipment
room with one exteriorwall. Communicationstransmitters,radar transmitters
and receivers,ILS, VOR, and all site locatedauxiliarypower are assumedto be
locatedin equipmentvans.
HEALTH SERVICES
Hospitalscan be describedin terms of the followingfunctions
t
or systems:
• Life support
m Power
• Communications.
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Typical Configurations
Hospitalconfigurationscan be synthesizedfrom one or more operating
rooms, recoveryrooms, and intensivecare areas where life support equipment
might be used, togetherwith primaryand auxiliarypower facilitiesand
emergencycommunicationsfacilities. The followingequipmentsare assumed o
on the basis of that found at a typicalsuburbanor small city hospital:
• Each operatingroom contains5-I0 medicaldevices (monitors,
defibrillators,etc., similar in constructionto GE Series 3000
equipments).
• Each nurse's stationhas a console/displayand small
processor.
• Power includesa coordinatedsecondarysubstationtogether
with an auxiliarymotor-generatorset.
• Emergencycommunicationincludesa telephoneterminaland
PBX and a radio transmitter/receivertied into the municipai
emergencycommunicationsnetwork (VHF or UHF).
Power. The coordinatedsecondarysubstationincludesa 13.8 KV primary
fused disconnectswitch, 13.8 KV to 480/208/120Volt transformerand 480/208/120
Volt distributionswitchgearpanels. Auxiliarypower is via a 480/208/120Volt
engine-generatorwith its own control panel.
Life Supportequipmenttypicallyuse TTL and CMOS IC boards for pro-
cessors togetherwith solid state displays. Those devicesvital to life sup-
port are sealed for safe use in an oxygen-richenvironment.
FailureParameters
The followingexposure-to-failurevalues are estimated:
• Serviceswitchgear(listedpreviously): _: 7 x IOs
• Auxiliarypower (listedpreviously): E = 2.2 x lO6
• Processors,based on lO TTL IC boards: E= l x lO7
• Medicalmonitors,based on TTL + CMOS
scopes: E = 4.5 x IOs
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Buildingsand Enclosures
Serviceswitchgearand auxiliarypower units are assumedto be located
in an unfilteredutility room. All other equipmentis assumedto be locatedin
double-filteredoperatingrooms or intensivecare areas.
- TELEPHONECENTRALOFFICE
Telephonecentralofficescan be describedin terms of the following
functions:
• Switching
m Control
m Communications/interface.
Centraloffice equipmentranges from all-relayto all-electronicusing one or
more combinationsof: strowagerswitchesin old stations,crossbar switches,
reed relays,discreetsemiconductors,minicomputers,and microprocessors.
Crossbarsystemsare now the most prevalentwith a trend toward
replacementby electronicswitching. Currentstate-of-artis representedby
the No. 4 ESS which can handleabout 550,000long distance calls per hour and
has a capacityof I07,000terminations. ESS systemsuse ferritecore memories,
integratedcircuitsfor logic and switching,TDM switching;etc. Recently
developedsystemsare replacingthe conventional24 V and 48 V switchingwith
140 Volt D.C. (IEEE Spectrum,Feb. 1976).
StationConfiguration
Figure B.5 shows a greatlysimplifiedschematicdiagramof a No. 5
crossbaroffice. Such an office might consistof lO,O00 or more line pairs
terminatingon a line frame. Crossbarswitches interconnectthese lines to
junctorsat the rate of !junctor for every 5 lines (i.e.,20% of all lines
can be servedat one time). Other crossbar switchesthen connectthe junctors
to trunk lines terminatingon a trunk frame. Trunks includeoperatortrunks,
. outgoingand incomingtrunks to other CentralOffices,and intra-officetrunks
to other subscribersin the same office. The crossbarswitchesalso connect
their respectivelines andtrunks throughtime-sharedconnectorsto time-shared
markersand time-sharedregistersand senders. Markers (about 7 per lO,O00
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FIGUREB.5. SIMPLIFIEDSCHEMATICOF CROSS-BARTELEPHONESWITCHING
Source: Control SystemEnglneering, Goodeand Machol, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1957.
lines)controlall selectionand switchingthroughthe time-sharedconnectors.
Registersand sendersprovidedialing,ringing,and call terminationfunctions.
simplifiedreliabilitymodelcan be definedby assumingthatmarker
and registercircuitsare time-sharedby a numberof linesand thatlinesare
servedby a numberof parallelcrossbarmodules(e.g.,one lO x 10 Crossbar
moduleservinglO0 lines). Failureeffectsmay be approximatelydefinedas:
" • Failureof crossbarswitchesmightput lO linesor lO
trunksand/orlO junctorsout of service.
e Failureof a markeror its associatedconnectorswould
causeabouta 15% reductionin capacity(calls/hour).
A markeris usedaboutI/2 sec.for eachcall.
e Registersare usedfor about12 secondsper call If
markerswere continuallybusyat a rateof aboutl second
per call itwouldtake 12 registers/markers.Lossof one
registerwouldreducecapacityby about2%.
An evensimplerassumptionis thatall telephoneservicecan be de-
finedby a largenumberof parallelmodules,eachconsistingof markers+
registers# switchmodulesin series.
FailureParameters
Meanexposure-to-failurevaluesare estimatedas follows:
e ServiceSwitchgear(listedpreviously): E = 7 x 10s
e Auxiliarypower(listedpreviously): _ = 2.2 x lO6
• Markercircuits,basedon discretesolid
statecircuitdata: E_ = l x IOT
• Registercircuits,basedon discretesolid
statecircuitdata:• E= l x IOT
e Crossbarswitches,basedon relayand control
circuitresults: _ = 7 x 10s
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Buildings and Enclosures
All equipment, including power equipment, is assumed to be in an
equipment room located within a building, and having one exterior wall (see
category 4 type enclosure in Table 6.1). Markers and registers are assumed
to be in a louvered equipment cabinet without forced air circulation (see °
Type 9b in Table 6.1).
RADIOSTATIONS
Radio stations of interest include Commercial AMand FMstations
as well as municipal/emergency communications.
Municipal/emergency communications include police and fire communi-
cations in the 25-50 MHz, 148-162 MHzand 450-470 MHz bands. A typical system
will include a central office connected to police stations, fire stations,
and hospitals via microwave and telephone links, and to mobile units via radio.
Remote radio transmitters are often used to obtain sufficient coverage.
Typical Configurations
Commercial and municipal radio communications systems typically con-
sist of a central office (dispatcher's office, broadcast house) connected to
remote transmitter sites via RF microwave links.
A typical central office will include consoles and displays, a com-
puter, a communications controller to interface the computer and consoles
to RF and telephone communication links, telephone terminal equipment, and
RF transmitter-receiver units. The system is often arranged so that the
communications controller will still interconnect the console/display
stations to the communication links if the computer fails.
Remote transmitter sites typically consist of dual RF microwave
receivers, dual modulators, dual transmitter power supplies, and dual
transmitters together with local/remote control cabinets and consoles and
remote monitoring via return RF microwave. Auxiliary engine generators
provide backup power. Manual and automatic switching of redundant units
and automatic start-up and power transfer are used to provide very high
transmission reliability. ,
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FailureParameters
Mean exposure-to-failurevaluesare estimatedas follows:
• ServiceSwitchgear(listedpreviously):• _ = 7 x IOs
• AuxiliaryPower(listedpreviously): _ = 2.2 x lO6
• • Console/displays(listedpreviously): E = 4.5 x IOs
- • CommunicationsController,PDP-8: E = l x lO7
• CentralComputer,LSI,ll: _ = 5 x IOs
• RF transmitters/receivers(listed
previously): _ = l x lOT(perunit)
• Powersupply,basedon dataon high
Voltagepowersupplies: E = 1.4 x IOs
Buildingsand Enclosures
The radiostationvisitedduringthisprojecthad all equipment
locatedin an air conditionedand filteredbuildingwith all transmitting
unitsadditionallyair cooledand filteredby a centralair conditioning
system.
MUNICIPALWATERPLANTS
Watertreatmentplantsincludebothwatersupplyand sewagetreat-
ment plants. Theseplantsconsistof motordrivenpumpsand valves,motor
controls,powersupply,and supervisorycontrolsin caseof remotely
operatedstations.Modularconstructionis usuallyusedand companies
suchas GE, Westinghouse,and SquareD providemoduleswhichare applicable
to smallutilitystations,pipelines,and variousprocesscontrolsaswell
as forwatertreatmentplants.
, StationConfigurations
. WestinghouseCatalo9 55-000showsthe applicationsof the
WestinghouseElectro-Centroto a typicalwatertreatmentplant. Motor
drivenpumpsfor 600 V, 2300V, or 5000V, 30 AC wound-rotormotorsare used.
Eachmotorhas an associatedhighvoltageswitchgearcabinet,h!ghvoltage_l _
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motor starter, high voltagemanual switch,low voltagepanelboardor
switchboard,dry type distributiontransformer,and stationbatteries.
When connectedto a primaryline voltageof less than 34.5 KV, the
distributiontransformercan be connecteddirectlytothe utilitysupply
through fused disconnects. Otherwisea second transformerand oil type °
breakerare usuallyrequired.
FailureParameters
Mean exposure-to-failurevalues are estimatedas follows:
• ServiceSwitchgear(listedpreviously): T = 7 x lO5
• AuxiliaryPower (listedpreviously): T = 2.2 x lO6
• High voltagecontrols (listedpreviously): E = 1.4 x IOs
e High voltagemotors: vulnerabilityassumednegligible.
RAIL/RAPIDTRANSITSYSTEMS
From the standpointof vulnerability,the rail/transitsystemscan
be describedin terms of:
• Motive Power
• Control/communications
e Power supply.
Motive Power for both railways and rapid transit is provided by
electric motors in the 600-750 volt DC range. These motors are open and
air cooled without filters. Control panels with Contactors, braking
switches, and terminal boards are located in compartments with louvers
without air filters.
Control/Communications for both railroad systems and rapid transit
systems are composed of control centers, field circuits, and communication
links which connect the field circuits to the control centers. Control
centers for rapid transit and for railroad centralized traffic control,
control of interlockings, and yard controls are similar. Older office
facilities consist of telephone type relay control panels with panel-
mounted push buttons, switches, and indicator lights. New office facili-
ties consist of computers plus keyboards with solid-state CRTdisplays and
solid-state logic.
B-28
Communicationlinksin oldersystemsuse telephonetyperelayllne
codingunitsto transmitand receivelow ratePCM for controlsand indica-
tionsover linewires. In new systemstheserelayunitshavebeen
replacedby higherdata ratesolid-statemodulatorsand demodulators
(communicationterminals).
PowerSupplyfor control/communicationstypicallyconsistsof small
. substationsto transformcommercialpower(e.g.,13.8KV) to a systemdistrib-
utionvoltage(e.g.,550 Volts). Thisdistributionvoltageis transformed
to llO V AC and rectifiedto requiredDC controlvoltagesat eachstation
and remotesite. Twenty-fourhourstandbybatteriesare usedat each station
and remotesite. PropulsionrequiressubstationseverylO to 20 milesfor
railroadsand everyl to 2 milesfor rapidtransit. Auxiliarypropulsion
poweris not provided;however,systemsare oftensectionalizedso that
powercanbe fed frommore thanone substation.Failureof a single
substationthenresultsin degradedoperation(e.g.,more spacingbetween
trains)ratherthana totalsystemoutage.
Fieldciruitsfor newerrapidtransitsystemsconsistof discrete
solid-statelogicand relaycircuitslocatedat stationsand on-boardtrains
to enforcetrainprotectionand to improvetrainoperation.Train-to-
stationcommunicationis typicallyvia audiofrequencytrackcircuits.
SystemConfigurationsforWashingtonMETROand forSan Francisco
BARTare describedbrieflybelow. Theserepresent he currentstate-of-
art in rapidtransi_controls.
WashingtonMETROconsistsof:
• A controlcenterwith a normaland back-upSigma-5
Computerand solid-statekeyboard/displayconsoles
assignedby route-segments.Solid-statevoice-band
" digitaltransmitter/receiversconnectthe central
officeto stationsviacable.
• Stationscontaindiscretesolid-stateandrelaylogic
circuitsfor automatictraincontrol,voice-bandtrans-
mitters/receiversfor cablecommunicationswith;the
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centraloffice,and audiofrequencyFSK encodersand
decodersconnectedto eachindividualtrackcircuit.
• Trainscontaindiscretesolid-stateand relaylogic
circuitstogetherwith tachometergeneratorsfor auto-
matictraincontroland audiofrequencyFSK encoders
and decodersinductivelycoupledto the track.
San FranciscoBARTconsistsof:
• A controlcenterwith normaland back-upPRODAC-250
computersand solid-stateconsolesforprogramming,
traincontrol,electrificationcontrol,and support
facilitiescontrol. Communicationto stationsis via
45, 1200bps digitaltransmissionlines. The control
centeralsocontainsan HP minicomputersystemfor
sequentialoccupancyreleaseof tracksectionsto cor-
rectproblemswith trackcircuits.
• Stationscontaindiscretesolid-stateand relaylogic
circuitsforautomatictraincontrol;an addedoscil-
latorand transposedcablesystemare includedto pro-
videprecisetrainlocationand speedinformationat
stations.Trackcircuitsuse timedivisionmultiplexing
of audiofrequencyFSK so thatseveraltrackcircuits
use a singlechannel.
e Trainscontaindiscretesolid-stateand relaylogicto-
getherwith tachometergeneratorsfor automatictrain
controlwith audiofrequencyFSK encodersanddecoders
inductivelycoupledto the track. An additionalreceiver
and controlsystemare includedforprecisionstopping
at a station.
B-30
FailureParameters
Mean exposure-to-failurevaluesare estimatedas followsfor the
differentequipmentgroupsdefinedhere:
d
ControlCenters
• Centralcomputer _ _ 5 x 10s each (LSI-ll)Q
• Consoles/displays E _ 4.5 x 105 each (TTL+ CMOS)
• Communicationsterminals _ _ 1 x 10T/line (line drivers, amplifiers)
• Power - switchgear E _ 7 x 10s (relay & control logic)
• Power- aux.MG Set E _ 2.2x 106
Stationsor remoteSites(aboutl per mile)
• Controlcircuits _l x 10T/station(discrete)
• Communicationsterminals _ _ 1 x 10T/station (line drivers, amps)
• (I0) track circuits _ _ 1 x 107/station (TTL PC}
_ 06e Primary power E = 1.5 x 1 (AC power distribution)
e Auxiliary power E _ 1 x 108 (battery/terminals)
Propulsion substation (similar to industrial power)
m High voltage power _ _ 1.6 x 10T per station
• Low voltagepower _ _ 7 x 10sper station
Trains/motivepower(perunit)
m Controlsystem E _ l x 10T (discretecircuits)
m Motorcontrols _ _ 7 x 10s (relay& controllogic)
o HV. propulsionmotors neglected.
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HOUSEHOLDS
A typicalhouseholdis assumedto includea colorTV set;a stereo
Hi Fi system;4 or 5 largerapplicancesuchas •freezers,refrigerators,
washers,dryers,and hotplates.Smallappliancesconsistingonlyof llO V
motors(suchas sewingmachines,mixers,etc.)are assumedtohave °
negligiblevulnerability.The vulnerabilityof largeapplianceswill 9
residein theelectronicontrolswhichare prevalentin the current•
state-of-art.
FailureParameters
Meanexposure-to-failurevaluethresholdsareas follows:
• ColorTV _ _ 1.7 x IOT
• Stereoamp E _ 6.6 x IOs
• Largeappliance E_l x IOT each (discretelectronics)
e Ranges/toasters/hotplatesE _ ? each.
OFFICEBUILDINGS
A typicalofficebuildinghas a smallpowersubstation,a telephone
PBX,intercomequipment,and officemachineryincludingelectrictype-
writersand reproductionfacilities.One or more smallcomputersmay also
be used in the building.A typicalofficebuildinghas 3 or 4 elevators.
FailureParameters
Meanexposure-to-failurevaluesare estimatedto be:
• High voltagepower _ _ 1.6 x IOT per building
• Lowvoltageswitchgear E _ 7 x IOs per building
e TelephonePBX _ _ ?
• Electrictypewriters _ _ ?
• Reproductionfacilities _ ?
• Elevators _ _ 7 x IOs each (relay& central ,
logic)
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Rail/Transit Systems
Fromthe standpoint of vulnerability, the rail/transit systems can
be describedin termsof: . ,_ , "
e MotivePower
• Control/communications
. • Power supply.
Motive Power for both railways and rapidtransit use electric
motors in the 600-750 volt DCrange. Thesemotors are openand air cooled
without filters. Control panels with contactors, braking switches, and
terminal boards are located in compartmentswith louver without air filters.
Control Communicationsfor both railroad systems and rapid transit
systems are composedof control centers, field circuits, and communication
links which connect the field circuits to the control centers. Control cen-
ters for rapid transit and for railroad centralized traffic control, control
of interlockings, and yard controls are similar. Older office facilities
consist of telephone type relay control panels with panel-mounted push
buttons, switches, and indicator lights. Newoffice facilities consist of
computers plus keyboards with solid-state CRTdisplays and solid'state
logic.
Communication links in older systems use telephone type relay line
coding units to transmit and receive low rate PCMfor controls and indica-
tions over line wires. In new systems these relay units have been replaced
by higher data rate solid-state modulators and demodulators (communi-
cation terminals).
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